The	
  Euro-­‐Summit	
  ‘Agreement’	
  annotated	
  by	
  Yanis	
  
Varoufakis	
  
	
  

	
  
Euro	
  Summit	
  	
  
Brussels,	
  12	
  July	
  2015	
  SN	
  4070/15	
  	
  
EUROSUMMIT	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
Subject:	
  	
  
Euro	
  Summit	
  Statement	
  Brussels,	
  12	
  July	
  2015	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  stresses	
  the	
  crucial	
  need	
  to	
  rebuild	
  trust	
  with	
  the	
  Greek	
  
authorities	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Greek	
  government	
  must	
  introduce	
  new	
  stringent	
  austerity	
  
directed	
  at	
  the	
  weakest	
  Greeks	
  that	
  have	
  already	
  suffered	
  grossly]	
  as	
  a	
  pre-­‐	
  
requisite	
  for	
  a	
  possible	
  future	
  agreement	
  on	
  a	
  new	
  ESM	
  programme	
  [i.e.	
  for	
  a	
  
new	
  extend-­‐and-­‐pretend	
  loan].	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  this	
  context,	
  the	
  ownership	
  by	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  is	
  key	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Syriza	
  
government	
  must	
  sign	
  a	
  declaration	
  of	
  having	
  defected	
  to	
  the	
  troika’s	
  ‘logic’],	
  and	
  
successful	
  implementation	
  should	
  follow	
  policy	
  commitments.	
  	
  
A	
  euro	
  area	
  Member	
  State	
  requesting	
  financial	
  assistance	
  from	
  the	
  ESM	
  is	
  
expected	
  to	
  address,	
  wherever	
  possible,	
  a	
  similar	
  request	
  to	
  the	
  IMF	
  	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  
precondition	
  for	
  the	
  Eurogroup	
  to	
  agree	
  on	
  a	
  new	
  ESM	
  programme.	
  Therefore	
  
Greece	
  will	
  request	
  continued	
  IMF	
  support	
  (monitoring	
  and	
  financing)	
  from	
  
March	
  2016	
  [i.e.	
  Berlin	
  continues	
  to	
  believe	
  that	
  the	
  Commission	
  cannot	
  be	
  
trusted	
  to	
  ‘police’	
  Europe’s	
  own	
  ‘bailout’	
  programs].	
  
	
  
Given	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  rebuild	
  trust	
  with	
  Greece,	
  the	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  welcomes	
  the	
  
commitments	
  of	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  to	
  legislate	
  without	
  delay	
  a	
  first	
  set	
  of	
  
measures	
  [i.e.	
  Greece	
  must	
  subject	
  itself	
  to	
  fiscal	
  waterboarding,	
  even	
  before	
  any	
  
financing	
  is	
  offered].	
  These	
  measures,	
  taken	
  in	
  full	
  prior	
  agreement	
  with	
  the	
  
Institutions,	
  will	
  include:	
  	
  
	
  
By	
  15	
  July	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  the	
  streamlining	
  of	
  the	
  VAT	
  system	
  [i.e.	
  making	
  it	
  more	
  regressive,	
  through	
  rate	
  
rises	
  that	
  encourage	
  more	
  VAT	
  evasion]and	
  the	
  broadening	
  of	
  the	
  tax	
  base	
  to	
  
increase	
  revenue	
  [i.e.	
  dealing	
  a	
  major	
  blow	
  at	
  the	
  only	
  Greek	
  growth	
  industry	
  –	
  
tourism].	
  
	
  
•	
  upfront	
  measures	
  to	
  improve	
  long-­‐term	
  sustainability	
  of	
  the	
  pension	
  system	
  as	
  
part	
  of	
  a	
  comprehensive	
  pension	
  reform	
  programme	
  [i.e.	
  reducing	
  the	
  lowest	
  of	
  
the	
  low	
  of	
  pensions,	
  while	
  ignoring	
  that	
  the	
  depletion	
  of	
  pension	
  funds’	
  capital	
  

	
  

1	
  

due	
  to	
  the	
  2012	
  troika-­‐designed	
  PSI	
  and	
  the	
  ill	
  effects	
  of	
  low	
  employment	
  &	
  
undeclared	
  paid	
  labour].	
  
	
  
•	
  the	
  safeguarding	
  of	
  the	
  full	
  legal	
  independence	
  of	
  ELSTAT	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  troika	
  
demands	
  complete	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  way	
  Greece’s	
  budget	
  balance	
  is	
  computed,	
  with	
  
a	
  view	
  to	
  controlling	
  fully	
  the	
  magnitude	
  of	
  austerity	
  it	
  imposes	
  on	
  the	
  
government.]	
  
