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The Nobel Peace Prize Watch
Lay down your arms
www.nobelwill.org

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December 6, 2016
Tor-Aksel Busch, Director of Public Prosecutions
P.O. Box 8002 – Dep, 0030 Oslo
Norway
Cc.: Jan F. Glent, Head of International Prosecutions Unit
REQUEST: SUMMONS FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION – HENRY KISSINGER
By a preliminary request of November 30 (that is hereby revoked and
should be deleted) we informed the Director of Public Prosecutions that
former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor of the USA, Henry
Kissinger, will be in Norway in the second week of December 2016. He is
invited as an honored guest by respected institutions, The Norwegian Nobel
Committee and the University of Oslo, to share his views on US foreign
policy, by all appearances not to regret or repent, or be held to account.
The discrepancy between the world of Kissinger and the peace by global
disarmament and co-operation, the demilitarized “fraternity of nations”
ideas, the Nobel committee was supposed to promote, is so glaring that it
defies comment. The same applies to the University of Oslo. We wish to
draw your attention to Kissinger´s comprehensive, unparalleled record of
serious international crimes and the need for prosecutorial action.
Document 1: Invitation by the Nobel Committee and the University of Oslo:
http://nobelpeaceprize.org/uploads/documents/Press_Release_Nobel_Peace_Pri
ze_Forum_Oslo.pdf

A book by the famous journalist Christopher Hitchens has given a
comprehensive survey of Kissinger´s international crimes:
Adresser: mail@nobelwill.org, Nobel Peace Prize Watch, c/o Magnusson, Marklandsgatan 63, 414 77 Göteborg, Sverige.

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Document 2: The Trial of Henry Kissinger (Verso, 2001).
A recent article in The New Yorker refers to new evidence, documents
recently released under the Freedom of Information Act:
Document 3: DOES HENRY KISSINGER HAVE A CONSCIENCE?
By Jon Lee Anderson , in The New Yorker, August 20, 2016
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/does-henry-kissinger-havea-conscience
The Trial of Henry Kissinger is not available in Norwegian, but can be
downloaded (Atlantic Books). We attach a resume of some points relevant
to the prosecutorial evaluation, translated into Norwegian, with some
remarks. A good resume is found in the foreword to the 2002 edition.
Annex 1: In Norwegian; oversikt over omtalt kriminell virksomhet (criminal
activities) i Hitchens “The Trial …” (2001) with some remarks, p. 10 below.
Annex 2: Foreword Christopher Hitchens, The Trial …. (2002), p. 14 below.
The menu of crimes ordered or organized by Kissinger, war crimes, torture,
aggression, subversion, interference and interventions in violation of
international law is without end. The cases most suited for prosecutorial
action seems to be 1) the warfare in Vietnam, 2) the “secret” bombing of
Cambodia and Laos, 3) the genocide in East Timor.
1. HENRY KISSINGER – A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
It is well known that, for fear of being apprehended and tried for a unique
record of serious crimes under international law, Kissinger is very careful
about where he travels. See Hitchens opening chapter (Document 2) and
Document 4: Christopher Hitchens, “The Fugitive” (The Nation, June 7,
2001). https://www.thenation.com/article/fugitive/
In 2001, in Paris, Kissinger was served with summons to appear before a
judge the next day, and then immediately checked out of the Ritz Hotel and
left the country. The summons was for his role in the “Operation Condor”

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in the 1970s, a coordinated effort by the secret police forces of seven
South American dictatorships. The death squads of Chile, Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador and Bolivia agreed to pool resources and to
hunt down, torture, murder and otherwise “disappear” one another’s
dissidents. They did this not just on their own soil but as far away as Rome
and Washington, where assassins and car-bombs were deployed to maim
Christian Democratic Senator Bernardo Leighton in 1975 and to murder the
Socialist Orlando Letelier in 1976. The main architect and supervisor of
these grave crimes was Henry Kissinger, wrote Hitchens.
Hitchens further explains that the French judge learnt that
“the inquiry can go no further until US government figures agree to
answer questions. In refusing to do this, Kissinger received the
shameful support of the US Embassy in Paris and the State
Department, which coldly advised the French to go through
bureaucratic channels in seeking information. Judge Le Loire replied
that he had already written to Washington in 1999, during the
Clinton years, but had received no response.

On the Friday immediately preceding Memorial Day, another
magistrate in a democratic country made an identical request. In
order to discover what happened to so many people during the years
of Condor terror, said Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, it
would be necessary to secure a deposition from Kissinger. And on
June 4 the Chilean judge Juan Guzmán Tapia asked US authorities to
question Kissinger about the disappearance of the American citizen
Charles Horman, murdered by Pinochet’s agents in 1973 and subject
of the Costa-Gavras movie Missing …. So that, in effect, we have a
situation in which the Bush regime is sheltering a man who is wanted
for questioning on two continents.”
Hitchens concludes his article by remarks on the will and the obligation to
adjudicate the war crimes of Kissinger and his accomplices:
“The seven Condor countries, groping their way back to democracy
after decades of trauma, are making brave and honest attempts to
find the truth and to punish the guilty. Time and again, commissions
of inquiry have been frustrated because the evidence they need is in
archives in Washington. And it is in those archives for the

unspeakable reason that the United States was the patron and
armorer of dictatorship.”

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Kissinger, his character, activities, and the official US protection of him are
well described and condemned by Fred Branfman in a 2013 Alternet article:
Document 4 B: http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/america-keepshonoring-one-its-worst-mass-murderers-henry-kissinger
2. NORWAY SHOULD PROSECUTE TO UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW
Norway´s wide rules on universal jurisdiction should not pose any problem
with the apprehension, questioning and trial of Mr. Kissinger. The rules in
Norwegian and international penal law defining international crimes, war
crimes, torture etc. have been thoroughly dealt with by the late professor
of law at the University of Oslo, Ståle Eskeland
Document 5: Ståle Eskeland “De mest alvorlige forbrytelser” (Cappelen
Damm 2011).
On page 47 Prof. Eskeland quotes a decision in 2009, where the Norwegian
prosecutors refrained from action in a complaint citing war crimes during
the 2009 war in Gaza. The prosecutors noted that Norway had a right to
initiate investigation and prosecution, but not an obligation,
“and none of the accused have any form of connection to Norway
and in our opinion the authority should exercise great caution with
opening an investigation in cases of alleged crimes committed
abroad by a perpetrator not domiciled in Norway or having any other
form of connection to our country.”
The case of Kissinger, however, seems very different. Several of his acts are
within a category of crimes where all nations are obliged by treaty to
prosecute; they “shall” take action if such criminals come within their
jurisdiction. Furthermore, Kissinger has for decades had a major influence
upon Norwegian politics and foreign and military affairs, by shaping and
conducting the policy of the NATO alliance of which Norway is a member.
Several of Kissinger´s crimes come under one of the treaties where it is

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mandatory for Norway to prosecute. He is complicit or main actor in many
violations of the CAT, the Convention Against Torture, and the Genocide
Convention. However, we are aware of the difficulty that the obligation to
prosecute under CAT applies only to acts after its entry into force on June
24, 1987, by which time Henry Kissinger seems no longer to have been in a
position to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. But there is no
time limit for prosecution of violations of the Genocide convention.

