Security Evaluation of Intel's Active
Management Technology

VA S S I L I O S V E RV E R I S

KTH Information and
Communication Technology

Master of Science Thesis
Stockholm, Sweden 2010
TRITA-ICT-EX-2010:37

Security Evaluation of Intel’s Active Management
Technology

Master thesis

Vassilios Ververis
ververis{at}kth.se

Supervisor and Examiner: Prof. Gerald Q. Maguire Jr. KTH
Industrial Supervisor: Prof. Jean-Pierre Seifert, Technische Universtität Berlin

i
Abstract
Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT) is, a hardware-based platform for remotely managing and securing personal computers out of band.
AMT is available in most desktop and notebooks PCs equipped with an Intel
Core 2, Centrino, or Centrino 2 processors with support for vPro technology.
AMT operates independently of the platform processor and operating system.
Remote platform management applications can access AMT securely, even
when the platform is turned off, as long as the platform is connected to
power supply and to a network. Developers can build applications that utilize
AMT using the application programming interface (API) provided by Intel.
While this might seem to enable creation of a powerful management tool, a
secure infrastructure that is secure against insider and outsider attacks on
an enterprise network is difficult. Unfortunately this technology can also
potentially be used to create a powerful backdoor that is easily deployed and
offers numerous features due to its almost unlimited permissions since the
platform can be managed even though it is powered off.

ii
Sammanfattning
Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) är en hårdvarubaserad
plattform för avlägset att hantera och säkra datorer utanför bandet. AMT
är tillgänglig de flesta stationära och bärbara dator utrustad med en Intel
Core 2, Centrino, eller Centrino 2 processorer med stöd för vPro-teknik. AMT
driver oberoende av plattform processor och operativsystem. Remote optimera
hanteringen ansökningar kan komma åt AMT säkert, även om Plattformen är
avstängd, så länge som plattform är ansluten till linjen makt och till ett nätverk.
Utvecklare kan bygga applikationer som utnyttjar AMT använder Application
Programming Interface från Intel. Även detta kan verkar för att möjliggöra
skapandet av ett kraftfullt verktyg i förvaltningen, faktiskt skapar en säker
infrastruktur som är säkert mot insider och outsider angrepp på företagets
nätverk är svårt. Tyvärr har denna teknik kan komma i används för att skapa en
kraftfull rootkit som är lätt att iordningställas och erbjuder flera egenskaper på
grund av dess nästan obegränsade tillstånd eftersom plattformen kan lyckades
även om den är avstängd.

Contents
Contents

iii

List of Figures

vi

List of Tables

vii

List of Listings

viii

List of Abbreviations

ix

1 Introduction
1.1 Remote management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Problem to be addressed by this thesis project
1.3 Importance of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.1 Corporations adopted Intel AMT . . . .
1.4 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5 Thesis structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

5
5
6
7
7
8
9

2 Intel AMT architecture
2.1 Platform architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.1 System power states . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Interface types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Remote access interfaces . . . . . . .
2.2.2 Local access interface . . . . . . . .
2.3 Architecture features . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Discovering IT assets . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Remote repair of systems . . . . . .
2.3.3 Viruses and rootkit protection . . .
2.3.4 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.5 IDE-R and Serial over LAN features
2.4 Intel AMT Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.1 ME firmware upgrade . . . . . . . .
2.5 AMT assigned network ports . . . . . . . .
2.6 Configuration methods . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

11
11
13
14
14
16
17
17
18
18
18
19
19
20
23
23

iii

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

iv

Contents

.
.
.
.

24
24
25
27

3 Security analysis of Intel AMT
3.1 Chapter overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1 Lab environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Bypassing Intel AMT’s local access restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 SMB setup mode vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.1 SMB countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 IDE-R and Serial over LAN vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 HTTP digest authentication scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.2 How digest access authentication works . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.3 How Intel AMT handles HTTP digest access authentication .
3.5.4 Intel AMT password policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.5 Exhaustive password policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.6 International keyboards on AMT MEBx . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.7 Keyboard mapping implementation fault . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.8 Password-based authentication to Intel AMT: attack scenario
3.6 Cracking process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.1 John the ripper patch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.2 Patch for AMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.3 Creating the password string . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.5 GPU cracking scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7 Remote provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7.2 Remote provision certificate fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7.3 Certificate fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7.4 Intel AMT remote provision configuration . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7.5 Intel AMT remote provisioning: attack scenario . . . . . . . .
3.7.6 Vulnerability: ZTC implemented when AMT is disabled . . .
3.8 Mobile version of AMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.1 How mobile AMT works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.2 Activating AMT mobile version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.3 Implementation fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.4 Wireless attacks on AMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.5 Attack types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.6 Confidentiality attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.7 Integrity attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.8.8 Availability attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.9 Intel AMT Privacy threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29
29
29
30
30
31
31
32
32
33
35
35
36
37
37
38
38
38
39
41
41
42
43
43
45
45
48
51
52
53
54
54
55
56
56
57
58
59
60

2.7

2.6.1
Setup
2.7.1
2.7.2

Zero touch configuration model . . .
and configuration models . . . . . . .
SMB provision model . . . . . . . .
Connecting to an Intel AMT device

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

Contents

v

3.9.1
3.9.2
3.9.3

Privacy protection mechanisms in AMT . . . . . . . . . . . .
End user notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Privacy concerns from publishers and end-users . . . . . . . .

4 Conclusions and Future Work
4.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 HTTP digest access authentication
4.3 Mobile version issues . . . . . . . .
4.4 Gratis hardware rootkit . . . . . .
4.5 Recommendations . . . . . . . . .
4.6 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .
issues
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

61
61
62
63
63
64
64
64
65
65

Appendices

67

A Vendor e-mail communication

69

Bibliography

71

List of Figures
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10

Intel AMT silicon architecture (adapted from [37]) . . . . . . . . .
Management engine diagram in greater detail (adapted from [37])
Management engine network OOB architecture (adapted from [37])
SOAP message structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standard management protocol stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Routing local requests to Intel AMT (adapted from [52] . . . . . .
AMT MEBx post screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT MEBx main menu screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT MEBx configuration menu screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT web UI login page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

12
13
14
15
16
17
25
26
27
28

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13

Administrator credentials transmitted in clear-text
Digest access authentication schema . . . . . . . .
MEBx common keys (adapted from [68]) . . . . . .
ZTC provisioning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT provisioning flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intel AMT disabled in BIOS . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intel AMT SCS console – not configured . . . . . .
Intel AMT SCS console – configured . . . . . . . .
AMT mobile power policies . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT mobile version web UI . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fake AP attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beacon flood attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT status notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

32
34
37
45
46
52
52
53
54
55
58
60
62

vi

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

List of Tables
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6

Intel AMT firmware releases [40],[2],[19] . . . . .
Intel AMT enabled desktops and notebooks [53]
AMT enabled embedded systems [58] . . . . . .
AMT registered IANA ports[47] . . . . . . . . .
OOB registered IANA ports[47] . . . . . . . . . .
Provisioning models[52] . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

19
21
22
23
23
24

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

Benchmarked systems . . . . .
JtR benchmarks . . . . . . . .
SSL certificate fingerprints . . .
Hello packet back-off algorithm
Vulnerability affected PCs . . .

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

42
42
46
51
53

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

vii

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

List of Listings
2.1
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14

Built-in AMT web server URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A1 hash calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A2 hash calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
response hash calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Initiation of HTTP digest access authentication – server response[48]
Client request with the authorization header on HTTP digest
authentication[48] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HTTP digest realm directive example of AMT . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intel AMT JtR patch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Apply JtR source code patch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HDAA-MD5 password string syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HDAA-MD5 AMT specific password string syntax . . . . . . . . . .
CSRrequest.cfg file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CSR generation command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PFX certificate generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De-authentication attack example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

27
33
33
33
34
34
39
40
41
41
41
49
50
50
60

List of Abbreviations
ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AD . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AMT . . . . . . . . . . . .
API . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ARP . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ASF . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ATM . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIOS . . . . . . . . . . . .
BMC . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CIM . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CPU . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CRC . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CSR . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DASH . . . . . . . . . . . .
DHCP . . . . . . . . . . .
DMTF . . . . . . . . . . .
DoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DSSS . . . . . . . . . . . .
EAP . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FQDN . . . . . . . . . . .
GNU . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GPL . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GPU . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HDAA-MD5 . . . . .
HECI . . . . . . . . . . . .
HTML . . . . . . . . . . .
HTTP . . . . . . . . . . .
HTTPS . . . . . . . . . .
ICH . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ICMP . . . . . . . . . . . .
IDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Access Control List
Active Directory
Active Management Technology
Application Programming Interface
Address Resolution Protocol
Alert Standard Format
Automatic Teller Machines
Basic Input/Output System
Baseboard Management Controller
Certificate Authority
Common Information Model
Common Name
Central Processing Unit
Cyclic Redundancy Check
Certificate Signing Request
Desktop and mobile Architecture for System Hardware
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
Distributed Management Task Force
Denial of Service
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
Extensible Authentication Protocol
Fully Qualified Domain Name
Gnu’s Not Unix
General Public License
Graphics Processing Unit
HTTP Digest Access Authentication MD5
Host Embedded Controller Interface
Hyper Text Markup Language
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
I/O Controller Hub
Internet Control Message Protocol
Integrated Device Electronics
Intrusion Detection System
ix

x

IETF . . . . . . . . . . . .
INC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IPMI . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ISV . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ITU-T . . . . . . . . . . .
JtR . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LAN . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LMS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MD5 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ME . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MEBx . . . . . . . . . . .
MITM . . . . . . . . . . .
MPI . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O ................
OEM . . . . . . . . . . . .
OS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OU . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PEM . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
QOP . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SIMD . . . . . . . . . . . .
SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SMB . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOAP . . . . . . . . . . . .
SSE2 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SSID . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TXT . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
URL . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USB . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WLAN . . . . . . . . . . .