	
  
•	
  full	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  relevant	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  Treaty	
  on	
  Stability,	
  
Coordination	
  and	
  Governance	
  in	
  the	
  Economic	
  and	
  Monetary	
  Union,	
  in	
  particular	
  
by	
  making	
  the	
  Fiscal	
  Council	
  operational	
  before	
  finalizing	
  the	
  MoU	
  and	
  
introducing	
  quasi-­‐automatic	
  spending	
  cuts	
  in	
  case	
  of	
  deviations	
  from	
  ambitious	
  
primary	
  surplus	
  targets	
  after	
  seeking	
  advice	
  from	
  the	
  Fiscal	
  Council	
  and	
  subject	
  
to	
  prior	
  approval	
  of	
  the	
  Institutions	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Greek	
  government,	
  which	
  knows	
  
that	
  the	
  imposed	
  fiscal	
  targets	
  will	
  never	
  be	
  achieved	
  under	
  the	
  imposed	
  
austerity,	
  must	
  commit	
  to	
  further,	
  automated	
  austerity	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  troika’s	
  
newest	
  failures.]	
  
	
  
By	
  22	
  July	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  the	
  adoption	
  of	
  the	
  Code	
  of	
  Civil	
  Procedure,	
  which	
  is	
  a	
  major	
  overhaul	
  of	
  
procedures	
  and	
  arrangements	
  for	
  the	
  civil	
  justice	
  system	
  and	
  can	
  significantly	
  
accelerate	
  the	
  judicial	
  process	
  and	
  reduce	
  costs	
  [i.e.	
  foreclosures,	
  evictions	
  and	
  
liquidation	
  of	
  thousands	
  of	
  homes	
  and	
  businesses	
  who	
  are	
  not	
  in	
  a	
  position	
  to	
  
keep	
  up	
  with	
  their	
  mortgages/loans.]	
  
	
  
•	
  the	
  transposition	
  of	
  the	
  BRRD	
  with	
  support	
  from	
  the	
  European	
  Commission.	
  	
  
	
  
Immediately,	
  and	
  only	
  subsequent	
  to	
  legal	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  four	
  
above-­‐mentioned	
  measures	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  endorsement	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  commitments	
  
included	
  in	
  this	
  document	
  by	
  the	
  Greek	
  Parliament,	
  verified	
  by	
  the	
  Institutions	
  
and	
  the	
  Eurogroup,	
  may	
  a	
  decision	
  to	
  mandate	
  the	
  Institutions	
  to	
  negotiate	
  a	
  
Memorandum	
  of	
  Understanding	
  (MoU)	
  be	
  taken	
  [i.e.	
  The	
  Syriza	
  government	
  
must	
  be	
  humiliated	
  to	
  the	
  extent	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  asked	
  to	
  impose	
  harsh	
  austerity	
  upon	
  
itself	
  as	
  a	
  first	
  step	
  towards	
  requesting	
  another	
  toxic	
  bailout	
  loan,	
  of	
  the	
  sort	
  that	
  
Syriza	
  became	
  internationally	
  famous	
  for	
  opposing.]	
  
	
  
This	
  decision	
  would	
  be	
  taken	
  subject	
  to	
  national	
  procedures	
  having	
  been	
  
completed	
  and	
  if	
  the	
  preconditions	
  of	
  Article	
  13	
  of	
  the	
  ESM	
  Treaty	
  are	
  met	
  on	
  the	
  
basis	
  of	
  the	
  assessment	
  referred	
  to	
  in	
  Article	
  13.1.	
  SN	
  4070/15	
  3	
  EN.	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  
form	
  the	
  basis	
  for	
  a	
  successful	
  conclusion	
  of	
  the	
  MoU,	
  the	
  Greek	
  offer	
  of	
  reform	
  
measures	
  needs	
  to	
  be	
  seriously	
  strengthened	
  to	
  take	
  into	
  account	
  the	
  strongly	
  
deteriorated	
  economic	
  and	
  fiscal	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  country	
  during	
  the	
  last	
  year	
  [i.e.	
  
the	
  Syriza	
  government	
  must	
  accept	
  the	
  lie	
  that	
  it,	
  and	
  not	
  the	
  asphyxiation	
  tactics	
  
of	
  the	
  creditors,	
  caused	
  the	
  sharp	
  economic	
  deterioration	
  of	
  the	
  past	
  six	
  months	
  
–	
  the	
  victim	
  is	
  being	
  asked	
  to	
  take	
  the	
  blame	
  by	
  the	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  the	
  villain.]	
  