All nations have comprehensive obligations to protect and realize the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, enact and enforce legislation
penalizing any of these crimes, and are also obligated to search for
persons who commit these crimes, and to bring them to trial
regardless of their nationality and regardless of the place where the
crimes took place. Article 85 (1) of the first additional protocol (1977)

to the Geneva Conventions extends the agreed obligation to prosecute
to military strategy and warfare that a.o. cause “excessive loss” of
civilian lives.
Document 2 contains ample documentation of war crimes and
excessive loss of civilian lives, see some extracts in Annex 1. Indeed,
Kissinger has shown unparalleled cynicism and callous co-operation,
he colluded and conspired with foreign despotic leaders. Human rights,
international law, mass murder, loss of civilian lives, or even deceiving
the US Congress and Constitution, did not concern him if he thought it
would serve US interests to ignore them.
Henry Kissinger is famous for, communicating President Nixon's orders for a
"massive" bombing of Cambodia in 1969, having said, "Anything that flies
on everything that moves". This shows a callous and shocking insouciance
about the basic rule of the laws of war, to protect civilian lives.
The responsibility of national prosecutors to take action against the gravest
international crimes are the result of a long development where it is seen in
the interest of the world community that all countries co-operate to end
impunity. If Western political and military leaders shall continue to enjoy
impunity this is bound to do serious harm to law and order in the world.
Nations do not commit international crimes, but persons, individuals, acting
for the state do, said the post WWII Nuremberg judgment. Therefore acting

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for a state or under superior order is no excuse, neither is acting under a
broad national consensus. This was a major leap in global ethical awareness.
History has shown what disasters can result from the judiciary failing to
stand firm against the waves of national emotions that often permeate
military and international issues; war and peace.
The Director of Public Prosecutions as a high public official has an individual
and personal duty to act to uphold law and order. It is incumbent on him to
live up to this responsibility also in the present case, even if it is likely to
offend many, at home and abroad, in the street and in high office alike.
The leading Norwegian expert on issue of universal jurisdiction and
immunity, Professor of law Jo Martin Stigen, has written these articles:
Document 6: (2010). Hvilken immunitet for internasjonale

kjerneforbrytelser? Retfærd. Nordisk Juridisk
Tidsskrift. ISSN 0105-1121. 33(1 = 128), s 57- 94
Document 7: (2009). Universaljurisdiksjon - en kritisk analyse.
Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. 22(1), s 1- 46

3. HAS NORWAY GUARANTEED SAFE PASSAGE TO KISSINGER?
It is a fact that Mr. Kissinger is very careful about foreign travel. His travel
to Norway raises an awkward question: has he decided to go to Norway
because he has been promised safe passage, or is he so confident about
Norway as a loyal subordinate that he takes it for granted? Neither
alternative is very honorable to a presumed independent country. If
Kissinger will enjoy automatic impunity it stands out in shameful contrast
with denying protection to whistleblower Edward Snowden for a stay of
two days to receive the Ossietzky prize from Norwegian PEN. Can Norway
really have offered protection to one who has committed the most serious
international crimes and at the same time denied it to one who has
exposed grave crimes against the US Constitution?
Snowden revealed how the US government are guilty of massive criminality
in the form of extensive and invasive surveillance activities, infringing the
privacy of people at home and abroad, including foreign governments, and

putting our free societies and civil liberties at risk. Many feel that he
should have won this year´s Nobel Peace Prize, he is included in the NPPW
list: http://www.nobelwill.org/index.html?tab=7#bolkovac

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The late Christopher Hitchens was disgusted by the way Henry Kissinger
was treated as a respected statesman and would have been appalled by
Norway’s submissive attitude. “Kissinger should have the door shut in his
face by every decent person and should be shamed, ostracized, and
excluded,” Hitchens wrote. “No more dinners in his honor; no more
respectful audiences for his absurdly overpriced public appearances; no
more smirking photographs with hostesses and celebrities; no more
soliciting of his worthless opinions by sycophantic editors and producers.”
Rather than fawning on him, Hitchens suggested, “why don’t you arrest
him?” And this is an idea with wide support.
Millions of people, victims and survivors, will question or be seriously
offended if Norway goes through with praise and honors to a person in the
top ranks in the history of callous international state criminality. The
suffering ordered or managed by Kissinger has led to increasing insecurity
and violence for which all citizens of the world pay a high prize.
We foresee that our request will be received with the same mixture of the
surprise, rejection and incredulity that Hitchens describes in his Foreword
2002 (underlinings by NPPW):
When this little book first appeared, in what may now seem the
prehistoric spring of 2001, it attracted a certain amount of derision in
some quarters, and on two grounds. A number of reviewers flatly
declined to believe that the evidence presented against Henry
Kissinger could be true. Others, willing to credit at least the veracity
of the official documents, nonetheless scoffed at the mere idea of
bringing such a mighty figure within the orbit of the law.
But your high office is obligated to rise above such an immediate automatic
reaction and has an obligation to evaluate the case on its merits. Some
questions ought to be considered. How would I react to a request for
extradition, investigation or action against an individual torturer, death
camp manager, killer of civilians? Surely I would not consider acting under
order an excuse. But can I then abstain from ensuring that a person who
gave the orders is brought to justice? To bow respectfully to one who,

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probably more than anyone in the last 70 years, pulled the strings and
managed the most and the gravest crimes against humanity and the laws of
war, would surely not be in line with the new level of global ethics reached
with the Nuremberg principles?
It was more than a paradox when, in her Dec. 10, 1973, speech in honor of
Kissinger, the Nobel chair Aase Lionæs offered the very true comment tha
“peace must be based on rules to which all states, at any rate the great
powers, adhere in their conduct.” True, there will neither be peace nor
justice if in the law between nations continues to be like cobwebs, strong
enough to detain only the weak and too weak to hold the strong.