List of Listings

Internet Engineering Task Force
Incorporated
Internet Protocol
Intelligent Platform Management Interface
Independent Software Vendor
Information Technology
Telecommunication Standardization Sector
John the Ripper
Local Area Network
Local Manageability Service
Media Access Control
Message Digest 5
Management Engine
Management Engine BIOS extension
Man In The Middle
message passing interface
Network Interface Card
Organization
Original Equipment Manufacturer
Operating System
Organization Unit
Personal Computer
Privacy Enhanced Mail
Point of Sale
Quality Of Protection
Radio Frequency
Setup and Configuration Service
Single Instruction Multiple Data
Session Initiation Protocol
Small Medium Business
Simple Object Access Protocol
Streaming SIMD Extensions 2
Service Set Identifier
Secure Sockets Layer
Transmission Control Protocol
Transport Layer Security
Trusted Execution Technology
User Datagram Protocol
User Interface
Universal Resource Identifier
Uniform Resource Locator
Universal Serial Bus
Virtualization Technology
Wireless Local Area Network

List of Listings

WS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WWW . . . . . . . . . . .
XML . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ZTC . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

Web Services
World Wide Web
Extensible Markup Language
Zero Touch Configuration

Preface
Intel Active Management Technology and Intel vPro technology are trademarks or
registered trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States
and other countries. Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of
their respective owners.

1

Acknowledgments
This thesis work took place at the SECT research group in technical university of
Berlin. There are a number of people that they have helped me during my research
on this thesis and I would like to acknowledge. First and foremost I would like to
thank my supervisor at SECT research group Prof. Jean-Pierre Seifert for providing
his valuable support and his excellent guidance during my whole thesis work. Also
my supervisor and examiner at KTH Prof. Gerald Q. Maguire Jr, for his overall
guidance, the essential comments, and his prompt feedback throughout the different
sections of the thesis.
Special thanks to the SECT research group for the extensive help as well as all
my friends and my family for their love and support during the work of the thesis.

3

Chapter 1

Introduction
Managing a computer system remotely is a non-trivial task using access and
maintenance tools that are freely-available especially for the GNU/LINUX operating system (OS). A typical scenario for most enterprises is to provide remote
management for multiple systems running on a variety of server platforms and
heterogeneous operating systems. The requirements for information technology
(IT) administration constantly shift. At the same time enterprises are trying to
perform this administration within a tight budget, thus generally precluding time
consuming operations while still providing reliable and secure system solutions for
the enterprise’s activities.

1.1

Remote management

One of most used out-of-band[71] (OOB) management infrastructure is intelligent
platform management interface (IPMI) which requires a separate serial port
connection from each remote machine to a centralized console server. The intelligent
platform management interface (IPMI) is a popular approach to remote management. It can be performed without strict server requirements and is supported
by numerous hardware vendors[41]. IPMI utilizes a baseboard management
controller (BMC); a micro-controller embedded on the motherboard of workstations
and servers that operates independently of the operating system OS and the
management software of the system – even when the monitored system is turned
off[42].
However, IPMI does not cover the complete spectrum of devices and systems
that need to be managed; when compared to remote management solutions based
on secure and routable protocols using a common data model. IPMI’s common
information model (CIM) provides a standard definition of management information
for systems, networks, applications, and services, while offering support for vendor
extensions. CIM’s common definitions enable vendors to exchange semantically rich
management information between systems throughout the network[21].
5

6

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In April 1998, Intel and IBM corporation collaborated on the development of
alert-on-LAN technology formally known as the alert standard format (ASF).
ASF[20] is a protocol for remote management and control of systems in both OSpresent and OS-absent environments, primarily focused on minimizing on-site IT
maintenance, maximizing system availability, and maximizing performance of the
local user. Since 1998, Intel focused on developing extended features based on Web
Services (WS) Management and simple object access protocol (SOAP) technologies, whilst establishing compatibility with standards based implementations and
applications.
In 2005 Intel released the vPro technology enclosing Intel AMT, Intel trusted
execution technology (TXT), and virtualization technology (VT). In 2007 the
distributed management task force (DMTF) published the desktop and mobile
architecture for system hardware (DASH) standard[22], a suite of specifications
that takes full advantage of the WS-Management (WS-MAN)[23] requirements,
providing standards for secure out-of-band and remote management of desktop and
mobile systems. In the same year Intel released support on vPro for the DASH
initiative specification, implementing hardware based support for remote repair,
diagnostics, configuration, tracking assets, secure network defense filters, hardwareassisted anti-virus and rootkits1 protection.

1.2

Problem to be addressed by this thesis project

Intel AMT is an out-of-band remote management technology making use of a
dedicated communication channel which is embedded in Intel AMT enabled chipsets
located on the north-bridge part of the motherboard. This technology is mainly
designed to assist system administrators and IT managers to remotely maintain,
repair, update, monitor, and upgrade networked computers without requiring onsite technical support or user actions. AMT helps organizations and enterprises
to reduce costs and minimize time spent on administrative operations without
demanding a complex management infrastructure.
Unfortunately this technology can provide a powerful backdoor[75] to the
managed platform that is fully operational and accessible, even while the PC is
turned off[10]. The problem to be addressed on this thesis is the fundamental
security vulnerabilities found in the authentication schema, the remote provisioning
mechanism, and the mobile version in terms of the new attacks vectors that they
introduce to the Intel AMT platform.
1

Rootkit is a form of system modification software, defined as an application that fraudulently
gains or maintains administrator level access that may also execute in a manner that prevents
detection[18]. It can be used for eavesdropping network traffic, capturing user keystrokes,
alternating log files and modifying standard OS system tools to circumvent detection. Rootkit’s
operations are hidden on the system by manipulating OS commands that execute arbitrary code
and by crafting the results returned by these commands chosen by the attacker.

1.3. IMPORTANCE OF THIS THESIS

1.3

7

Importance of this thesis

The contributions of this thesis are two fold. First it uncovers fundamental security
vulnerabilities of the Intel AMT system and it sketches the implications that
these vulnerabilities may have on critical operations; thence on remote network
management. To demonstrate the inefficiency of current deployments of Intel AMT
to home users or enterprises we orchestrate a potpourri of attacks with respect to
the authentication schema, the remote provisioning process, and the mobile version.
Unfortunately, these is almost no related work (concerning the problem introduced
in section 1.2). At the Black Hat conference in USA, Alexander Tereshkin and
Rafal Wojtczuk presented a ring -3 rootkit[10]. They describe ring -3 rootkit as a
backdoor that abuses the Intel AMT technology and could potentially bypass the
dedicated memory protection of AMT and compromise the AMT code executed
on the chipset. They introduced an attack vector that assumes to be performed
locally in order to be successful; whereas in this thesis our attack vectors can be
accomplished remotely. Detailed information can be found in section 3.
Intel’s AMT could be clearly seen as a major privacy concern, as it introduces new
attack vectors via a covert channel, since the user is not able to monitor the network
traffic, produced by the Intel AMT embedded microprocessor. An attacker or a
malicious entity, could misuse this technology for monitoring, controlling, exploiting,
or even gaining access to the whole system, since Intel AMT is present on computers
used by both home users and corporations. Moreover, Intel AMT operates even
when it is disabled in the BIOS configuration; showing that the complexity and
visibility of the technology are at issue. Detailed information is present in section
x. Being prone to potential attack vectors, Intel AMT provides the basis for a
backdoor that silently operates in our PCs.

1.3.1

Corporations adopted Intel AMT

Intel’s worldwide computing environment includes more than 100,000 PCs, by
the end of 2009 they have deployed and provisioned 50,000 PCs with Intel vPro
technology and the AMT platform extension[45]. Additionally there is an extensive
list of large corporations that have adopted Intel AMT in their IT infrastructure.
Atos Origin an international IT services company[16]. The company’s annual
revenues are more than 5 e billion and it employs over 46,000 people in 40
countries.
Nottingham University Hospitals (NHS) Trust is one of the largest hospitals in
the UK with an annual budget of more than 555 e million. The hospital has
provisioned[36] and uses around 6,000 Intel vPro based desktop PCs embedded
with the Intel AMT platform over two sites: Queen’s medical center and city
hospital.

8

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

University of Plymouth the fifth largest university in the United Kingdom,
deployed around 4,800 PCs with Intel DQ965GF vPro and AMT enabled
motherboards[29].
Bangkok’s general hospital one of the largest hospitals in Thailand. They have
migrated to the Intel AMT infrastructure with over 1500 PCs[77],[34]
Additionally, the following[33],[34] ISVs have added support for the Intel AMT infrastructure and applications usages, supporting management software for Windows,
GNU/Linux and Mac OS: Altiris, BMC Software, Check Point Software, Cisco,
Computer Associates, HP, LANDesk Software, Microsoft, Novell, StarSoftComm,
Symantec, Trend Micro.

1.4

Related work

Michiel Timmers and Adriaan van der Zee have published an article[57] that
describes the limitations and capabilities of Intel AMT targeting the network defense
system sub-component of system defense and agent presence security tool-set[32] of
the underlying technology. They have conducted a number of experiments aimed
at determining the effectiveness of network blocking and rate limiting filters; in
terms of throughput and the overall network performance. Their experiments are
categorized based on blocking outgoing ICMP traffic, rate limiting a single protocol,
the effectiveness of a rate limit on other network based traffic and also on a large
number of non-matching filters. They concluded that most of these network filters
can be performed via a network switch device, but without the robustness and
manageability that AMT architecture offers, combined with the reduced work load
on the IT staff. Moreover by using the Intel AMT platform there are no extra
software requirements and computing overhead as would be the case with most
remote network management suites. Their article covers only a limited fraction of
the AMT platform’s capabilities and does not evaluate or measure the performance
of the other features that underly this technology (as described in section 2.3)
Additionally related work is the presentation at the Black Hat conference in
Las Vegas, USA by Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk introducing ring −
3 rootkits[10]. They demonstrated code injection executed into the Intel AMT
management engine (ME) environment. Their attack is successfully only in the
Intel Q35 chipset and requires physical presence. They implemented a proof of
concept that injects arbitrary code into the chipset’s AMT/ME memory on an Intel
DQ35JO motherboard, using the chipset memory reclaiming mechanism[11]. Their
code is based on the ARC4 architecture and repetitively write the "ITL" string to
incremental locations in the host memory. This is a proof of concept code injection
that imitates a rootkit’s behavior. Their findings imply that a malicious person
needs local access to the motherboard in order to implement such a rootkit.