	
  
The	
  Greek	
  government	
  needs	
  to	
  formally	
  commit	
  to	
  strengthening	
  their	
  
proposals	
  [i.e.	
  to	
  make	
  them	
  more	
  regressive	
  and	
  more	
  inhuman]	
  in	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  

	
  

2	
  

areas	
  identified	
  by	
  the	
  Institutions,	
  with	
  a	
  satisfactory	
  clear	
  timetable	
  for	
  
legislation	
  and	
  implementation,	
  including	
  structural	
  benchmarks,	
  milestones	
  and	
  
quantitative	
  benchmarks,	
  to	
  have	
  clarity	
  on	
  the	
  direction	
  of	
  policies	
  over	
  the	
  
medium-­‐run.	
  They	
  notably	
  need,	
  in	
  agreement	
  with	
  the	
  Institutions,	
  to:	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  carry	
  out	
  ambitious	
  pension	
  reforms	
  [i.e.	
  cuts]	
  and	
  specify	
  policies	
  to	
  fully	
  
compensate	
  for	
  the	
  fiscal	
  impact	
  of	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  ruling	
  on	
  the	
  2012	
  
pension	
  reform	
  [i.e.	
  cancel	
  the	
  Court’s	
  decision	
  in	
  favour	
  of	
  pensioners]	
  and	
  to	
  
implement	
  the	
  zero	
  deficit	
  clause	
  [i.e.	
  cut	
  by	
  85%	
  the	
  secondary	
  pensions	
  that	
  
the	
  Syriza	
  government	
  fought	
  tooth	
  and	
  nail	
  to	
  preserve	
  over	
  the	
  past	
  five	
  
months]	
  or	
  mutually	
  agreeable	
  alternative	
  measures	
  [i.e.	
  find	
  ‘equivalent’	
  
victims]	
  by	
  October	
  2015;	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  adopt	
  more	
  ambitious	
  product	
  market	
  reforms	
  with	
  a	
  clear	
  timetable	
  for	
  
implementation	
  of	
  all	
  OECD	
  toolkit	
  I	
  recommendations	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  
recommendations	
  that	
  the	
  OECD	
  has	
  now	
  renounced	
  after	
  having	
  re-­‐designed	
  
these	
  reforms	
  in	
  collaboration	
  with	
  the	
  Syriza	
  government],	
  including	
  Sunday	
  
trade,	
  sales	
  periods,	
  pharmacy	
  ownership,	
  milk	
  and	
  bakeries,	
  except	
  over-­‐the-­‐
counter	
  pharmaceutical	
  products,	
  which	
  will	
  be	
  implemented	
  in	
  a	
  next	
  step,	
  as	
  
well	
  as	
  for	
  the	
  opening	
  of	
  macro-­‐critical	
  closed	
  professions	
  (e.g.	
  ferry	
  
transportation).	
  On	
  the	
  follow-­‐up	
  of	
  the	
  OECD	
  toolkit-­‐II,	
  manufacturing	
  needs	
  to	
  
be	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  prior	
  action;	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  on	
  energy	
  markets,	
  proceed	
  with	
  the	
  privatisation	
  of	
  the	
  electricity	
  
transmission	
  network	
  operator	
  (ADMIE),	
  unless	
  replacement	
  measures	
  can	
  be	
  
found	
  that	
  have	
  equivalent	
  effect	
  on	
  competition,	
  as	
  agreed	
  by	
  the	
  Institutions	
  
[i.e.	
  ADMIE	
  will	
  be	
  sold	
  off	
  to	
  specific	
  foreign	
  vested	
  interests	
  at	
  the	
  behest	
  of	
  the	
  
Institutions.]	
  
	
  
•	
  on	
  labour	
  markets,	
  undertake	
  rigorous	
  reviews	
  and	
  modernisation	
  of	
  collective	
  
bargaining	
  [i.e.	
  to	
  make	
  sure	
  that	
  no	
  collective	
  bargaining	
  is	
  allowed],	
  industrial	
  
action	
  [i.e.	
  that	
  must	
  be	
  banned]	
  and,	
  in	
  line	
  with	
  the	
  relevant	
  EU	
  directive	
  and	
  
best	
  practice,	
  collective	
  dismissals	
  [i.e.	
  that	
  should	
  be	
  allowed	
  at	
  the	
  employers’	
  
whim],	
  along	
  the	
  timetable	
  and	
  the	
  approach	
  agreed	
  with	
  the	
  Institutions.	
  [i.e.	
  
the	
  Troika	
  decides.]	
  