The International Criminal Court, ICC, is presently in serious danger of being
destroyed by the attitudes of hegemonic Western powers. Its application of
justice has become so lopsided that Third World countries are starting to
withdraw. They cannot be expected to accept forever the guaranteed
impunity of the war criminals of powerful nations. A potential collapse of
this essential institution ought to concern all tasked with law enforcement
and the protection of citizens all over the world against terror and
lawlessness.
Many civil servants who once served their nation with unquestioning
loyalty have been harshly condemned after shifts of power and in new
political settings. We trust the Norwegian prosecutors, mindful that history
is watching, will act in a professional and unbiased way and give the right
answer to our request.
4. Documentation and evidence
The articles referred to above are available by links to websites, the books
and legal articles are presumed to be in the possession of your office. We
shall be glad to assist with further documents and information.
Sincerely yours,
Nobel Peace Prize Watch
Fredrik S. Heffermehl
Co-signatories – next page:

Tomas Magnusson

We support and join the call for prosecutorial action by Norway:
Richard Falk, Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University, USA.
Erni and Ola Friholt, Peace movement activists, Orust, Sweden
Jon Hellesnes, Professor emeritus of philosophy, Tromsoe, Norway
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Ph.D., Author, Bondi Beach, NSW 2026, Australia
Gunnar Nerdrum, attorney-at-law, Tromsoe, Norway
Jan Oberg, Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Lund, Sweden
Antonio Carlos da Silva Rosa, M.A., editor, researcher. Porto, Portugal/São Paulo, Brasil
Sven Ruin, human rights activist, Köping, Sweden
David Swanson, author, World Beyond War, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
Ola Tellesbø, Attorney-at-law, Norway
Kenji Urata, Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law, Waseda University, Japan
Gunnar Westberg, Prof. emeritus, Sahlgrenska academy, Göteborg, Sweden

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Annex 1:
Christopher Hitchens: The Trial of Henry Kissinger
Basert på førsteutgaven (Verso, 2001), 159 sider.
Norsk resyme: Kissingers kriminelle handlinger
- utarbeidet for anmeldelse til norsk påtalemyndighet:
Forord, s. ix
Boken omhandler bare de mest alvorlige av Kissingers forgåelser, de som er egnet til å
føre til straff, for krigsforbrytelser, forbrytelser mot menneskeheten, forbrytelser mot
folkerettens lover og sedvaner, herunder sammensvergelse for å begå mord, kidnapping
og tortur.
s. x: Hitchens gjør følgende oppregning av Kissingers forbrytelser:
1. The deliberate mass killing of civilian populations in Indochina.
2. Deliberate collusion in mass murder, and later in assassination, in Bangladesh.
3. The personal suborning and planning of murder, of a senior constitutional officer in a
democratic nation — Chile — with which the United States was not at war.
4. Personal involvement in a plan to murder the head of state in the democratic nation of
Cyprus.
5. The incitement and enabling of genocide in East Timor
6. Personal involvement in a plan to kidnap and murder a journalist living in Washington,
D.C.
s. xi Argumenterer for iretteføring (i USA), Nurnberg-dommen binder USA. Viser til at
selv ikke de mektigste skal være hevet over loven; til at en rekke av Ks
samarbeidspartnere er straffedømt; og til filosofen Anacharsis: Loven er som spindelvev,
bare sterkt nok til å fange de svake og for svakt til å ta de sterke.
Innledning,
s. 2-3: Kissinger frykter universal jurisdiksjon og publisering av dokumentasjon, om
forbrytelser under Pinochet, og hva det kan bety for hans egne reisemuligheter at en
spansk dommer sørget for arrest av Pinochet i London.
s. 4-5 Ks aktuelle situasjon, service- og konsulentvirksomhet for tvilsomme despoter og
maktmennesker over hele verden.
s. 6-16 ”Forsmak” Ks hemmelige samspill med Nixon for å stjele presidentvalget 1968,
et forrædersk samspill mot demokratiet og USAs konstitusjon fikk Nixon valgt i 1968.
K var betrodd i president Johnsons forhandlinger med Nord-Vietnam som gikk mot en
løsning like før presidentvalget h/68, og ville ha sikret Humphrey (D) valget. Men i dypt
hemmelig konspirasjon med K saboterte Nixon (R) fredsløsning ved å love nord-Vietnam

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en bedre fredsavtale om han ble valgt, i strid med forbudet mot privat diplomati med
fremmed makt (s. 10). Kontakten gikk fra K til leder av Nixons kampanjeorganisasjon,
John Mitchell, den senere justisminister, og soningsfange. Nixon ble valgt – og hans aller
første utnevnelse var K som nasjonal sikkerhetsrådgiver (s. 15 lj. 10). Ks personlige svik
og sideskifte ga 4 nye krigsår med ekstreme lidelser og massive tap av liv og verdier for
Vietnam og Kambodsja.
Merk: Dette er i første omgang grove krenkelser av USAs konstitusjon, men kapitlet
handler i høy grad om Ks personlige ansvar for krigshandlinger. Ikke for å ha startet
krigen, men for å ha spilt en grotesk dobbeltrolle i å hjelpe en presidentkandidat med å
sabotere en fredsløsning i 1968. K ble en trojansk hest i forhandlingene, konspirerte med
presidentkandidat Nixon og med fienden for å sikre Nixon seier i valget. K for sin del
sikret seg øverste innflytelse på utenrikspolitikken i nært samarbeid med Presidenten – og
med State Department på sidelinjen. Prisen ble fire års forlengelse av krigen i Vietnam og 20 492 US-amerikanske soldater (nøyaktige tall for hvor mange som døde på den
andre siden mangler, anslag går opp til 2 millioner i Vietnam og 95 0 000 i Kambodsja).
S. 16 – 18: Ks makt og innflytelse i de verste delene av USAs utenrikspolitikk. En
”Komiteen av de 40” hadde overordnet styring med CIAs hemmelige operasjoner i
utlandet (og kanskje på hjemmebane), og K var leder fra 1969 til 1976 (i kraft av å være
nasjonal sikkerhetsrådgiver) og hadde full innsikt og fullt ansvar for handlingene (s. 18).
S. 19 – Indochina (Vietnam-krigen)
S. 20 nederst: K visste hva han gjorde, han skrøt av at fred kunne vært oppnådd i 1972,
og når krigen fortsatte så handlet det om hans spill og personlige maktglede.
S. 21 nederst: en krig med stadig hardere midler. Fire eksempler på hvordan
sivilbefolkningen med overlegg ble utsatt for stadig mer hensynsløs og dødelig bruk av
”indiscriminate” militærmakt, med brudd på krigens sedvanerett og nøytralitet. En
virksomhet som ble skjult tildekking av fakta. S. 22, ”total krig mot VietCong og FNLs
infrastruktur.” En overlegen militærmakt opererer på fremmed territorium, kan ikke
påberope selvforsvar. I realiteten var Nixon-Kissinger opptatt av valgtaktikk, jfr. sitat av
Haldeman, som viser at K gjerne utsatte en våpenhvile for å bedre sjansene i neste valg.
S. 23 Bombeoffensiv h/72 1972 var koordinert (to år tidligere) med 72-valget i USA, den
hadde begynt under valget og fortsatte etter at det var vunnet. Ikke av militære grunner,
men av to politiske grunner, dels å vise styrke for hjemlige ekstremister og få
demokratene på defensiven, dels å overtale syd-vietnamesiske ledere til å ikke presse så
sterkt mot amerikansk tilbaketrekning.
S. 25 Kissingers krigsforbrytelser i Indochina
Telford Taylor, USAs sjefsanklager i Nürnbergdomstolen uttalte i 1971 at USAs politiske
og militære ledere i Vietnam hadde begått krigsforbrytelser som fortjente dødsstraff. S.
26 de handlet med viten og overlegg. Taylors bok Nuremberg and Vietnam ble utgitt i
1973, mens krigen fortsatt pågikk og mye fortsatt ikke fullt kjent, men nok til at han
kunne trekke udiskutable konklusjoner om straffbare handlinger. USA hadde et spesielt
ansvar for å være kjent med og respektere folkeretten fra Nürnberg, utdypet i langt sitat.
S. 27 nederst: til Colonel Corsons forsvar om at alle overgrep (mot sivilbefolkningen)
skyldtes ”feilbedømmelser ikke kriminell atferd” svarer Taylor at handlingene er
straffbare, uansett feilbedømmelse. S. 28 Taylor overordnede har under straffansvar plikt
til å forhindre underordnedes forbrytelser. S. 29 nederst: Forsvarsminister Melvin Laird
hadde betenkeligheter om det under bombingen i Kambodsja ble gjort tilstrekkelige tiltak