1.5. THESIS STRUCTURE

1.5

9

Thesis structure

This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives a detailed overview of the Intel AMT architecture, enumerating
the interface types, the use cases, the released versions, registered network ports, the
offered setup, and configuration models; as well as utilization of a basic connection
to the platform. Additionally we discuss functionalities that extend this platform
and the supported configuration methods for the deployment of this technology.
In the third chapter there is an overview of the hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP) authentication schema that is used by AMT and we discuss our implementation (a patch) for successfully brute-forcing Intel AMT credentials giving
access to the remote management functions, including some benchmarks for doing
so. Moreover we present a way of exploiting the built-in support for provisioning
thus exploiting remote provision to avoid the need for any physical access to the
targeted computer. We clearly present how easily the AMT protection technology
can be circumvented even while the AMT functionality is disabled. Additionally,
we present some potential attack vectors on the mobile version of this platform
classifying these as confidentiality, integrity, and availability attacks.
In chapter 4 we conclude with a summary of the potential privacy threats and lack
of protection, as well as summarizing the security concerns that the AMT technology
introduces. Finally, we present some suggestions for future work in order to mitigate
the risks that this technology introduces as well as providing recommendations for
potential research related to this technology.

Chapter 2

Intel AMT architecture
In this section we present an overview of how the AMT’s architecture performs
providing characteristics about the platform architecture in terms of hardware such
as schema, as well as a detailed explanation of how the overall system perform in the
hardware level. Additionally we introduce the available interface types that apply
to AMT (local and remote), how the AMT performs in the user space level as well
as enumerating the functionalities of remote network management tasks (i.e. use
cases). Moreover we present the firmware releases of AMT, their offered capabilities
(in respect to hardware) as well as firmware upgrade details. Additionally we
cover the network ports registered and used by AMT, the setup and configuration
models providing details on the configuration settings and the requirements to
initiate a remote connection to manage an AMT platform. Furthermore we outline
the configuration methods used by AMT and list the fraction of the systems
to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that employ the AMT platform.
Last we demonstrate a serious vulnerability of the small to medium business
configuration model and we denote how the Intel’s AMT local access restrictions
can be circumvented.

2.1

Platform architecture

Intel AMT hardware is realized as an embedded ARC4 micro-controller[12] located
in the chipset’s graphics and memory controller hub. The basic system architecture
is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The management engine’s (ME) persistent code resides
in firmware within the same flash memory device as the BIOS, in computer systems
containing specific Intel motherboard chipsets as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The ME
persistent code is stored outside the context of the OS in a protected, compressed,
and non-volatile flash memory section in order to survive power outages and system
rebuilds. The ME can access its dedicated memory space even when the system
is in S3 power state (see section 2.1.1), and the ME can dynamically change the
memory power state to allow the ME access to memory through the graphics and
memory controller hub[37].
11

12

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

Figure 2.1. Intel AMT silicon architecture (adapted from [37])

The ME is connected via a serial peripheral interface (SPI) the FLASH memory
device. The flash memory device contains also a third-party data storage designed to
allow communication using a master-slave relationship model.Note that this thirdparty data store is designed to allow other application to securely store their data
in the FLASH memory device. For dynamic memory, the micro-controller uses a
small amount of the main system memory, typically less than 1% of the total system
memory. A more detailed view is depicted in Figure 2.2
One of the most interesting features that this technology supports is direct access
to the network interface card (NIC) via SOAP services as the ME share access to a
LAN interface. In practice this means that they use the same MAC address and IP
address (especially if using the dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP)). As
a result both the ME and the main processor will appear to be reachable using the
same hostname. The OS can use the ME as an embedded network firewall solution
(shifting the processing to the ME from the host processor) enabling the ME to
handle IP port based filtering, while forwarding and routing address resolution
protocol (ARP) and DHCP network packets between the host and the ME microcontroller as shown in Figure 2.3.
Intel AMT can provide manageability over a wired or wireless network environment as well as accessibility outside the context of the OS. Additionally, some
operations can be initiated by the host OS of the managed station to the ME
for transmission (for example, as of a management service notification). This
communication is implemented with the aid of a host embedded controller interface
(HECI). Thus the operating system can use a HECI driver to communicate via this
HECI to the ME.

2.1. PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE

13

Figure 2.2. Management engine diagram in greater detail (adapted from [37])

2.1.1

System power states

The ME runs independently from the main system’s power state, thus it can operate
under all six system power states[30]:
• S0 defines a completely powered on and fully operational system.
• S1 to S3 power states are various sleep states.
• S4 is the hibernate state. This state use only a very limited amount of power,
hence the system is almost powered off.
• S5 defines a completely powered off system (but attached to a power supply)
and is available to the ME and the Wake-on-LAN portion of the network
interface(s).
The system power states S0 to S5 can only be controlled over a wired local area
network (LAN); since the radio in a wireless network interface card (NIC) is
generally not operational in power states other than S0. As a result, the wireless

14

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

Figure 2.3. Management engine network OOB architecture (adapted from [37])

LAN Intel AMT interface is inaccessible when notebooks are powered down or in
low-power modes (sleep, hibernate, or suspend power state modes)[44].

2.2

Interface types

By design AMT supports two types of interface access: local and remote access
(via wired and wireless) interfaces. Remote interfaces can send and receive network
based traffic via a LAN connection and access the most AMT firmware functions,
while the local interface has limited access to the AMT firmware in order to prevent
alternations of critical security aspects of the configuration.

2.2.1

Remote access interfaces

Remote access interfaces communicate with Intel AMT via three methods[52]:
SOAP messages, Proprietary Redirection Protocol, and WS-Management. Each
of these is explained in more detail below.
• SOAP messages based on the XML language the SOAP network protocol
are used for transmitting and exchanging AMT related messages with the
structure depicted in Figure 2.4:
An envelope provides the framework for defining what is in the message
and how to process it. The header provides a set of encoding rules that
denoting instances of application-defined data types. The body contains text
that follows a convention for representing procedure calls and responses.

2.2. INTERFACE TYPES

15

Figure 2.4. SOAP message structure

• The proprietary redirection protocol utilizes serial over LAN and integrated
drive electronics (IDE) as well as universal serial bus (USB) redirection
capabilities to redirect input and output to the serial interface or the IDE
interface to the LAN interface. This allows a remote application to provide
serial input (or to receive serial output) and IDE (disk operations) operations.
This enables PXE remote booting from a remote CD or disk drive. Both
Serial over LAN and IDE redirection use a proprietary protocol and can
be implemented using Intel AMT software development kit in independent
software vendor (ISV) applications.
• WS-Management[23] is a DMTF open standard that manages, accesses
and exchanges information in an object oriented manner across supported
devices and systems via the network. WS-Management is based on the
CIM as extended by Intel to include support for most AMT functionalities
by implementing the DASH specification. An overview of the standard
management protocol stack as defined by the WS-Management standard is
illustrated in Figure 2.5. The WS standard specifications used to communicate
with AMT are WS-Transfer, WS-Enumeration, WS-Eventing, and WSAddressing. Each of these is described further below.
WS-Transfer Provides simple operations on a single resource (GET, PUT,
CREATE, or DELETE)
WS-Enumeration Provides context specific enumeration based on a given filter
by utilizing the PULL operation.
WS-Eventing Provides a subscription to events emitted by a resource.

16

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

WS-Addressing Provides a common framework for defining references to resources and defines the basic mechanisms for sending and routing these to
the appropriate destination.

Figure 2.5. Standard management protocol stack

2.2.2

Local access interface

Intel AMT access the local interface by using the WS-Management standard
protocol transmitting SOAP messages transmitted over HTTP. This way permitted
local applications could communicate with the Intel AMT interface. When a local
application transmits a SOAP message destined to the local Intel AMT host name,
the local manageability service (LMS) intercepts the request and routes it via the
HECI to the management engine for further processing. The LMS acts as a proxy
service that transfers TCP requests (open/close connections and TCP packets),
between the host management applications and the ME as illustrated in Figure 2.6.
The HECI enables the host OS to control other devices (e.g. an on-board fan
controller) and provides a bi-directional channel so that the host OS and the
management engine can initiate and complete transactions. The I/O controller
hub (ICH), often called the south bridge chipset, is used to interface the processor
to various I/O devices. It exists in several versions (shown later in Table 2.4), when
referring to a generic version we write ICHx (as in Figure 2.6).

2.3. ARCHITECTURE FEATURES

17

Figure 2.6. Routing local requests to Intel AMT (adapted from [52]

2.3

Architecture features

Intel AMT functionality can be categorized in terms of use cases[52] for a variety
of remote network management tasks. The common tasks are discussed in the
following section.

2.3.1

Discovering IT assets

Since the ME is able to respond to network traffic even when the host is powered
off, it is possible for a network management system to query the AMT enabled
device (typically a PC) and get updated information regarding its configuration.
This configuration is stored in a local non-volatile data storage area managed by
the ME. For instance, a remote application could query the network according to a
schedule to find out what computers are attached to the network, what their MAC
and IP address is, what is the type and the available number of processors, what is
the processor’s serial number, what OS that is being run, etc.
Some of this information can be stored in advance by the OS when it is running,
but the information remains accessible even if the OS is not running. By using the
hardware asset interface which runs locally on the platform specific IT infrastructure
data regarding hardware and software inventory can be tracked down and audited
with ease. Additionally the underlying information can be stored in the non-volatile

18

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

data storage of the platform with the aid of the storage interface and the library
components.

2.3.2

Remote repair of systems

Using AMT an administrator can remotely control and manage a PC with the
AMT technology. This could be used to install a new OS (even on a system that
has no OS installed yet), run diagnostics on the computer, etc. The remote access
functionality can be used to examine hardware logs. Specific filters could be set up
to automatically, trigger an alert to a remote management system. This behavior
establishes a watchdog1 timer that reports when specific patterns of connections
to TCP ports occur. This might be used as part of an intrusion detection system
(IDS).

2.3.3

Viruses and rootkit protection

Version control of anti-virus and firewall applications is of great importance;
especially in an enterprise since the number of malicious programs as well as
viruses and rootkits[18] are increasing daily. By using the storage interface of
the AMT platform it is possible to track the version number of the protection
software that is being used on a given computer, in order to determine that the
software is up to date and has the latest virus signatures. Moreover by using the
redirection and remote control interfaces this software can be updated regardless of
the system state (i.e., the software can be updated even if the computer is initially
powered off). Additionally a managed device can be placed in a quarantine state by
using the system defense interface to control its network access, thus limiting the
communication of this device.
Furthermore by combining the remote agent presence interface with the local
agent presence interface different policies and customized log events can be applied
with the aid of the event management interface. This is useful when a malicious
threat is detected so that an AMT capable system can be automatically isolated
from the rest of the network (using the circuit breaker interface) while triggering
an array of commands to help remedy the infected system.