	
  
On	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  these	
  reviews,	
  labour	
  market	
  policies	
  should	
  be	
  aligned	
  with	
  
international	
  and	
  European	
  best	
  practices,	
  and	
  should	
  not	
  involve	
  a	
  return	
  to	
  
past	
  policy	
  settings	
  which	
  are	
  not	
  compatible	
  with	
  the	
  goals	
  of	
  promoting	
  
sustainable	
  and	
  inclusive	
  growth	
  [i.e.	
  there	
  should	
  be	
  no	
  mechanisms	
  that	
  waged	
  
labour	
  can	
  use	
  to	
  extract	
  better	
  conditions	
  from	
  employers.]	
  
	
  
•	
  adopt	
  the	
  necessary	
  steps	
  to	
  strengthen	
  the	
  financial	
  sector,	
  including	
  decisive	
  
action	
  on	
  non-­‐performing	
  loans	
  [i.e.	
  a	
  tsunami	
  of	
  foreclosures	
  is	
  ante	
  portas]	
  and	
  
measures	
  to	
  strengthen	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  HFSF	
  and	
  the	
  banks	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Greek	
  
people	
  who	
  maintain	
  the	
  HFSF	
  and	
  the	
  banks	
  will	
  have	
  precisely	
  zero	
  control	
  
over	
  the	
  HFSF	
  and	
  the	
  banks.],	
  in	
  particular	
  by	
  eliminating	
  any	
  possibility	
  for	
  
political	
  interference	
  especially	
  in	
  appointment	
  processes.	
  [i.e.	
  except	
  the	
  

	
  

3	
  

political	
  interference	
  of	
  the	
  Troika.]	
  On	
  top	
  of	
  that,	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  shall	
  
take	
  the	
  following	
  actions:	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  significantly	
  scaled	
  up	
  privatisation	
  programme	
  with	
  improved	
  
governance;	
  valuable	
  Greek	
  assets	
  will	
  be	
  transferred	
  to	
  an	
  independent	
  fund	
  
that	
  will	
  monetize	
  the	
  assets	
  through	
  privatisations	
  and	
  other	
  means	
  [i.e.	
  an	
  East	
  
German-­‐like	
  Treuhand	
  is	
  envisaged	
  to	
  sell	
  off	
  all	
  public	
  property	
  but	
  without	
  the	
  
equivalent	
  large	
  investments	
  that	
  W.	
  Germany	
  put	
  into	
  E.	
  Germany	
  in	
  
compensation	
  for	
  the	
  Treuhand	
  disaster.]	
  The	
  monetization	
  of	
  the	
  assets	
  will	
  be	
  
one	
  source	
  to	
  make	
  the	
  scheduled	
  repayment	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  loan	
  of	
  ESM	
  and	
  
generate	
  over	
  the	
  life	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  loan	
  a	
  targeted	
  total	
  of	
  EUR	
  50bn	
  of	
  which	
  EUR	
  
25bn	
  will	
  be	
  used	
  for	
  the	
  repayment	
  of	
  recapitalization	
  of	
  banks	
  and	
  other	
  assets	
  
and	
  50	
  %	
  of	
  every	
  remaining	
  euro	
  (i.e.	
  50%	
  of	
  EUR	
  25bn)	
  will	
  be	
  used	
  for	
  
decreasing	
  the	
  debt	
  to	
  GDP	
  ratio	
  and	
  the	
  remaining	
  50	
  %	
  will	
  be	
  used	
  for	
  
investments	
  [i.e.	
  public	
  property	
  will	
  be	
  sold	
  off	
  and	
  the	
  pitiful	
  sums	
  will	
  go	
  
toward	
  servicing	
  an	
  un-­‐serviceable	
  debt	
  –	
  with	
  precisely	
  nothing	
  left	
  over	
  for	
  
public	
  or	
  private	
  investments.]	
  This	
  fund	
  would	
  be	
  established	
  in	
  Greece	
  and	
  be	
  
managed	
  by	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  under	
  the	
  supervision	
  of	
  the	
  relevant	
  
European	
  Institutions	
  [i.e.	
  it	
  will	
  be	
  nominally	
  in	
  Greece	
  but,	
  just	
  like	
  the	
  HFSF	
  or	
  
the	
  Bank	
  of	
  Greece,	
  it	
  will	
  be	
  controlled	
  fully	
  by	
  the	
  creditors.]	
  In	
  agreement	
  with	
  
Institutions	
  and	
  building	
  on	
  best	
  international	
  practices,	
  a	
  legislative	
  framework	
  
should	
  be	
  adopted	
  to	
  ensure	
  transparent	
  procedures	
  and	
  adequate	
  asset	
  sale	
  
pricing,	
  according	
  to	
  OECD	
  principles	
  and	
  standards	
  on	
  the	
  management	
  of	
  State	
  
Owned	
  Enterprises	
  (SOEs)	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Troika	
  will	
  do	
  what	
  it	
  likes.]	
  