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for å hindre sivile tap og skader på infrastruktur. Det er ikke kjent at K tok, verken som
sikkerhetsrådgiver eller utenriksminister tok noen slike forholdsregler. Tvert imot er det
mye materiale som beviser at Kongressen ble bevisst forledet når det ble forsikret at slike
tiltak ble tatt. S. 30: Flere sentrale ledere har i etterhånd beklaget dette, K aldri. Mye av
dette, luftkrig mot landsbyer mistenkt for å ”skjule” vietnamesiske geriljakrigere dreide
seg om krigføring med grove krenkelser av Genevekonvensjonens forbud mot kollektiv
straff og represalier. Taylor skrev dette lenge før slik uhyrlig krigføring ble utvidet til
”represalieraids” mot to hele land [nøytrale], Laos og Kambodsja, som om de var
landsbyer man bare kunne kvitte seg med. K hadde et spesielt ansvar, han visste at mange
sivile døde (og ble rapportert som militære døde) og at det var unngåelig – det lå en
fredsløsning klar, men han ville ikke benytte den. Deretter konkret om Ks sentrale rolle
[much authority] over krigføringen og Operation Speedy Express våren 1969. S. 31
nederst: Tall på falne (11 000) og på våpen funnet (748) viser at de drepte var sivile.
s.32-43 omfattende detaljer og bevis om ulike sider av USAs krigføring.
S. 44 flg. Folkemord, kupp og drap i Bangladesh
I et telegram protesterte USAs konsul, Archer Blood, i Dacca mot USAs delaktighet i
folkemord i Bangladesh. [Staten Pakistan besto av to deler – med India imellom.]
Hovedavsnittet er gjengitt på s. 45 handler om hvordan USA, i sin iver etter et godt
forhold til (daværende Vest-)Pakistan, forsømte å fordømme folkemord i (Øst-)Pakistan,
nå Bangladesh. Telegrammet medunderskrevet av 20 amerikanske diplomater i
Bangladesh og ytterligere ni i Syd-Øst-Asiaavdelingen i State Department. S.46 om
gjennomføring av statskupp og folkemord, og s. 47 øverst: Kissinger sender april 1971
støttehilsen og takker General Yaha Khan [altså Pakistans president (mars 1969 til des.
1971)] for ”delicacy and tact” i gjennomføringen. USA var delaktig, dette var et ledd i Ks
maktspill, innflytelse og diplomati i regionen, motiv beskrevet nederst s. 48 og
underbygd s. 49: K fikk råd om å be president Khan respektere valgresultatet. K ble sint
over innvendingene og viste til at det var Nixons faste politikk å støtte Pakistan ”men jeg
får alltid råd om det motsatte. Noen ganger lurer jeg på om jeg er i et galehus.” S. 49 K
behandlet konsekvent Bangladesh med fiendtlighet. Da K ble utenriksminister i 1973 ble
alle de [29] diplomatene som hadde underskrevet protesten i 1971 degradert. S. 53
nederst: Ledelsen i Vest-Pakistan hadde klarert på forhånd med USA (K) at det ”å styrte
Mujib [leder i Øst-P] ikke var noe problem.” Videre belegg på s. 54.
S. 90 Kissingers rolle i folkemordet i Øst-Timor (se essensen i Annex 3, s. 22-24)
Indonesias overfall på Øst-Timor er ikke nevnt i Kissingers selvbiografi, han har
systematisk fornektet enhver rolle og enhver innflytelse på hendelsene. Den tidligere
portugisiske kolonien, beliggende i det indonesiske øyrike, hadde i starten en sterk
frigjøringsbevegelse, FRETILIN, men (s. 91) Indonesia styrt av diktatoren general
Suharto søkte kontroll ved under dekke av å ville hjelpe sto først for en bevisst
infiltrasjon av egne styrker i FRETILIN. Den 7. 12 1975 erklærte Indonesia landet som
sin ”19. provins,” regulære indonesiske styrker krysset grensen og gjennomførte et
ekstremt brutalt og blodig angrep hvor 200 000 døde, en firedel av det totale folketall.
Samme dag som angrepet ble innledet hadde Suharto hatt besøk fra USAs politiske
ledelse. Angrepet begynte umiddelbart etter at flyet til president, Gerald Ford og
utenriksminister Kissinger hadde forlatt Indonesias luftrom. USA hadde forsynt
indoneserne med våpen. Det var naturlig å spørre om USA hadde gitt klarsignal til