2.3.4

Infrastructure

Part of the AMT platform makes use of the security administration, network
administration, and network time interface to configure the access control list (ACL)
with the appropriate network and security settings in order to adapt the system to
1

Watchdog timer is a software or hardware timer that provides protection, by triggering an
alarm (such as system reset) to the system when an error occurs, for instance network packet
flooding. The watchdog facility ensure that the system is in a working state.

2.4. INTEL AMT RELEASES

19

the desired configuration to fit the local IT environment. The use of the ACL
manages who has access to which functionalities within the Intel AMT platform.

2.3.5

IDE-R and Serial over LAN features

An interesting hardware based feature of AMT is the remote booting operation
via the integrated device electronics redirection (IDE-R)[39]. This feature can be
used by the IT technical support personnel or the administrator to remotely boot
a PC that has software remediation problems (e.g. booting errors) to a known
clean state. This is achieved by using the IDE-R functionality in order to boot the
problematic PC from an image or medium (e.g. CD-ROM) on a local or remote
storage destination. Moreover by using the console redirection via the Serial over
LAN[39] functionality the administrator or the IT department can provide support
by controlling a PC outside the context of the OS. This feature allows the remotely
use of a keyboard and mouse, as well as video console output in order to perform
tasks such as BIOS configuring and pre OS maintenance. The redirection network
traffic is transmitted over TCP port number 16994 and over TLS using port number
16995 (see Table 2.5).

2.4

Intel AMT Releases

Table 2.4 lists the Intel AMT firmware releases [40], [2], [19] along with their
capabilities and the corresponding hardware. These various releases introduce new
features and resolve previous bugs. The functions and features of the Intel AMT
platform reside in firmware and are supported via different firmware releases shipped
on a variety of systems. Note that Intel AMT version 1.0 is based on Intel’s Gigabit
Ethernet controller[40].
Table 2.1. Intel AMT firmware releases [40],[2],[19]

Version
1.0
2.0
2.5
3.0
4.0
4.1
5.0
6.0

South Bridge
ICH7
ICH8
ICH8M
ICH9
ICH9M
ICH9M
ICH10
PCHM

Chipset
Intel 82573LM/LC
Intel Q963/Q965
Intel GM965/PM965
Intel Q35
Intel GM45 or 47/PM45
Intel GM45
Intel Q45
Calpella, Piketon

20

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

2.4.1

ME firmware upgrade

The revision numbering of the ME firmware uses the following format: W.X.Y.ZZZZ,
where W stands for platform version, X for major version, Y for minor version, and
ZZZZ for build number[50]. The following requirements must be met in order to
successfully upgrading the AMT ME firmware[50]:
1. (W): the platform version needs to be the same as the current firmware
2. (X): the major version is required to be the same or greater than the existing
firmware. Note that version 2.0 can only be upgraded to 2.1 or 2.2 and
similarly version 2.5 to 2.6.
3. (Y): the minor version must be equal or greater than the existing firmware
version when the major version (X) is the same.
4. Downgrading to previous firmware versions is not permitted.
Apparently in order to take advantage of the full-featured and secure capabilities
of AMT, one must also upgrade to a newer AMT hardware version for instance
it is not supported to upgrade the AMT firmware from version 3.x to version 5.x
since the system is based on an AMT 3.x hardware, in fact it can be also dangerous
performing such an upgrade. Additionally, all firmware upgrades are provided from
the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Any upgrade is subject to the OEM
taking responsibility for supporting the newer firmware. In most of cases a version
of AMT is shipped along with the BIOS flash upgrades from the OEM. Table 2.2
list some notebook and desktop OEMs along with the corresponding model, chipset,
and the latest released AMT firmware revision for the referenced models[53].
In the same format we have also generated Table 2.3 presenting a listing of OEMs
supporting AMT on a variety of embedded platforms such as points of sale (POS),
kiosks and automatic teller machines (ATM)[58]. Note that the AMT versions
listed on Table 2.3 have the latest supported firmware as of August 2009 and not
the standard version that is shipped from factory default.

2.4. INTEL AMT RELEASES

21

Table 2.2. Intel AMT enabled desktops and notebooks [53]
Type
D
N
N
N
D
N
N
D
D
W
W
N
N
N
N
N
N
D
D
D
N
N
N
N
D
D
D
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
C
N
N
N
N
D
N
D
D

Brand Model
Acer Veriton L/S/M 670G, M67WS
Acer TravelMate 6592
Acer TravelMate 6593G
Acer TravelMate 6493,6593
Dell OptiPlex 780,960
Dell Latitude E4200,4300
Dell Latitude E6400,6500
Dell Esprimo P5925,E5925
Dell Esprimo E7935
Dell Celcius W360
CESLIUS W370
Fujitsu Lifebook E8420/T5010
Fujitsu Esprimo U9215,M9415,D9515,X9515,X9525
Dell Celcius H265/H270
Dell Celcius H250
Dell Lifebook E8410
Dell Lifebook E8410
HP Compaq dc7700p
HP Compaq dc7800p
HP Compaq dc7900
HP Elitebook 2530p,2730p
HP Elitebook 6930p
HP Elitebook 8530p/8530w/8730w
HP Compaq 2510p,2710p, 6910p,8510p/w, 8710p/w
Lenovo ThinkCentre M55p
Lenovo ThinkCentre M57p
Lenovo ThinkCentre M58p
Lenovo M58pX200/X200s,X301
Lenovo T400,T500
Lenovo W700
Lenovo X61, X61S
Lenovo T61/T61P
Lenovo X61
LG S510
Panasonic CF-T8,W8,F8(All Models)
Panasonic CF-30Mk3(All CF-30 K or L models)
Panasonic CF-19Mk3(All CF-19 K or L models)
Panasonic CF-52ELN(B/D/F/H)QAM
Panasonic CF-52FLN(B/D)ZAM
Panasonic CF-52HFN(B/D)ZAM
Panasonic CF-52HUN(B/D)ZAM
Samsung Magic Station DB-P70,Z70
Samsung SENS P55
Intel Desktop Board DQ35JO
Intel Desktop Board DQ45CB/EK

Chipset
Intel Q45
Mobile Intel GM965 Express
Intel PM45
Intel GM45
Intel Q45 Express
Mobile Intel GS45 Express
Mobile Intel 45 Express
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q45 Chipset
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q45 Chipset
GM45
GM45
PM45
Mobile Intel PM965 Express
Mobile Intel GM965 Express
Mobile Intel PM965 Express
Intel Q965 Express
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q45 Express
Mobile Intel GS45 ICH9M
Mobile IntelPM45 or GM45 ICH9M
Mobile Intel PM45 Express ICH9M
Mobile Intel GM965 Express
Intel Q965 Expres
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q45 Express
Mobile Intel GS45 Express
Mobile Intel GM45 Express
Mobile Intel PM45 Express
Mobile Intel GM965 Express
Mobile Intel PM965 Express
Mobile Intel GM965 Express
Mobile Intel PM965 Express
Mobile Intel GS45 Express
Mobile Intel GS45 Express
Mobile Intel GS45 Express
Mobile Intel PM45 Express
Mobile Intel PM45 Express
Mobile Intel GM45 Express
Mobile Intel GM45 Express
Intel Q35 Express
Mobile Intel PM965 Express
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q45 Express

D: Desktop, N: Notebook, W: Workstation, C: Convertible, Ver.: Version

Ver.
5
4
4
4
5
4
4
3
5
3
5
4
4
4
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.1
3.2
5
4.1
4.1
4.1
2.6
2.1
3
5
4
4.x
4
2.x
2.x
2.x
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3.x
2.x
3.2
5.1

22

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

Table 2.3. AMT enabled embedded systems [58]

Type
POS
POS
POS
Kiosk
POS
SC
ATM
POS
POS
POS
POS

Brand/Model
Fujitsu TeamPoS 3624
Fujitsu TeamPoS
NCR RealPOS 70XRT
NCR SelfServ 60
NCR RealPOS 80XRT
NCR SelfServ Checkout
NCR SelfServ 22,25,26,32,34,38
Radiant P1760
Radiant P1560
Wincor Nixdorf Beetle /S-II plus
Wincor Nixdorf Beetle /M-II plus

SC: Self checkout

Chipset
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q35 Express
Intel GM45 Express
Intel GM45 Express
Intel Q965 Express
Intel Q965 Express
Intel Q965 Express
Intel GME965 Express
Intel GME965 Express
Intel Q35 Express
Intel Q35 Express

Version
3.2
3.2
4.1
4.1
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.6
2.6
3.2
3.2

2.5. AMT ASSIGNED NETWORK PORTS

2.5

23

AMT assigned network ports

Intel AMT platform transmits data over the network by using registered Internet
assigned numbers authority (IANA) network ports registered by David T. Hines
and Nimrod Diamant from Intel in February 2005 [47]. These ports are listed in
Table 2.5. The type of data that is transmitted to the network by and from the
AMT device can be categorized as command and response messages, redirection
traffic, and system alerts. The TLS and HTTPS network ports usage is optional
and is subject to the provision model used (i.e. the enterprise provision model with
TLS support).
Table 2.4. AMT registered IANA ports[47]

Service
amt-soap-http
amt-soap-https
amt-redir-tcp
amt-redir-tls

Ports
TCP, UDP
TCP, UDP
TCP, UDP
TCP, UDP

16992
16993
16994
16995

Description
Intel AMT SOAP/HTTP
Intel AMT SOAP/HTTPS
Intel AMT Redirection/TCP
Intel AMT Redirection/TLS

For other OOB services such as ASF or DASH compliant systems the registered
IANA ports[47] assigned by Jim Davis and Carl First as listed on Table 2.5. In
addition to the IANA registered network ports, AMT uses by default TCP port
number 9971 as the configuration service port. This port is used to initiate the
configuration process by transmitting hello packets to the provisioning server. This
service is also know as remote provisioning, a detailed discussion about the remote
configuration process is given in section 3.7.
Table 2.5. OOB registered IANA ports[47]

Service
oob-ws-http
asf-rmcp
oob-ws-https
asf-secure-rmcp

2.6

Ports
TCP 623
UDP 623
TCP 664
UDP 664

Description
DMTF OOB web services management protocol
ASF remote management and control protocol
DMTF OOB secure web services management protocol
ASF secure remote management and control protocol

Configuration methods

Intel AMT supports different methods for provisioning of a client system, three
configuration methods exist for implementing the desired provisioning: manually
installing and configuring the client, one-touch by using USB disk booting, and
remotely by using a zero-touch configuration. The major differences between

24

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

these configuration types is that the two first require physical interaction with the
AMT client whereas the last does not. One-touch configuration requires that an
administrator enters the credential data into the PC being provisioned by booting
using a USB memory stick key or by manually entering the necessary configuration
data into the AMT MEBx screen.