	
  
•	
  in	
  line	
  with	
  the	
  Greek	
  government	
  ambitions,	
  to	
  modernise	
  and	
  significantly	
  
strengthen	
  the	
  Greek	
  administration,	
  and	
  to	
  put	
  in	
  place	
  a	
  programme,	
  under	
  the	
  
auspices	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Commission,	
  for	
  capacity-­‐building	
  and	
  de-­‐politicizing	
  
the	
  Greek	
  administration	
  [i.e.	
  Turning	
  Greece	
  into	
  a	
  democracy-­‐free	
  zone	
  
modelled	
  on	
  Brussels,	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  supposedly	
  technocratic	
  government,	
  which	
  is	
  
politically	
  toxic	
  and	
  macro-­‐economically	
  inept]	
  A	
  first	
  proposal	
  should	
  be	
  
provided	
  by	
  20	
  July	
  after	
  discussions	
  with	
  the	
  Institutions.	
  The	
  Greek	
  
government	
  commits	
  to	
  reduce	
  further	
  the	
  costs	
  of	
  the	
  Greek	
  administration	
  [i.e.	
  
to	
  reduce	
  the	
  lowest	
  wages	
  while	
  increasing	
  a	
  little	
  the	
  wages	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  
Troika-­‐friendly	
  apparatchiks],	
  in	
  line	
  with	
  a	
  schedule	
  agreed	
  with	
  the	
  
Institutions;	
  SN	
  4070/15	
  5	
  EN	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  to	
  fully	
  normalize	
  working	
  methods	
  with	
  the	
  Institutions,	
  including	
  the	
  
necessary	
  work	
  on	
  the	
  ground	
  in	
  Athens,	
  to	
  improve	
  programme	
  
implementation	
  and	
  monitoring	
  [i.e.	
  The	
  Troika	
  strikes	
  back	
  and	
  demands	
  that	
  
the	
  Greek	
  government	
  invite	
  it	
  to	
  return	
  to	
  Athens	
  as	
  Conqueror	
  –	
  the	
  
Carthaginian	
  Peace	
  in	
  all	
  its	
  glory.]	
  The	
  government	
  needs	
  to	
  consult	
  and	
  agree	
  
with	
  the	
  Institutions	
  on	
  all	
  draft	
  legislation	
  in	
  relevant	
  areas	
  with	
  adequate	
  time	
  
before	
  submitting	
  it	
  for	
  public	
  consultation	
  or	
  to	
  Parliament	
  [i.e.	
  Greek	
  
Parliament	
  must,	
  again,	
  after	
  five	
  months	
  of	
  short-­‐lived	
  independence,	
  become	
  
an	
  appendage	
  of	
  the	
  Troika	
  –	
  passing	
  translated	
  legislation	
  mechanistically.]	
  The	
  
Euro	
  Summit	
  stresses	
  again	
  that	
  implementation	
  is	
  key,	
  and	
  in	
  that	
  context	
  
welcomes	
  the	
  intention	
  of	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  to	
  request	
  by	
  20	
  July	
  support	
  

	
  

4	
  

from	
  the	
  Institutions	
  and	
  Member	
  States	
  for	
  technical	
  assistance,	
  and	
  asks	
  the	
  
European	
  Commission	
  to	
  coordinate	
  this	
  support	
  from	
  Europe;	
  	
  
	
  
•	
  With	
  the	
  exception	
  of	
  the	
  humanitarian	
  crisis	
  bill,	
  the	
  Greek	
  government	
  will	
  
reexamine	
  with	
  a	
  view	
  to	
  amending	
  legislations	
  that	
  were	
  introduced	
  counter	
  to	
  
the	
  February	
  20	
  agreement	
  by	
  backtracking	
  on	
  previous	
  programme	
  
commitments	
  or	
  identify	
  clear	
  compensatory	
  equivalents	
  for	
  the	
  vested	
  rights	
  
that	
  were	
  subsequently	
  created	
  [i.e.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  promising	
  that	
  it	
  will	
  no	
  
longer	
  legislative	
  autonomously,	
  the	
  Greek	
  government	
  will	
  retrospectively	
  
annul	
  all	
  Bills	
  it	
  passed	
  over	
  the	
  past	
  five	
  months.]	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  above-­‐listed	
  commitments	
  are	
  minimum	
  requirements	
  to	
  start	
  the	
  