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angrepet. President Ford var unnvikende i sin kommentar om dette da presidentflyet
landet på Hawaii – men pressetalsmannen sa til reporterne at ”USA er alltid på vakt mot
bruk av vold og presidenten håper dette kan løses fredelig.”
S. 92 – men Kissinger hadde langt på vei gitt klarsignal i sin uttalelse til pressen i Jakarta
hvor han sa at USA vil ikke anerkjenne den republikken FRETILIN hadde erklært og at
”USA forstår Indonesias syn på spørsmålet.” Men rapportene som fulgte om massedrap,
voldtekt og bevisst utsulting var så grove at Kissinger fikk vansker med sin åpne tale. To
australske journalister som ble øyenvitner ga rapporter som rystet verden og gjorde saken
til en stor belastning. USAs FN-ambassadør skrev i sine memoarer at dødstallene i ØstTimor i de første dagene hadde vært like store som de Sovjetunionen opplevde under
andre verdenskrig, og at ”USA ønsket den utviklingen som fant sted og søkte å fremkalle
den. Utenriksdepartementet ønsket at FN skulle vise seg absolutt maktesløst hva det enn
måtte foreta seg. Denne oppgaven ble gitt meg og jeg gjennomførte den med ikke liten
suksess.” Dette var en policy instruert av K. S. 93-96 K boklansering hvor meget
nærgående spørsmål til K om hans ansvar for forbrytelsene mot Øst-Timor gis
unnvikende svar. S. 98 Amy Goodman (Democracy Now) tar opp at 90 prosent av de
våpnene som ble brukt under invasjonen kom fra USA, får svar fra K om at USA ikke har
styring med hvordan amerikanske våpen blir brukt i en slik situasjon, konfronteres i neste
avsnitt med USAs retorikk om makt og styrke, ikke være ”en ynkelig, hjelpeløs kjempe.”
Sitatet nederst på s. 99 fra CIAs tidligere operasjonsleder i Indonesia viser at USA og Ks
State department ga full tilslutning (støtte) til hva Suharto ønsket å gjøre. Dette kunne bli
til belastning om allmennheten eller Kongressen skulle få rede på omfanget av
militærhjelp til Indonesia. Om Indonesia ikke hadde fått USAs militære støtte er det
usikkert om de hadde greid å gjennomføre dette. S. 95 nederst er om et memorandum om
et møte i US DU 18.12 1975 hvor K hudflettet sine medarbeidere i deptet for i hans
fravær å ha nedskrevet (så det ble bevislig) en betenkning fra rettssjefen i UD, Mr Leigh
som anså Indonesias invasjon for ulovlig ved å krenke folkeretten og et forbud i en traktat
mot at amerikanske våpen ble anvendt. Ks harme handlet om frykt for at det som sto på
papir kunne bli røpet utad. S. 100 (fra midten) det telegram fra Ks State department i des.
1975 og memorandumet (s. 95) viser Ks fordekte atferd, hvor opptatt han er av å skjule
spor etter sin rolle eller delaktighet i kriminelle handlinger. Beslutningen om USAs linje i
Øst-Timor var besluttet i juli samme år (1975) da K hadde fått presidentens ja til et
hemmelig program om militær intervensjon i Indonesia, koordinert med aksjon i en
annen portugisisk ekskoloni, Angola (K så – tross avstanden – de to i sammenheng).
Måneden etter (aug. 1975) hadde K informert de indonesiske generalene om at han ikke
ville motsette seg deres invasjon i Øst-Timor. Det eneste samtalen i Jakarta i des. 1975
gjaldt var å utsette angrepet inntil USAs Air Force One var ute av indonesisk luftrom.
Her var det to problemer med lovligheten, begge US UDs (Ks) ansvar. Først Indonesias
krenkelse av Portugals rett og ansvar til å avvikle kolonistyret (noe K ikke likte). Dernest
et brudd på USAs lovgivning som fastslo at våpen levert fra USA bare kunne brukes i
selvforsvar.
S. 106 (fra midten) om leveranser av tunge våpen til bruk mot sivile våpen som ble
gjenopptatt i 1976, etter en kort periode da Kongressen ble forledet som planlagt. Ingen i
Ks krets av medarbeidere kommer særlig godt ut av møtet, Ks embedsmenn var alt annet
enn ”uplettede noviser” – og (pkt 4 i opplistingen) K innrømmet at han brøt loven. S. 107
nederst, gjennomgåelsen slutter med påvisning av at USA (K) hadde vært tidlig og
fullstendig informert om forbrytelsene mot Øst-Timor, og at president Ford ved et utsagn
til journalist Jack Anderson, viste at alt K noensinne hadde sagt om emnet var løgn.

Annex 2:

14

(Text retrieved by optical reading, minor errors may occur)
Christopher Hitchens: The Trial of Henry Kissinger
Preface to the Paperback Edition (Feb 2002)

When this little book first appeared, in what may now seem the prehistoric
spring of 2001, it attracted a certain amount of derision in some quarters, and on
two grounds. A number of reviewers flatly declined to believe that the evidence
presented against Henry Kissinger could be true. Others, willing to credit at least
the veracity of the official documents, nonetheless scoffed at the mere idea of
bringing such a mighty figure within the orbit of the law. [underlined by NPPW]
It says nothing for the author, but a great deal about the subject, to be able to
report that the lapse of just one year has brought important and incriminating new
disclosures and seen significant new developments. To begin with the
disclosures, then, one might instance fresh and conclusive evidence under four
of the headings originally discussed here: Indochina, Latin America, East Timor
and Washington, DC. And, to follow on with the legal developments, one can now
cite important proceedings brought against Kissinger in four democratic
countries, including his own. I hope I will not seem to boast if I say that most of
these disclosures and initiatives were foreshadowed in the first version of this
book. At any rate, they now appear below and any reader may judge by
comparison with the unaltered original text.

Indochina

Further material has come to light about both the origins and the conclusion
of this terrible episode in American and Asian history. The publication of Larry
Berman's No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger and Betrayal in Vietnam in early
2001 provided further evidence of the secret and illegal diplomacy conducted by
Nixon and his associates in the fall of 1968, and discussed on pages 1-21 here
as well as in my appendix on page 205. Indeed, it can now be safely said that the

15
record of this disgusting scandal has become, so to speak, apart of the official
and recognized record, rather as President Johnson's original provocation in the
Gulf of Tonkin is now generally called by its right name. (In his edition of
President Johnson's private papers and conversations in the fall of 2001,
Professor Michael Beschloss produced first-hand and direct proof that Johnson
himself knew at the time that he was lying to the Congress and the world about
the episode.)
As for the expiring moments of that hideous war, the month of May2001 saw
the publication of an extraordinary book, The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident
and the End of the Vietnam War. Written byRalph Wetterhahn, a Vietnam veteran
who had decided to stay with the subject, the book establishes beyond doubt by
the use of contemporary documents and later interviews that:

a) The crew of the Mayaguez were never held on Koh Tang island, the
island that was invaded by the United States Marine Corps.
b) The Cambodians had announced that they intended to return the
vessel, and had indeed done so even as the bombardment of Cambodian
territory was continuing. During that time, the crew was being held on quite
another island, named Rang Sam Lem. The statements of Ford and
Kissinger, claiming credit for the eventual release and attributing it to the
intervention on the wrong island, were knowingly false.
c) American casualties were larger than has ever been admitted:
twenty-three men were pointlessly sacrificed in a helicopter crash in
Thailand that was never acknowledged as part of the operation. Thus, a
total of sixty-four servicemen were sacrificed to "free" forty sailors who had
already been let go, and who were not and had never been at the
advertised location.
d) As a result of the official panic and confusion, three Marines were left
behind alive on Koh Tang island, and later captured and murdered by the
Khmer Rouge. The names of Lance Corporal Joseph Hargrove, Pfc Gary
Hall and Pvt Danny Marshall do not appear on any memorial, let alone the
Vietnam Veterans' wall(see my page 31). For a long time, their names had

16
no official existence at all, and this "denial" might have succeeded
indefinitely were it not for Mr. Wetterhahn's efforts.