2.6.1

Zero touch configuration model

In zero-touch configuration mode the provisioning can be accomplished from a
remote location since the MEBx contains at least one or more (usually four)
third party trusted certificate fingerprints that are provided by default in any
AMT platform at the time of production state (i.e., when the BIOS is flashed).
The remote configuration process utilizes a setup and configuration SCS server for
successfully provisioning and enabling AMT on a PC without physical attendance,
thus allowing administrators to deploy and provision systems without visiting each
system individually. A special type of certificate is need for remote configuration
to take place, a thorough discussion of the zero-touch remote configuration process
is given in section 3.7.

2.7

Setup and configuration models

In order to make a concrete security evaluation of how this technology performs we
need to understand the setup and configuration models, also know as provisioning
models. Table 2.6 shows a detailed listing of the different security schema supported
by the AMT platform. There are three different stages of increased security: smallto-medium business (SMB) mode, enterprise mode with no transport layer security
(TLS) support, and the enterprise mode with TLS support. Following we are going
Table 2.6. Provisioning models[52]
Feature
Firmware setting
Provision model
Network infrastructure
Client authentication
Management traffic encryption
Secure network authentication
Client configuration maintenance

Basic (no encryption)
SMB Mode
Manual, One touch
DHCP or Static IP
HTTP digest
n/a
n/a
One-to-one

Standard (no encryption)
Enterprise mode (no TLS)
Manual, One touch, Remote
DNS and DHCP
HTTP digest
n/a
802.1X, NAC, NAP (opt.)
One-to-many

Advanced (encryption)
Enterprise mode (TLS)
Manual, One touch, Remote
DNS and DHCP, CA, AD (opt.)
HTTP digest, Kerberos (opt.)
TLS using certificates
802.1X, NAC, NAP (opt.)
One-to-many

to present and describe how to active the SMB provisioning model on a PC equipped
with the Intel AMT technology. We explain the SMB model extensively since it
requires less effort to be configured and with no additional requirements such as
a DHCP server, a DNS server and a certification authority (CA). Additionally we
demonstrate how easily a malicious person could enable the AMT technology, when
the physical security of the PC is compromised (i.e an unattended PC).

2.7. SETUP AND CONFIGURATION MODELS

2.7.1

25

SMB provision model

The SMB mode is implemented in order for smaller businesses to take advantage
of the Intel AMT features without depending on independent software vendors
(ISVs) or third party software solutions. It is the most basic form of the setup and
configuration models listed in Table 2.6. For this mode there is no requirement for
network infrastructure services, but one rather simple configuration task through
the MEBx configuration screen[35]. The steps necessary for configuring an Intel
AMT capable PC from factory default mode are described below. After successfully
connecting the required peripherals and devices (e.g. power supply, keyboard,
mouse, and video) and powering up the system, the AMT MEBx will appear on the
screen prompting the user to press the CTRL-P keyboard combination as displayed
in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7. AMT MEBx post screen

By entering the keyboard combination CTRL-P the user enters the main menu
of the Intel AMT MEBx screen as displayed in Figure 2.8. To successfully configure
the setup in SMB mode the following steps must be performed[35]:
1. Entering the default password "admin" to the password prompt.
2. A new screen is displayed that requests you to change the (default) password
to a new acceptable value as will be discussed in section 3.5.4.
3. Enter the AMT configuration menu and define an appropriate host name for
the configured system; as shown in Figure 2.9.
4. Enter to the TCP/IP sub-menu to select between DHCP (enabled by default)
or static IP addressing scheme according to the desired LAN configuration
parameters.
5. Enter the provision model sub-menu and select the SMB mode.
6. Finally, exiting the AMT MEBx allows changes to be take place (this requires
a system power-cycle)

26

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

Figure 2.8. AMT MEBx main menu screen

2.7. SETUP AND CONFIGURATION MODELS

27

Figure 2.9. AMT MEBx configuration menu screen

2.7.2

Connecting to an Intel AMT device

The built-in web server on Intel AMT can be accessed through the LAN or Internet
connection via a web browser that supports the HTTP digest access authentication
scheme and JavaScript functionality. To connect with the AMT built-in web server
one must enter the following URL listed on 3.3. Figure 2.10 illustrates the login
web page of the AMT built-in web server.
h t t p : / / amtdevice : 1 6 9 9 2
Listing 2.1. Built-in AMT web server URL

Note that the "amtdevice" must be replaced with the appropriate configured host
name or IP address of the AMT system. It is important to mention that Intel AMT
denies any local host access to the built-in web server located on the same machine
due to a restrictive policy concerning local services. The applications running within
the OS are not considered trusted for AMT, as stated in [13]:
"by restricting local access to services, we also limit the possibility of
rogue applications trying to attack Intel AMT using the local interface."
[[13]; page 192]

28

CHAPTER 2. INTEL AMT ARCHITECTURE

Figure 2.10. AMT web UI login page

Chapter 3

Security analysis of Intel AMT
3.1

Chapter overview

In this chapter we assess and evaluate the security consideration of Intel’s AMT
taking mostly network approach, since our main research evaluation is based
on remote attacks vectors since there is almost not related work (see section
1.2). We start our security analysis by describing a way to bypass Intel’s AMT
local interface access restrictions. Then we quote statements from Intel’s AMT
software engineer, Intel’s development forum presentation as well as parts from
Intel’s security configuration guide manual regarding the SMB provisioning model
vulnerability.

3.1.1

Lab environment

For our security evaluation we have build a laboratory environment based on our
test hardware; a Fujitsu Siemens lifebook T5010 series notebook with AMT version
4 based on the GM45 Express chipset with a revision 9 I/O Controller Hub (ICH).
Additionally we have configured several virtual machines in order to successfully
evaluate the AMT technology in a variety of OS such as GNU/Linux, FreeBSD,
Windows as well as different architectures. Moreover we have chosen open source
applications and freely available tools on Intel’s website[51] to demonstrate that our
attacks vectors could be orchestrated effectively, while keeping a tight budget.
We have implemented the specified security lab in order to experiment with
different security software and test a variety of attack methods, while keeping it
on a safe environment separate from the production network (i.e. our work IT
environment). The specific notebook was chosen based on the network interfaces
cards; wired and wireless thus we could evaluate both wired (standard version) and
mobile version of AMT. Additionally the cost of the selected hardware is affordable
for mainstream users to buy showing that this notebook as well as similar priced
PCs on the market (see Table 2.2) could be acquired giving a large magnitude of
order.
29

30

3.2

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

Bypassing Intel AMT’s local access restrictions

In this section we demonstrate a trivial way of bypassing the Intel AMT protection
mechanisms that prohibit access to the AMT built-in web server via the local host.
By connecting a universal serial bus (USB) to Ethernet adapter to an available
USB port we can add an extra Ethernet port which is not managed by Intel AMT
LMS, thus once connected to the LAN or Internet one can access the built-in web
server from the same local host regardless of the host name. Using a cheap USB to
Ethernet adapter we trivially overcome the restrictive policy restricting Intel AMT
from access by local applications.
We tested this with a 9.04 Ubuntu Linux release and found that this requires
no additional drivers or even administrative (root) privileges to configure or enable
the network device (USB to Ethernet adapter) to successfully access the built-in
Intel AMT web server. As of December of 2009 the web statistics for Ubuntu’s
OS share indicate a percentage between forty and fifty percent as stated in[69] and
[25]. Nonetheless bypassing Intel AMT’s local access restrictions is classified as a
vulnerability flaw that the system is exposed to. Usurping privileges on the user’s
system is defined as allowing unauthorized access to system control functions[65].

3.3

SMB setup mode vulnerability
A security vulnerability is a flaw in a product that makes it infeasible
-even when using the product properly- to prevent an attacker from
usurping privileges on the user’s system, regulating its operation,
compromising data on it, or assuming ungranted trust. [[14]]

According to Intel’s security configuration guide[52] SMB mode is considered the
most insecure configuration type for AMT. This guide states:
(section 3.1) Vulnerability: The Small Business setup, which does not
support TLS-based communication, is used when sufficient infrastructure is not available to support the recommended Enterprise setup.[52]
Additionally on February 2008 Ylian Saint-Hilaire a senior software engineer, author
of the Intel AMT book[13] and architect at Intel Research Labs in Hillsboro, Oregon
wrote on his blog:
Allow TLS in SMB mode. This is a long time feature request that
is somewhat related to the first issue. In my work with Intel AMT, I
can do everything I need to setup TLS in SMB mode except enabling it.
Allowing administrators to setup server-side authenticated TLS would
be very easy to add to Intel AMT and would provide improved security
with almost no work. In fact, Intel AMT Commander could just prompt
the administrator on first connect if he or she want to enable TLS when

3.4. IDE-R AND SERIAL OVER LAN VULNERABILITY

31

a non-TLS SMB computer is found. A new root certificate would be
generated if none already exist. Strictly speaking, it would not provide
"bank level" security, but would go a long way for shops, schools, small
business owners that have more to think about than understanding
secure manageability.[76]
Furthermore in the Security FAQ for Intel vPro Technology there is a short
description of the risk of not using TLS:
Both authentication credentials and data between configuration/management console or web client and an Intel AMT machine is
traversing network in a clear text and may be eavesdropped. Also,
a rogue machine may be put on a network to receive profiles with
credentials from the configuration console.[8]

3.3.1

SMB countermeasures

The following countermeasures for this vulnerability are given in Intel’s security
configuration guide manual:
Enterprise setup is designed to serve the needs of large organizations.
When supported with the proper network infrastructure services, enterprise setup can provide automated one-touch setup and configuration
for Intel AMT platforms.[52]
As we have previously quoted from Intel’s security configuration guide[52] the
SMB model is vulnerable by design. However, as presented at the latest (2009)
Intel’s developer forum[6] the SMB provision model has a highly important role. In
particular, we highlight the following from the presentation[6]:
• SMB is second largest client segment and the fastest growing.
• SMB is a large opportunity and should be taken seriously.