negotiations	
  with	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities.	
  However,	
  the	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  made	
  it	
  clear	
  
that	
  the	
  start	
  of	
  negotiations	
  does	
  not	
  preclude	
  any	
  final	
  possible	
  agreement	
  on	
  a	
  
new	
  ESM	
  programme,	
  which	
  will	
  have	
  to	
  be	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  decision	
  on	
  the	
  whole	
  
package	
  (including	
  financing	
  needs,	
  debt	
  sustainability	
  and	
  possible	
  bridge	
  
financing)	
  [i.e.	
  self-­‐flagellate,	
  impose	
  further	
  austerity	
  upon	
  an	
  economy	
  crushed	
  
by	
  austerity,	
  and	
  then	
  we	
  shall	
  see	
  whether	
  the	
  Eurogroup	
  will	
  grave	
  you	
  with	
  
another	
  toxic,	
  unsustainable	
  loans.]	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  takes	
  note	
  of	
  the	
  possible	
  programme	
  financing	
  needs	
  of	
  
between	
  EUR	
  82	
  and	
  86bn,	
  as	
  assessed	
  by	
  the	
  Institutions	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Eurogroup	
  
conjured	
  up	
  a	
  huge	
  number,	
  well	
  above	
  what	
  is	
  necessary,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  signal	
  the	
  
debt	
  restructuring	
  is	
  out	
  and	
  that	
  debt	
  bondage	
  ad	
  infinitum	
  is	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  the	
  
game.]	
  It	
  invites	
  the	
  Institutions	
  to	
  explore	
  possibilities	
  to	
  reduce	
  the	
  financing	
  
envelope,	
  through	
  an	
  alternative	
  fiscal	
  path	
  or	
  higher	
  privatisation	
  proceeds	
  [i.e.	
  
And,	
  yes,	
  it	
  may	
  possible	
  that	
  pigs	
  will	
  fly.]	
  Restoring	
  market	
  access,	
  which	
  is	
  an	
  
objective	
  of	
  any	
  financial	
  assistance	
  programme,	
  lowers	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  draw	
  on	
  the	
  
total	
  financing	
  envelope	
  [i.e.	
  which	
  is	
  something	
  the	
  creditors	
  will	
  do	
  their	
  
utmost	
  to	
  avoid,	
  e.g.	
  by	
  ensuring	
  that	
  Greece	
  will	
  only	
  enter	
  the	
  ECB’s	
  
quantitative	
  easing	
  program	
  in	
  2018,	
  once	
  quantitative	
  easing	
  is…	
  over.]	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  takes	
  note	
  of	
  the	
  urgent	
  financing	
  needs	
  of	
  Greece	
  which	
  
underline	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  very	
  swift	
  progress	
  in	
  reaching	
  a	
  decision	
  on	
  a	
  new	
  MoU:	
  
these	
  are	
  estimated	
  to	
  amount	
  to	
  EUR	
  7bn	
  by	
  20	
  July	
  and	
  an	
  additional	
  EUR	
  5bn	
  
by	
  mid	
  August.	
  [i.e.	
  Extend	
  and	
  Pretend	
  gets	
  another	
  spin.]	
  The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  
acknowledges	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  ensuring	
  that	
  the	
  Greek	
  sovereign	
  can	
  clear	
  its	
  
arrears	
  to	
  the	
  IMF	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  Bank	
  of	
  Greece	
  and	
  honour	
  its	
  debt	
  obligations	
  in	
  
the	
  coming	
  weeks	
  to	
  create	
  conditions	
  which	
  allow	
  for	
  an	
  orderly	
  conclusion	
  of	
  
the	
  negotiations.	
  The	
  risks	
  of	
  not	
  concluding	
  swiftly	
  the	
  negotiations	
  remain	
  fully	
  
with	
  Greece	
  [i.e.	
  Once	
  more,	
  demanding	
  that	
  the	
  victim	
  takes	
  all	
  the	
  blame	
  in	
  
behalf	
  of	
  the	
  villain.]	
  The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  invites	
  the	
  Eurogroup	
  to	
  discuss	
  these	
  
issues	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  urgency.	
  	