Kissinger was the crucial figure at all stages of this crime and cover-up,
arguing at the onset of the crisis that B-52 bombers should at once (and again)
be launched against Cambodia and arguing, too, for the dropping of the BLU-82
bomb-a 15,000-pound device-on the center of Koh Tang island. He must also
have been crucial in the following hair-raising episode, made public by William
Triplett in the official publication of the Vietnam Veterans of America. Mr. Triplett
interviewed then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who recalled two
cabinet meetings during the crisis. The first was the one at which Kissinger
demanded the use of B-52s. The second was the one-no less alarming to
Secretary Schlesinger-at which it was decided to sink all ships spotted in the
vicinity of Koh Tang island.As Schlesinger recalled it:

When I got [back] to the Pentagon ... I said that before any ships are
sunk, our pilots should fly low over the ships and see what they could see,
particularly if there were any [Mayaguez] crew members aboard. If they did
see them, they were to report back in1mediately before doing anything. In
the course of flying over the area, one of our Navy pilots called back saying
that he saw "Caucasians"aboard a ship .... Or he thought he saw that. It
later turned out that every member of the Mayaguez crew was on that ship.

Q: Did you apprise the White House of this ship with the Caucasians aboard?
A: Yes, indeed.
Q: And it was then that the White House said to sink it?
A: Yes, the White House said, "We told you to sink all ships, so sink it!"

By stalling for three hours, the Secretary of Defense managed to avoid
committing this atrocity. And by "the White House" he clearly does not mean the
President, or he would have said so. In any case, we know who was managing
the Mayaguez "rescue," and who took credit for it at the time. We are sure to

17
learn even more aboutKissinger's "hands-on" policy in Indochina as still more
officials write their memoirs or make their confessions.

Latin America
The documentary record on Chile is now more or less complete, but much
remains to be discovered about Kissinger's role in Operation Condor (see my
pages 101-4), and in the nexus of dictatorship and repression which gave it birth.
Recent published work by MartinEdwin Andersen and John Dinges, in the
conservative Washington magazine Insight in January 2002, has presented us
with incontrovertible proof of high-level approval for Argentina's "dirty war" of
death and "disappearance" in the mid-1970s.
The evidence here might be described as unimpeachable, since it originates
with a senior member of the Argentine dictatorship and an ultra-conservative
United States diplomat. The first man, AdmiralCesar Guzzetti, foreign minister of
the Videla dictatorship, had a dispute about both means and ends with the
second man, USAmbassador Robert Hill. Ambassador Hill was a Cold-War
veteran with tight family connections to the business oligarchy in LatinAmerica. A
Nixon appointee to the Buenos Aires post, he had also served contentedly as
envoy to a number of despotic right -wing regimes. However, he was appalled by
the campaign of murder unleashed in Argentina after the 1976 military coup, and
became distressed by the way in which Kissinger, from Washington, undercut his
representations on the matter.
To those familiar with the Chile investigation, in which a "two track"policy was
pursued and the officially accredited ambassador is not supposed to know of the
real or covert policy, this may seem unsurprising. But not to Hill, an old-school
type, the declassification of whose cables furnishes much of the new material.
Before Admiral Guzzetti traveled to Washington to see Kissinger in October
1976,Hill had met him and told him that "murdering priests and dumping fortyseven bodies in the street in one day could not be seen in the context of
defeating the terrorists quickly; on the contrary such acts were probably
counterproductive. What the USG [United StatesGovernment] hoped was that the

18
GOA [Government of Argentina]could soon defeat terrorists, yes, but as nearly
as possible within the law."
Even this admonition, which might be seen by some as containing a loophole
or two, was considered too harsh by Kissinger. Guzzetti set off for Washington,
Hill subsequently minuted, "fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct
warnings on his government's human rights practices." However, having met
Guzzetti on his return to Buenos Aires, he concluded:

Rather than that, he [Guzzetti] has returned in a state of jubilation,
convinced that there is no real problem with the United States over this
issue. Based on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must
now believe that if it has any problems with the US over human rights,, they
are confined to certain elements ofCongress and what it regards as biased
and/or uninformed minor segments of public opinion .... While this
conviction exists, it will be unrealistic and ineffective for this Embassy to
press representations to the GOA over human rights violations.

This is even more grave in its implications than may at first appear.In
October 1976 the rate of state-sponsored kidnapping and" disappearance" was
relatively slow and could, Ambassador Hill believed, be made slower still. But the
declassified documents show Kissinger advising Guzzetti, in effect, to speed up
the pace. He told him that "if the terrorist problem was over by December or
January, he [Kissinger] believed that serious problems could be avoided in
theUnited States." These and other reassurances were, according to Hill-and in a
phrase that has since become obscenely familiar-"the green light" for intensified
repression. When Kissinger and Guzzetti first met, the number of "disappeared"
was estimated at 1,022. By the time that Argentina had become an international
byword for torture, for anti-Semitism, for death-squads and for the concept of the
desaparecido, a minimum of 15,000 victims had been registered by reliable
international and local monitors. In 1978, when the situation was notorious,
Kissinger (by then out of office) accepted a personal invitation from the dictator
General Videla to be his guest during Argentina's hosting of the soccer World

19
Cup. The former Secretary of State made use of the occasion to lecture the
Carter administration for its excessive tenderness concerning human rights.
General Videla, with whom I had a horrifying interview at about this time in the
Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires, has since been imprisoned for life. One of the
more specific charges on which he was convicted was the sale of the children of
rape victims held in his secret jails. His patron and protector, meanwhile, is
enjoying a patriarchal autumn that may still(see below) be disturbed by the
memory of what he permitted and indeed encouraged.