3.4

IDE-R and Serial over LAN vulnerability

The IDE-R and Serial over LAN features in AMT functionalities are subject to a
serious implementation vulnerability when they are transmitted in the clear (i.e.,
when not using TLS). Surprisingly this is a known issue for Intel as Ylian SaintHilaire wrote on his blog in February of 2008:
No TLS, Serial-over-LAN/IDE-R password in the clear. As many
of you have discovered, when using Intel AMT in small business or
enterprise mode without TLS, the login username and password is sent
on the network in the clear when the administrator performs a serialover-LAN or IDE redirect operation. With so many coffee shops, schools,

32

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

Internet cafes playing around with Intel AMT features, this could be a
big problem. Imagine a classroom with a few vPro computers with AMT
setup in SMB mode by an unsuspecting teacher. A student running a
packet sniffer, obtaining the password and rebooting AMT computers
remotely.[76]
This weakness of Intel AMT remote IDE and Serial over LAN transmitting
administrator credentials in clear text is depicted in Figure 3.1. Along these lines,
why does Intel AMT permit use of this architecture without a TLS implementation?
This seems to be a poor decision since it is a great security vulnerability, especially
considering that it is being used for such a crucial operation; remote management.
Blindly trusting the end-users and administrators, that would not even reviewed
thoroughly the security documentation of Intel AMT.

Figure 3.1. Administrator credentials transmitted in clear-text

3.5
3.5.1

HTTP digest authentication scheme
Introduction

HTTP is a request and response protocol[63] widely used on the WWW for
exchanging data, normally HTML files (web pages), across different architectures
via the Internet, LAN, and WAN. HTTP offers support for two authentication
schemes[48]: basic access authentication and digest access authentication. The
former is the most popular authentication method since almost all web browsers
support it. Digest access authentication was implemented in order to supersede
the basic access authentication scheme which uses an insecure way of transmitting
credentials by using Base64 content transfer encoding; a simple algorithm to encode
and decode text[59].
Digest authentication uses message digest 5 (MD5) cryptographic hashes in
addition to nonce values to implement more secure authentication than the basic
access authentication method, which transmits credentials over the network in the
clear. When a network session is eavesdropped the username and password can be
trivially decoded. Below we demonstrate a serious implementation fault illustrating

3.5. HTTP DIGEST AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

33

the poor choice Intel made when selecting the digest access authentication method
for the AMT platform. This insecurity applies also to a wide range of web servers
on the Internet, as well as session initiation protocol (SIP) devices and services that
are using HTTP digest authentication.

3.5.2

How digest access authentication works

HTTP network packets are composed of a header and an entity (i.e., payload) fields.
Digest authentication scheme is based on a challenge-response protocol[48], when
the client requests a web page that requires authentication without providing any
credentials in the clear, the server sends back a reply with a status message (401)
"authentication required", providing the authentication realm, the available "quality
of protection" (qop), the opaque value that must be returned to the server to match
the challenge with the client’s response, and a cryptographic nonce. Then the client
submits the user’s credential in an MD5 hashed response along with the nonce,
opaque value, universal resource identifier (URI), authentication realm, a nonce
counter, the selected qop, and the client’s nonce value.
Finally the server compares the response with it’s own computation which is a
hash normally stored in a local database and grants or deny access accordingly.
Below we show how the digest response value is computed. First the A1 hash is
calculated:
A1= MD5( usename : realm : password )
Listing 3.1. A1 hash calculation

Then the A2 hash is computed:
A2= MD5( h t t p method : URI)
Listing 3.2. A2 hash calculation

Finally the response is computed:
r e s p o n s e= MD5(A1 : nonce : nonce c o u n t e r : c l i e n t nonce : qop
d i r e c t i v e : A2)
Listing 3.3. response hash calculation

Note that the colon punctuation mark (:) is part of the hashing computation. An
overview of the HTTP digest access authentication scheme is illustrated in Figure
3.2. Additionally an example (taken from[48]) is shown in listing 3.4 where an access
protected HTML file is requested from the web server via a HTTP GET request. As
previously discussed the first time that the client requests the file no authorization
occurs and the server sends the response shown in listing 3.4 in order to instruct
the client to use the digest access authentication scheme.

34

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

HTTP/ 1 . 1 401 Unauthorized
WWW
−A u t h e n t i c a t e : D i g e s t
realm=" t e s t r e a l m @ h o s t . com " ,
qop=" auth , auth−i n t " ,
nonce=" d c d 9 8 b 7 1 0 2 d d 2 f 0 e 8 b 1 1 d 0 f 6 0 0 b f b 0 c 0 9 3 " ,
opaque=" 5 c c c 0 6 9 c 4 0 3 e b a f 9 f 0 1 7 1 e 9 5 1 7 f 4 0 e 4 1 "
Listing 3.4. Initiation of HTTP digest access authentication – server response[48]

Figure 3.2. Digest access authentication schema

Next the client is to enter the appropriate credential data (username and
password) which are valid for the requested resource. Listing 3.5 shows the client
request for the HTML file with the authorization header added.
A u t h o r i z a t i o n : D i g e s t username=" Mufasa " ,
realm=" t e s t r e a l m @ h o s t . com " ,
nonce=" d c d 9 8 b 7 1 0 2 d d 2 f 0 e 8 b 1 1 d 0 f 6 0 0 b f b 0 c 0 9 3 " ,
u r i=" / d i r / i n d e x . html " ,
qop=auth ,
nc =00000001 ,
cnonce=" 0 a 4 f 1 1 3 b " ,
r e s p o n s e=" 6629 f a e 4 9 3 9 3 a 0 5 3 9 7 4 5 0 9 7 8 5 0 7 c 4 e f 1 " ,
opaque=" 5 c c c 0 6 9 c 4 0 3 e b a f 9 f 0 1 7 1 e 9 5 1 7 f 4 0 e 4 1 "
Listing 3.5.
Client request with the authorization header on HTTP digest
authentication[48]

3.5. HTTP DIGEST AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

3.5.3

35

How Intel AMT handles HTTP digest access authentication

Intel AMT client authentication[48] is based on the digest access authentication
scheme in basic and standard provision models where no standard encryption
applies, as explained in section 2.6. Contrary to modern security practices Intel
AMT provides only conformance with the default RFC 2617[48] that dates back
eleven years for their implementation of authentication for the embedded web and
XML server. As stated
An off-line brute force dictionary based password attack can occur in
the case of an eavesdrop attacker (MIMT). Since the user’s credentials
are transmitted as an one way MD5 hashed key on a HTTP message to
the server. The server can mitigate this type of attack by not allowing
users to select passwords that are in a dictionary.[48]
Additionally we enumerate the following security considerations (listed along with
the section in RFC 2617 where this issue is addressed):
Section 4.2 Digest Authentication does not provide a strong authentication
mechanism, when compared to public key based mechanisms. Additionally, it
offers no confidentiality protection other than protecting the actual password.
All of the rest of the request and response are available in plain text. Digest
Authentication offers only limited integrity protection for the messages in
either direction.
Section 4.7 An attacker that can eavesdrop can test any overheard nonce/response
pairs against a list of common words to perform a dictionary attack.
Section 4.8 Both Basic and Digest authentication are vulnerable to "man in
the middle" (MITM) attacks. A MITM attack has all the problems of
eavesdropping -while offering some additional opportunities to the attacker.
Section 4.13 Stored passwords: If the password file is compromised, the attacker
can access documents on the server within this realm.
Things have changed during last decade when brute force password based
attacks where computationally infeasible due to computation power and memory
limitations. Technological advances along with more sophisticated techniques
have been introduced, such as distributed computing[24], on-line databases of
precomputed hashed keys[56], field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA’s), precomputed dictionary attacks, custom hardware, and graphical processing unit
(GPU) accelerated attacks for example nVidia’s CUDA[60] technology.

3.5.4

Intel AMT password policy

In this section we will examine the password strength and limitations of the Intel
AMT password policy. In factory setup mode (in the default configuration) the

36

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

default password in Intel’s management engine BIOS extension (MEBx) is "admin"
when the platform is in a non-provisioned state. Obviously an adversary that gains
physical access to a computer with AMT capabilities can compromise the system
by entering MEBx (with the CTRL-P key combination) and typing the default
password ("admin"). Then a malicious person can configure the AMT as required
to implement his attack schema at will. Note that the AMT technology is enabled
by default in most PCs BIOS, so people with no knowledge of the AMT technology
suffer from this default password policy. The setup mode password policy that
MEBx uses is the following:
• Password length can be between 8 and 32 characters long
• The password must have both upper and lower case Latin characters
• It must have at least one numeric character
• It must have at least one ASCII non-alphanumeric character (!, @, *, #, $,
%, ˆ, &,)
• In general 7-bit ASCII characters in the range of 32-126 without the invalid
characters (listed below) can be used in the password.
The following characters are considered invalid and not allowed in the password
policy of AMT:
• " (double quotations)
• . (period)
• , (comma)
• : (colon)
Note that the underscore character (_) and the space character are not counting to
the password complexity according to the password policy of AMT.

3.5.5

Exhaustive password policy

Using this policy the password length is more interesting than the password
complexity policy requirement, since it reduces the total number of available
passwords (in terms of the maximum entropy). As a result password cracking is
a big concern, especially for enterprises. Note that a sophisticated attacker may
save time by avoiding passwords that do not meet the policy criteria, thus making
cracking process more efficient. Such a policy restriction suffers from a rainbow table
cracking attack[62] based upon generating only the potential reduced password set
by applying the complexity policy requirements to the initial set of possible strings.

3.5. HTTP DIGEST AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

3.5.6

37

International keyboards on AMT MEBx

AMT MEBx has an implementation fault[50] when non-US keyboards are used.
MEBx assumes that everything is typed on a QWERTY type US keyboard.
Therefore, different keyboards mappings, for instance QWERTZ or AZERTY, are
treated as if they were US keyboards. As a result tremendous problems arise since
users have to blindly enter the password and trust what they type on the keyboard.
Entering the same sequence of keys will work, but will not when the OS level is
running - due to the use of language locales.
For instance if a user is typing in more than two languages, then changing to
another language and typing the password for the AMT platform will not work as
long when the user enters the password using the local keyboard mapping. Ending
with an absurd recommendation from Intel[68] as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Passwords using the A,M,Q,W,Y and Z keys can cause problems and
are not recommended[68].