  
	
  
Given	
  the	
  acute	
  challenges	
  of	
  the	
  Greek	
  financial	
  sector,	
  the	
  total	
  envelope	
  of	
  a	
  
possible	
  new	
  ESM	
  programme	
  would	
  have	
  to	
  include	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  
buffer	
  of	
  EUR	
  10	
  to	
  25bn	
  for	
  the	
  banking	
  sector	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  address	
  potential	
  
bank	
  recapitalisation	
  needs	
  and	
  resolution	
  costs,	
  of	
  which	
  EUR	
  10bn	
  would	
  be	
  
made	
  available	
  immediately	
  in	
  a	
  segregated	
  account	
  at	
  the	
  ESM	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  Troika	
  

	
  

5	
  

admits	
  that	
  the	
  2013-­‐14	
  recapitalisation	
  of	
  the	
  banks,	
  which	
  would	
  only	
  need	
  a	
  
top	
  up	
  of	
  at	
  most	
  10	
  billion,	
  was	
  insufficient	
  –	
  but,	
  of	
  course,	
  blames	
  it	
  on…	
  the	
  
Syriza	
  government.]	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  is	
  aware	
  that	
  a	
  rapid	
  decision	
  on	
  a	
  new	
  programme	
  is	
  a	
  
condition	
  to	
  allow	
  banks	
  to	
  reopen,	
  thus	
  avoiding	
  an	
  increase	
  in	
  the	
  total	
  
financing	
  envelope	
  [i.e.	
  The	
  Troika	
  closed	
  Greece’s	
  banks	
  to	
  force	
  the	
  Syriza	
  
government	
  to	
  capitulate	
  and	
  now	
  cries	
  out	
  for	
  their	
  re-­‐opening.]	
  The	
  ECB/SSM	
  
will	
  conduct	
  a	
  comprehensive	
  assessment	
  after	
  the	
  summer.	
  The	
  overall	
  buffer	
  
will	
  cater	
  for	
  possible	
  capital	
  shortfalls	
  following	
  the	
  comprehensive	
  assessment	
  
after	
  the	
  legal	
  framework	
  is	
  applied.	
  	
  
	
  
There	
  are	
  serious	
  concerns	
  regarding	
  the	
  sustainability	
  of	
  Greek	
  debt	
  [N.b.	
  
Really?	
  Gosh!]	
  This	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  easing	
  of	
  policies	
  during	
  the	
  last	
  twelve	
  months,	
  
which	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  recent	
  deterioration	
  in	
  the	
  domestic	
  macroeconomic	
  and	
  
financial	
  environment	
  [i.e.	
  It	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  Extend	
  and	
  Pretend	
  ‘bailout’	
  loans	
  of	
  2010	
  
and	
  2012	
  that,	
  in	
  conjunction	
  with	
  GDP-­‐sapping	
  austerity,	
  caused	
  the	
  debt	
  to	
  
scale	
  immense	
  heights	
  –	
  it	
  was	
  the	
  prospect,	
  and	
  reality,	
  of	
  a	
  government	
  that	
  
criticized	
  the	
  the	
  Extend	
  and	
  Pretend	
  ‘bailout’	
  loans	
  that…	
  caused	
  Debt’s	
  
Unustainability!]	
  
	
  
The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  recalls	
  that	
  the	
  euro	
  area	
  Member	
  States	
  have,	
  throughout	
  the	
  
last	
  few	
  years,	
  adopted	
  a	
  remarkable	
  set	
  of	
  measures	
  supporting	
  Greece’s	
  debt	
  
sustainability,	
  which	
  have	
  smoothed	
  Greece’s	
  debt	
  servicing	
  path	
  and	
  reduced	
  
costs	
  significantly	
  [i.e.	
  The	
  1st	
  &	
  2nd	
  ‘bailout’	
  programs	
  failed,	
  the	
  debt	
  
skyrocketing	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  always	
  going	
  to	
  since	
  the	
  real	
  purpose	
  of	
  the	
  ‘bailout’	
  
programs	
  was	
  to	
  transfer	
  banking	
  losses	
  to	
  Europe’s	
  taxpayers.]	
  Against	
  this	
  
background,	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  a	
  possible	
  future	
  ESM	
  programme,	
  and	
  in	
  line	
  with	
  
the	
  spirit	
  of	
  the	
  Eurogroup	
  statement	
  of	
  November	
  2012	
  [i.e.	
  a	
  promise	
  of	
  debt	
  
restructure	
  to	
  the	
  previous	
  Greek	
  government	
  was	
  never	
  kept	
  by	
  the	
  creditors],	
  
the	
  Eurogroup	
  stands	
  ready	
  to	
  consider,	
  if	
  necessary,	
  possible	
  additional	
  
measures	
  (possible	
  longer	
  grace	
  and	
  payment	
  periods)	
  aiming	
  at	
  ensuring	
  that	
  
gross	
  financing	
  needs	
  remain	
  at	
  a	
  sustainable	
  level.	
  These	
  measures	
  will	
  be	
  