East Timor
On more than one occasion (see my pages 138-66) Henry Kissinger has
absolutely and publicly denied that he had any foreknowledge of the Indonesian
invasion of East Timor, any interest in the subject, or even any awareness of its
importance. That this is a huge falsehood, or perhaps a series of interlocking
falsehoods, has long been apparent from independent evidence. What might be
called conclusive or"smoking gun" proof, however, only became available in
December2001, when a fresh document became available. Declassified by the
State Department, and publicized by the National Security Archive, it is the official
record of a conversation that took place in theIndonesian capital of Jakarta on 6
December 1975. Present were Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford, and the
Indonesian dictator Suharto with a group of his military advisers.
Since Kissinger himself had received a cable from Washington two days
before, informing him that the Indonesian junta had "plans" to invade East Timor,
he cannot have been very much surprised to be told exactly that. Nor can he
have been startled to hear from Suharto that: "We want your understanding if we
deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action." President Ford did not attempt
to mask his endorsement in any ambiguity. "We will understand and will not
press you on the issue," he said. "We understand the problem and the intentions
you have." Kissinger, more experienced in the spin-problems that could result
from unleashing extremist dictatorships, employed language similar to that which
he had (see above) lavished upon Admiral Guzzetti of Argentina. "The use of USmade arms could create problems," he mused, adding that "it depends on how

20
we construe it; whether it is in self-defense or a foreign operation." This was an
absolute untruth, since (see my page 159) Kissinger knew perfectly well that the
use of American-supplied (not "American made") weaponry would violate
international law and United States law as well. Brightening somewhat, he
assured Suharto that: "We would be able to influence the reaction in America if
whatever happens happens after we return . . ... If you have made plans, we will
do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home."As ever, he
was willing to act as errand-boy for an unelected foreign dictatorship and to
consider only Congress as his enemy.
It was therefore agreed, in an early instance of the now-famous
pseudoscience of "deniability," that the aggression be timed to suit the fact that
"The President will be back on Monday at 2.00 pm Jakarta time. We understand
your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only saying that it would be
better if it were done after we returned." With these words, Kissinger made
himself directlycom plicit in the letter and the spirit of Indonesia's attack. A
certainnervousness prompted him to ask Suharto if he anticipated "a long
guerrilla war"; proof in itself that he did not believe Suharto' s claim of popular
support in East Timor. The dictator was reassuring, predicting that there would
"probably be a short guerrilla war," while refusing to be drawn on its actual
duration. The announced imperative of speed, as in Argentina above, was a spur
to ruthless methods that had in effect been demanded by Washington. "It is
important," said Kissinger coldly, "that whatever you do succeeds quickly." The
consequences of this deadly injunction are discussed on my pages140-42.
The same memorandum shows that the talk then turned toIndonesia's oil
policy, and to Suharto's complaint that major petroleum corporations shared more
of the wealth with their MiddleEastern partners than they did with Indonesia.
Expressing sympathy for his attempt to negotiate a better deal, Kissinger found
time to warn the despot that, whatever he did, he should "not create a climate
that discourages investment." This was a case of pushing at an open door: to the
very end of his regime Suharto maintained an investment-friendly climate, at
least for a certain class of cronies of whom, perhaps coincidentally (see my
pages 194-96), Kissinger eventually became one. Indeed, Indonesian "crony

21
capitalism" and its practitioners became a major element in the scandal of
United States campaign finance, and of the Congressional investigation into it,
that marked the Clinton years. Kissinger even hired Clinton's former White House
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty as a partner in Kissinger Associates, and it may not
be fanciful to suppose that the Indonesian connection played a role in this
beautiful piece of bipartisanship.
The Suharto regime collapsed and imploded between the years 2000 and
2001. East Timor won its independence, and Indonesia formally withdrew its
claim to the territory. Suharto himself was indicted by the Indonesian courts for
corruption and only escaped the verdict by resorting, as had General Pinochet, to
the claim of mental and physical incompetence. Once again, though, the senior
partner in the massacres and in the corruption managed to escape
condemnation.

Washington
As I was preparing to publish the original version of this book, I received a
call from William Rogers. Mr. Rogers is a partner in the distinguished Washington
law firm of Arnold and Porter and was, during Kissinger's period as Secretary of
State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. He is also a cog
in the wheel ofKissinger Associates (for the activities of which, see chapter
10).Someone had leaked the advance news of publication to a New York
newspaper and Mr. Rogers, on first contact, was all friendliness.Could he help?
he wanted to know. I told him that I had already forwarded a request for an
interview to his boss, and had mentioned the headings-Chile, Timor, Bangladesh
and the Demetracopoulos affair-which I hoped to discuss with him. Mr. Rogers
professed astonishment at the fourth of these topics. "Who is this guy Demetra
whatsisname?"he inquired. "We've never heard of him." He then asked me to
send a list of all my questions, in order that he might be more "helpful" still.
Recognizing a fishing expedition when I saw one, I instead wrote again to
Kissinger offering to pay him for his trouble and proposing that, if he would give
me and Harper's magazine half an hour on the record, we would pay him at the

22
same rate offered by ABC News Nightline. (I did not add that, for this
honorarium, we would ask him all the questions he has never been asked by Mr.
Ted Koppel.)
Mr. Rogers then dropped the mask of pretended if inquisitive politeness and
sent me a savage e-mail, in which he said that he had never heard of such a
disgraceful proposal. How could I, he demanded to know, propose to pay a
source? Quite obviously I was morally unfit for further conversation. His
indignation got the better of him. I was only making an ironic reference to
Kissinger's habit of charging immense fees for his time (and at no period did I
think of him as a "source"). I wrote back to Rogers, saying that he seemed to be
the same man who had attended the Kissinger-Pinochet private discussion on 8
June 1976 (see my pages 105-9) during which Pinochet had threatened a
Chilean exile then living in Washington. On that occasion, I pointed out, the
record showed that Mr. Rogers had sat in silence. It was therefore good to know
what did, and what did not, touch his nerve of outrage. Mr. Rogers, it now turns
out, also played a role in facilitating the Kissinger-Guzzetti conversations in1976,
and later in trying to put a positive shine upon them. Such men are always, it
seems, with us.
The absurdity of the official pretense, that Elias Demetracopoulos was
beneath Kissinger's notice, is even further exposed by a recently declassified
letter from Kissinger to Nixon, sent on 22 March 1971. It is headed "SECRET:
The Demetracopoulos Affair." It begins by saying to the President: "You may
have heard some repercussions from the recent flap over a request by Greek
'journalist' and resistance leader, Elias Demetracopoulos, to return to Greece to
see his sick father." (It's rather flattering that Kissinger should have put
"joumalist" in sarcastic quotes, but left the definition of resistance leader
unamended.) The letter goes on to say:

Since Demetracopoulos has such a following in Congress and has an
outlet inRowland Evans [then a senior Washington columnist] I thought you
might be interested in knowing that he has long been an irritant in US-Greek
relations. Among his intrigues-which have included selling himself as a

23
trusted US agent to anyone and everyone-he has touched off a record
number of controversies and embarrassments between Greek and
American officials. Through various journalistic enterprises, he has
somehow managed to gain access to press and government circles. CIA,
State, Defense and USIA have repeatedly warned officials about
Demetracopoulos ...