Figure 3.3. MEBx common keys (adapted from [68])

3.5.7

Keyboard mapping implementation fault

The keyboard mapping implementation fault of AMT assumes that only US
keyboards are used, this implies that end users and system administrators need

38

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

to obtain a US keyboard and stick to the US language locale on the OS and change
their typing habits to match the AMT implementation fault. This is a known issue
since May of 2008[68], there is still no released fix. Additionally when changing the
password on the Intel manageability platform via web access (e.g. web browser) the
administrator credentials are not synchronized with the MEBx[50].
This can be an issue since every time that the credentials are changed the Intel
AMT platform needs to be re-provisioned for the credential change to take effect.
If the password is changed via web access, but the machine is re-provisioned then
the Intel AMT is going to use the old credentials that were entered when the MEBx
was configured. Thus new credentials should be instantiated inside the MEBx after
the last stage of the post BIOS boot phase or on the first remote configuration
provisioning, details presented in section 3.9 regarding the AMT’s privacy protection
mechanisms. Moreover since usernames and passwords are involved a database is
required to keep track of all of this information, thus enlarging the insecurity factor
as more data needs to be securely managed[54].

3.5.8

Password-based authentication to Intel AMT: attack scenario

For the attack scenario to be successful, the attacker requires to eavesdrop only a
network packet transmitted over the wire. Specifically a transmitted response or
request of the HTTP session is needed while the administrator is remote managing
the AMT platform. Next the attacker obtains the HTTP transmitted packet (see
Figure 3.5), most commonly by sniffing the networked traffic. From this point the
attacker can perform a brute-force password attack to recover the administrator’s or
other privileged user’s credentials as discussed in section 3.6. Most important, this
attack can be implemented in two out of the three setup and configuration models
of Intel’s AMT technology (i.e. basic and standard).

3.6
3.6.1

Cracking process
John the ripper patch

John the Ripper (JtR) is an active password cracking tool[9] that is used for different
cipher algorithms and offers support for numerous patch scripts and different OS
system and processor architectures as well as a variety of brute force attack methods
for recovering passwords mostly by providing password hash strings. Licensed under
the GNU general public license (GPL) version 2 and can be downloaded from the
openwall project website[9]. It is an open source code community driven project
where developers and users can implement and contribute additional cipher-text
formats, optimization, and implementation tweaks as software patches and scripts.
In our case we have used the HTTP digest access authentication (HDAA-MD5)
patch contributed by Romain Raboin[67] based on the RFC 2617[48] standard.

3.6. CRACKING PROCESS

39

As previously discussed AMT uses the RFC 2617[48] standard unmodified as
the main and only access authentication method while transmitting data over the
network to and from the AMT platform. When TLS is not applied as the security
configuration model (i.e. SMB and standard provision models) a network capture of
a transmitted packet from an eavesdropped connection is sufficient for utilizing an
off-line brute-force attack, to successfully recover the administrator or management
account password.

3.6.2

Patch for AMT

The AMT platform includes the ":" colon character as part of the realm directive
value on the HTTP transmitted packet as depicted in listing 3.6.
realm=" D i g e s t : 8 DC54871523E45648425F8782646E734897428B3 "
Listing 3.6. HTTP digest realm directive example of AMT

JtR detects automatically the cipher text hash type and splits the user name
from the password hash by using the ":" colon character as a delimiter. Using this
knowledge we have implemented a patch based on the HDAA-MD5 cipher text
plugin[67] (see listing 3.7) to provide an AMT patch. The resulting patch can easily
be applied to John the Ripper version 1.7.4.2 along with the jumbo patch that
performs many updates on the JtR main engine1 .

1

Note that only the file HDAA_fmt.c is affected by this patch, thus one can apply the AMT
patch after the Romain Raboin[67] HDAA-MD5 plugin has been installed.

40

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

−−− john −1.7.4.2 − jumbo −2. o r i g / s r c /HDAA_fmt . c
2010−02−05
1 6 : 2 1 : 0 4 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +0000
+++ john −1.7.4.2 − jumbo−2/ s r c /HDAA_fmt . c 2010−02−05
1 5 : 4 6 : 5 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +0000
@@ −289 ,6 +289 ,7 @@ s t a t i c void
∗ hdaa_salt (
char ∗ c i p h e r t e x
int
nb ;
int
i;
char
∗∗ r e q u e s t ;
+
char
∗AMTrealm ;
char
∗ str ;
reqinfo_t
∗r ;
#i f d e f __MMX__
@@ −308 ,7 +309 ,6 @@ s t a t i c void
∗ hdaa_salt (
char ∗ c i p h e r t e x
nb++;
}
}
−
/∗ c a l c u l a t e h2 ( h2 = md5( method : d i g e s t U R I ) ) ∗/
s t r = m a l l o c ( s t r l e n ( r e q u e s t [R_METHOD] ) + s t r l e n (
r e q u e s t [ R_URI ] ) + 2 ) ;
s p r i n t f ( s t r , "%s :% s " , r e q u e s t [R_METHOD] , r e q u e s t [
R_URI ] ) ;
@@ −319 ,7 +319 ,10 @@ s t a t i c void
∗
hdaa_salt ( char ∗ c i p h e r t e x
memset ( conv , 0 , s i z e o f ( conv ) ) ;
b i n 2 a s c i i ( h2 ) ;
free ( str ) ;
−
+
/∗ When t h e HTTP d i g e s t message c o n t a i n s t h e : ( JtR
f i e l d s e p a r a t o r ) as p a r t o f t h e realm s e c t i o n . Convert _
t o : ∗/
+
i f ( NULL != ( AMTrealm = s t r s t r ( r e q u e s t [R_REALM] , "
Digest_ " ) ) )
+
AMTrealm [ 6 ] = ’ : ’ ;
+
/∗ c r e a t e a p a r t o f h1 ( h1tmp = r e q u e s t : realm : ) ∗/
s n p r i n t f ( r−>h1tmp , HTMP − PLAINTEXT_LENGTH, "%s :% s : "
, r e q u e s t [R_USER] , r e q u e s t [R_REALM] ) ;
Listing 3.7. Intel AMT JtR patch

3.6. CRACKING PROCESS

41

In order for the patch to work successfully one must change the colon (’:’)
character of the AMT realm to the (’_’) character. Hence the patch checks for the
colon character and changes it appropriately. To apply the patch on the GNU/Linux
OS one must use the command as shown in listing 3.8.
patch −p1 < . . / john − 1 . 7 . 4 . 2
Listing 3.8. Apply JtR source code patch

The command shown listing 3.8 strips one leading directory name from the
pathnames specified in the patch file[61]. Note that one must apply the jumbo patch
or the HDAA-MD5 plugin[67] prior to the AMT patch. An excellent resource that
describes in detail how to apply patches to the JtR source code can be found on
the openwall community website[61].

3.6.3

Creating the password string

In order to create the password string for use with the HDAA-MD5 plugin[67] we
use a single captured HTTP packet based on Intel AMT network traffic (see listing
3.5). The password string syntax for use with JtR must be defined as shown in
listing 3.9.
u s e r : $MAGIC$response$user$realm$method$uri$nonce$nonceCount$
$ClientNonce$qop
Listing 3.9. HDAA-MD5 password string syntax

By default the dollar sign (’$’) is the field delimiter for the password string;
however, it can be changed in the HDAA_fmt.c file. After applying the AMT
patch one can use the syntax shown in listing 3.10. In this example the value of the
magic string represented as $MAGIC$ in listing 3.9 is $response$.
admin : $ r e s p o n s e $ 9 a 5 4 e 4 8 4 f 8 9 b 2 f 6 8 5 2 1 f 9 e 4 9 f b f 4 b 3 a e $ a d m i n $
Digest_8DC54871523E45648425F8782646E734897428B3
$GET$/ d i r / i n d e x . html
$dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093$00000001$0a4f113b$auth
Listing 3.10. HDAA-MD5 AMT specific password string syntax

3.6.4

Results

Here we present some performance tests based on the JtR benchmarks of how fast
the HDAA-MD5 cipher-text performs. The benchmarks are based on a standard
GNU/Linux distribution Ubuntu 9.10 with non-optimized and non-tweaked versions
of the GNU project C compiler version 4.4.1 and the message passing interface (MPI)

42

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

based on mpich2 version 1.2. The MPI spreads the workload simultaneously to
multiple cores. The benchmarks have been measured on the systems shown in Table
3.1. The benchmark are based on JtR version 1.7.4.2 with the jumbo patch. In Table
3.2 we summarize the benchmark reports, both benchmarks were compiled for the
x86-64 bit architecture with support for the streaming single instruction, multiple
data (SIMD) extensions 2 (SSE2) instruction set. The single instruction/multiple
data stream processing mode enables a single instruction to act on multiple data
streams at one time. The GNU C compiler (referenced above) will automatically
generate vectorized code when the target machine supports SSE2.
Table 3.1. Benchmarked systems

Vendor
Gigabyte
Intel

Baseboard
GA-MA74GM-S2H
MFS5520VI

CPU
AMD Athlon 64 X2 5200+
Intel Xeon E5530 2,40GHz

Cores
2
8(16 HT)

HT: Hyper-threaded

The tested systems are multi-core CPU systems and the password combinations
per second (c/s) are shown for one CPU core. The total maximum number of
password combinations per second can be achieved with proper CPU parallelization.
In our benchmark (see Table 3.2) the crack progress of Intel Xeon E5530 at 2.4 GHz
CPU performance is marked significant than AMD Athlon 64 X2 at 2.7Ghz due to
the 8 physical hyper-threaded cores, it is almost 16 times faster than a single core,
as it takes advantage of otherwise-idle execution units. Additionally the brute-force
cracking performance can be boosted tremendously if optimizing compilers are used.
Table 3.2. JtR benchmarks

CPU
AMD Athlon 64 X2 2.7Ghz
Intel Xeon E5530 2.4GHz

3.6.5

Time
200 s
200 s

Combinations/s
1,421,000
1,380,000

Total c/s
2,842,000
22,080,000

GPU cracking scenario

Recently, it appears that GPUs have became efficient in providing cost effective
ways, to recover (crack) a key or a password with an enormous speed capacity.
A variety of security projects introduced the use of GPUs in order to increase the
magnitude of order in password cracking attacks, especially in the case of brute force
attacks. A notable project is BarsWF[3] calculates 350 million keys (combinations)
per second. The result is based on a nVidia 9600GT/C2D 3Ghz CUDA version on
a single machine! Additionally IGHASHGPU release provides a recovery speed on
ATI HD4850 that peaks at 955 million keys (combinations) per second.