conditional	
  upon	
  full	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  measures	
  to	
  be	
  agreed	
  in	
  a	
  possible	
  
new	
  programme	
  and	
  will	
  be	
  considered	
  after	
  the	
  first	
  positive	
  completion	
  of	
  a	
  
review	
  [i.e.	
  Yet	
  again,	
  the	
  Troika	
  shall	
  let	
  the	
  Greek	
  government	
  labour	
  under	
  un-­‐
payable	
  debt	
  and	
  when,	
  as	
  a	
  result,	
  the	
  program	
  fails,	
  poverty	
  rises	
  further	
  and	
  
incomes	
  collapse	
  much	
  more,	
  then	
  we	
  may	
  haircut	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  debt	
  –	
  as	
  the	
  
Troika	
  did	
  in	
  2012.]	
  
	
  
The	
  Euro	
  Summit	
  stresses	
  that	
  nominal	
  haircuts	
  on	
  the	
  debt	
  cannot	
  be	
  
undertaken	
  [N.b.	
  The	
  Syriza	
  government	
  has	
  been	
  suggesting,	
  since	
  January,	
  a	
  
moderate	
  debt	
  restructure,	
  with	
  no	
  haircuts,	
  maximizing	
  the	
  expected	
  net	
  
present	
  value	
  of	
  Greece’s	
  repayments	
  to	
  creditors’	
  –	
  which	
  was	
  rejected	
  by	
  the	
  
Troika	
  because	
  their	
  aim	
  was,	
  simply,	
  to	
  humiliate	
  Syriza.]	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  
reiterate	
  their	
  unequivocal	
  commitment	
  to	
  honour	
  their	
  financial	
  obligations	
  to	
  
all	
  their	
  creditors	
  fully	
  and	
  in	
  a	
  timely	
  manner	
  [N.b.	
  Which	
  can	
  only	
  happen	
  after	
  
a	
  substantial	
  debt	
  restrucuture.]	
  Provided	
  that	
  all	
  the	
  necessary	
  conditions	
  
contained	
  in	
  this	
  document	
  are	
  fulfilled,	
  the	
  Eurogroup	
  and	
  ESM	
  Board	
  of	
  

	
  

6	
  

Governors	
  may,	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  Article	
  13.2	
  of	
  the	
  ESM	
  Treaty,	
  mandate	
  the	
  
Institutions	
  to	
  negotiate	
  a	
  new	
  ESM	
  programme,	
  if	
  the	
  preconditions	
  of	
  Article	
  
13	
  of	
  the	
  ESM	
  Treaty	
  are	
  met	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  the	
  assessment	
  referred	
  to	
  in	
  Article	
  
13.1.	
  To	
  help	
  support	
  growth	
  and	
  job	
  creation	
  in	
  Greece	
  (in	
  the	
  next	
  3-­‐5	
  years)	
  
[N.b.	
  Having	
  already	
  destroyed	
  growth	
  and	
  jobs	
  for	
  the	
  past	
  five	
  years…]	
  the	
  
Commission	
  will	
  work	
  closely	
  with	
  the	
  Greek	
  authorities	
  to	
  mobilise	
  up	
  to	
  EUR	
  
35bn	
  (under	
  various	
  EU	
  programmes)	
  to	
  fund	
  investment	
  and	
  economic	
  activity,	
  
including	
  in	
  SMEs	
  [i.e.	
  Will	
  use	
  the	
  same	
  order	
  of	
  magnitude	
  of	
  structural	
  funds,	
  
plus	
  some	
  fantasy	
  money,	
  as	
  were	
  available	
  in	
  2010-­‐2014.]	
  As	
  an	
  exceptional	
  
measure	
  and	
  given	
  the	
  unique	
  situation	
  of	
  Greece	
  the	
  Commission	
  will	
  propose	
  
to	
  increase	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  pre-­‐financing	
  by	
  EUR	
  1bn	
  to	
  give	
  an	
  immediate	
  boost	
  to	
  
investment	
  to	
  be	
  dealt	
  with	
  by	
  the	
  EU	
  co-­‐legislators.	
  [i.e.	
  Of	
  the	
  headline	
  35	
  
billion,	
  consider	
  1	
  billion	
  as	
  real	
  money.]	
  The	
  Investment	
  Plan	
  for	
  Europe	
  will	
  
also	
  provide	
  funding	
  opportunities	
  for	
  Greece	
  [i.e.	
  the	
  same	
  plan	
  that	
  most	
  
Eurozone	
  ministers	
  of	
  finance	
  refer	
  to	
  as	
  a	
  phantom	
  program].	
  
	
  

	
  

7