It would appear safe to say, then, that Demetracopoulos was taken with
sufficient seriousness by Kissinger to warrant a slanderous and paranoid
memorandum for the President's desk. This only strengthens the argument made
in my chapter 9, that Kissinger was attempting to represent his Greek critic as a
person dangerous and sinister enough to be dealt with.
Another declassified secret document, this time of a "Secretary's Analytical
Staff Meeting" at the State Department on 20 March 1974, shows Kissinger's
obsession at work again. Irritated by talk of a return to constitutional rule in
Greece, he said: "My question is: Why is it in the American interest to do in
Greece what we apparently don't do anywhere else-of requiring them to give a
commitment to thePresident to move to representative government?"
This was only a few months after the existing right-wing dictatorship in
Athens had been overthrown from the extreme right by the psychopath Brigadier
Joannidis. Even Henry Tasca, then United States Ambassador to Athens and a
trusted friend of the regime, was moved to reply:

Well, I think because Greece and the Greek people-in terms of their
position and public opinion in Western Europe-are quite unique. You can go
back to the constitutional Greece or the Greek lobby-whatever you want to
call it-and they've got a position in Western Europe and the United States
that Brazil and Chile and these other countries don't have. None of these
countries has a Demetracopoulos – a Greek refugee who's been activated
and who for four years has been leading a very vigorous fight on our policy
in Greece.

24
To this Kissinger made the glacial reply that "That just means we're letting
Demetracopoulos's particular group make policy." But he was clearly nettled that
some of his own deputies found it difficult to treat Greece as a banana republic.
This was a high-level meeting. The minutes record the attendance of such
policy heavyweights as Joseph Sisco, Helmut Sonnenfeld, Lawrence
Eagleburger and Arthur Hartman. It is clear that the dangerous activity of a single
dissident was not beneath official attention.
Once again, I note that the Greek government, for which Kissinger was
acting as proxy here, was a murderous and torturing dictatorship, with aggressive
designs upon its Cypriot neighbor, and that its then leaders are now in prison for
life. And once again, I note that their senior partner and patron is still at liberty,
and still lying about his part in all this.

Legal Consequences

Just as this book was being published, Kissinger produced a volume of his
own with the pseudo-solemn title Does America Need a Foreign Policy? It
contained an anxious chapter on the perils of the new legal doctrine of "universal
jurisdiction," and this same chapter was reprinted as a separate essay in the
Establishment's house-organ,Foreign Affairs. There was a certain amount of
public laughter at the sheer disingenuousness of this: Kissinger wrote as if he
was cogitating the subject with absolute disinterest.
Events, however, were to give independent validation of his professed
concern. In May 2001, Judge Rodolfo Corral, a senior magistrate in Argentina,
issued a summons to Kissinger to answer questions about his knowledge of
Operation Condor (see my pages101-4). Judge Corral's investigation, like many
similar human rights inquiries in the southern hemisphere of the Americas, could
proceed no further without disclosure of what the United States knew and when it
knew it, and Kissinger was the chief material witness at all material times.
Only a few days later, on 28 May 2001, Kissinger was visited in his suite at
the Ritz Hotel in Paris by the criminal division of the French gendarmerie. They
brought him a summons, issued by Judge RogerLe Loire, to appear at the Palais

25
de Justice the following morning and answer questions about the
"disappearance" of five French citizens in Chile during the early days of the
Pinochet regime. Kissinger might reasonably have thought himself safe in the
hotel owned byMohammed al-Fayed, but chose the path of prudence and left
Paris at once. (The summons remains valid if he should ever choose to return;I
should like to boast briefly that the European press attributed this judicial move in
part to the then-recent appearance of this book in itsFrench translation.)
Since then, the Chilean courts-including the judge who is deciding the
Pinochet case itself-have written to Kissinger asking for his cooperation as a
witness in the case of Charles Horman, anAmerican reporter murdered during
Pinochet' s coup, and in the general matter of "Condor" -related crime. This
means that duly constituted magistrates in three democratic nations are seekingand are being refused-his testimony on grave crimes against humanity.As
predicted in my introduction (see pages xliii-li) he can no longer make travel
plans without consulting his expensive attorneys.
Most serious of all, though, was the suit filed in Federal Court inWashington,
DC, on 10 September 2001. This suit is brought by the surviving members of the
family of General Rene Schneider of Chile(see my pages 84-101 and 203). It
charges Kissinger and others with "summary execution" of the General; in other
words, but in a civil case, with murder and international terrorism. The date of the
lawsuit may seem unpropitious to some, but in fact the hideous aggression
against American civil society that occurred the following day has laid greater
emphasis than ever on the need for a single standard, and one day a single
international court, for the hearing of crimes against humanity, state-sponsored
murder and international nihilism.
In the same period, the National Security Archive and others compelled
Kissinger to return 50,000 pages of the public documents he had illegally
abstracted when he left office (see my page 116-17) and to have these returned
to the scrutiny of scholars and historians(and victims). It is an empirically safe bet
that Kissinger did not seek to conceal or bury material that put him in a good
light. We may therefore expect the coming years to be as full of appalling
disclosure, of official crime and official lying on his part, as the last year has

26
been. And there is just a chance that some of the victims may secure some
justice on their own account, by means of American and other courts. It seems to
me deplorable, though, and even shameful, that those who have already suffered
enough should have to volunteer for the performance of a task that properly lies
on the shoulders of Congress and the Justice Department.
To leave a personal note to the very last, I had myself rather hoped to be
engaged in litigation with Kissinger. Had he sued me over this book (as the
London Literary Review said that he was in honor bound to do, if he valued his
reputation) I had dreamed of producing witnesses, and subpoenaing documents,
that would accelerate the process of discovery. It was not to be: Kissinger's
reticence remained his best counsel. I did, however, find myself threatening to
sue him when he publicly accused me of being an anti-Semite and a denier of the
Holocaust. In very grudging and graceless terms, he did through his lawyers offer
me a swift retraction. In other words, he admitted that he had no basis for this
especially foul accusation, but had thought it worth trying. Those who are curious
to learn the background and to follow the correspondence may direct their trusty
search engines and browsers.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

Washington, DC, 15 February 2002