3.7. REMOTE PROVISIONING

43

A likely scenario would be a distributed cross-platform password recovery project
based on GPU acceleration for brute forcing password attacks. Since the cost of
this implementation for a large corporation that focuses in password recovery of
hashes is of relatively high importance such as large scale organizations, governments
and multinational companies. The incentive for utilizing a distributed brute force
password attack could potentially derive a variety of malicious activities such as
gathering intelligence, compromise a resource, access classified databases and assets,
etc. The outcome of a distributed GPU accelerated password recovery attack would
be of an increasingly high magnitude of order. A rough estimate calculation of 100
machines that could compute around 500 million (combinations) keys per second,
based on one or two powerful GPU cards could provide a potential of 50,000 million
(combinations) keys per second.

3.7

Remote provisioning

An interesting use case of Intel’s AMT was introduced in section 2.6. That use is
remote configuration without any physical attendance. This is known as zero touch
remote provisioning or bare-metal provisioning. As the name implies the goal is
an automated set up and configuration process that applies to almost every nonprovisioned or new (factory default) AMT capable computer when connected to a
network[32]. Detailed information will be presented in this section.

3.7.1

Introduction

There are many ways to provision AMT capable computers, but the most interesting
is the zero touch remote provision method, also know as bare-metal remote
provisioning. The important characteristics of this provisioning method is that:
1. It can occur though a wired network connection, typically a LAN.
2. There is no need for physical interaction with the computer, it simply requires
that the computer have electrical power and a network connection.
Normally Zero touch configuration (ZTC) process takes place outside the context
of the OS, since this feature was created to enable remote provisioning AMT systems
prior to OS installation and without any physical presence being needed. A typical
example is to deploy one thousand AMT systems by simply taking the machines
out of their packages and connect them to a power supply and connecting them
with an Ethernet network cable to the LAN, then deploying an OS or other boot
image to all of the Intel AMT clients.
Remote provision process
By default Intel AMT uses a timer used to initiate or limit the network interface,
allowing the SCS to configure a device without any physical attendance or software

44

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

based support. The ZTC process starts at the first boot of the system by requesting
an IP address lease from the DHCP server pool along with other local configuration
information, such as the host name, the default gateway, and one or more DNS
servers on the attached network. An overview of the ZTC provisioning process is
illustrated in Figure 3.4. The basic steps in this AMT provisioning process are:
• An AMT enabled system is plugged to power and connected to a wired LAN
or WAN.
• The AMT platform transmits a DHCPDISCOVER1 request packet containing
the following information:
– The source MAC address is set as the client’s MAC address (remember
that the AMT shares a common MAC address with the PC).
– The destination MAC address is set as a network link local broadcast
address (FFFFFF-FFFFFF).
• The DHCP server listens for a DHCPDISCOVER request and replies with a
DHCPOFFER1 packet containing a potential IP address for this host.
• Finally the client replies back with a DHCPREQUEST1 packet and requests
the appropriate network parameters (IP address, netmask, gateway) that are
offered from the DHCP server.
• The DHCP server updates the DNS entries and (if dynamic DNS service is
implemented) specifies the DNS domain name (DHCP option 15).
• The AMT device is now in setup mode status and starts transmitting
"HELLO" packets to the provisioning server.
• The provisioning server checks for the appropriate fully qualified domain name
(FQDN) entries for this AMT host.
• The provisioning server loads the appropriate certificate (the one intended for
provisioning) and checks for an appropriate certificate fingerprint of AMT (as
was discussed in section 3.7.1).
• The provisioning server configures the AMT device with the desired configuration parameters.
The complete Intel AMT remote provisioning flow for ZTC is illustrated in 3.5.
1

DHCPDISCOVER, DHCPOFFER and DHCPREQUEST are messages transmitted through
out the DHCP configuration process

3.7. REMOTE PROVISIONING

45

Figure 3.4. ZTC provisioning process

3.7.2

Remote provision certificate fingerprints

During production AMT platforms are equipped with one or more active embedded
hashed root certificates (factory default) from various SSL vendors worldwide.
These certificates are stored in the firmware image that is stored in the FLASH
memory. As per the Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) recommendation X.509[17] a root certificate is a public key certificate which identifies
the root certificate authority2 Every signed certificate from a CA vendor includes a
hash called a fingerprint. This fingerprint is used to validate that the certificate as
originating from the CA vendor and not from a malicious CA. Intel AMT includes
a table with SHA1 fingerprints of several different SSL vendors[38] that are trusted
CA by default (see Table 3.7.2). Note that the Starfield CA is only available in
Intel AMT firmware releases 2.2, 2.6, and 3.2.

3.7.3

Certificate fingerprint

A certificate fingerprint that matches the stored (factory default) fingerprints in
AMT firmware image can be used to initiate the remote configuration process.3
2

CA can be described as a network authority that issues, maintains and validates, public keys
for message encryption. Next it validates the information submitted (i.e. the certificate requester)
in order to issue the requested certificate.
3
AMT platforms are supported in several different chipsets and architectures types, as well
as different firmware revisions. According to [38] AMT firmware versions 2.0, 2.1, and 2.5 are
documented as not supporting ZTC.

46

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

Figure 3.5. AMT provisioning flow

Table 3.3. SSL certificate fingerprints

Certificate vendor
Comodo
Go Daddy class 2
VeriSign class 3 G1
VeriSign class 3 G3
Starfield class 2

ID
OID
OU
OU
OU
OU

SHA1 fingerprint
d1eb 23a4 6d17 d68f d925 64c2 f1f1 6017 64d8 e349
2796 bae6 3f18 01e2 7726 1ba0 d777 7002 8f20 eee4
742c 3192 e607 e424 eb45 4954 2be1 bbc5 3e61 74e2
132d 0d45 534b 6997 cdb2 d5c3 39e2 5576 609b 5cc6
ad7e 1c28 b064 ef8f 6003 4020 14c3 d0e3 370e b58a

Typically every digital certificate that follows the X.509 standard[64] from version
2 or later contains the following fields:
Version: defines the issued certificate version
Serial number: uniquely identifies the certificate
Signature algorithm: the algorithm used to issue the certificate
Issuer: the organization or entity that issues the certificate, this contains the
following values:

3.7. REMOTE PROVISIONING

47

• Common Name (CN)
• Organization (O)
• Organization Unit (OU)
Issued to: the person or entity that is identified, this contains the following values:
• Common Name (CN)
• Organization (O)
• Organization Unit (OU)
• Serial Number
Validity: specified the period when the certificate is valid.
components:

This has two

• Issued on: issued date
• Expires on: expiration date
Fingerprint algorithm: the hash algorithm used to generate the certificate
Fingerprint: the hash of the certificate
Requirements for remote provisioning
To successfully provision an AMT system we need the following components:
1. A specific type of SSL certificate
2. A DHCP and DNS server with specific parameters
3. A provision server, for instance Intel’s Setup and Configuration (SCS) service.
The resources needed in order to utilize zero touch remote provision via a LAN
connection are freely available from Intel’s website[51]. Additionally a deluxe SSL
certificate needs to be purchased. In the next section we provide specific details of
how to order such a certificate. First we need to clarify the required parameters
that are needed for the digital certificates(s) and how the certificate signing request
(CSR) procedure operates.
Acquiring a SSL certificate
Acquiring an appropriate certificate is rather easy. As we have explained before we
need a deluxe assurance SSL certificate from vendors that are supported by Intel’s
AMT remote provision process. These CA vendors were listed in Table 3.7.2. In
our implementation we have used the GoDaddy as our CA vendor. Although there
many vendors that offer certificates intended for Intel AMT remote configuration
process we found this vendor to be the least inexpensive and they issued the

48

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

certificate immediately after the verification process. Normally an entity (individual
or company) that would like to obtain an SSL certificate from CA vendor needs to
prove that has the requisite rights or is the owner of the domain that requests an
SSL certificate - in order for the vendor to validate this information. The following
steps are needed to acquire the special type of certificate that will be used for the
remote configuration (ZTC) process.
1. Own a domain name that matched the same entity name (individual or
organization) as the name registered for the deluxe SSL certificate order as
written on the WHOIS request.
2. Order a single deluxe SSL certificate from GoDaddy.com Inc.
3. After successfully purchasing the certificate, the request is processed automatically.
4. Select the appropriate certificate type: corporate or small business/sales
proprietor.
5. Then enter the necessary personal information (certificate requester information) that matches the billing data (in the previous step that we ordered the
certificate). Note that the WHOIS directory service information must match
the domain name for which the certificate will be issued.
6. Finally generate and submit the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) as
explained in section 3.7.4.
7. As part of the individual authentication process (our case), you will be asked
to send two forms of identification:
a) Provide driver’s license, passport, or a valid government issued photo ID.
b) Provide a bank statement or a credit card statement
Note that in all identification fields the requirement is to enter the exact data (even
a hyphen matters) that match the entity name (organization or individual), the
WHOIS directory service information of the domain that is registered with the
certificate, and the billing information when ordering the certificate.

3.7.4

Intel AMT remote provision configuration

There are many options for generating a CSR request, in our lab we have used the
OpenSSL cryptographic toolkit[5]. The important data required for the certificate
fields are listed below:
• OU must be "Intel(R) Client Setup Certificate".
• CN must be "SystemName".domain.com matching the FQDN of the host that
will perform the remote provisioning configuration and will generate the CSR.

3.7. REMOTE PROVISIONING

49

• O must match the entity name (individual or organization).
Additionally the following entries must match the domain name WHOIS directory
service lookup.
• C: country two-character abbreviation
• ST: state or province (full listing)
• L: locality or city name (full listing)
Generating a CSR request for AMT
To simply the creation of the CSR request we created a configuration file (shown
in listing 3.11). Given the configuration file the CSR generation command can be
invoked as shown in listing 3.13. This generates a CSR request in privacy enhanced
mail (PEM) format. The next step is to export this PEM formatted certificate as
a PFX certification[49]. This is done using the command shown in listing 3.12.
RANDFILE= . / . rnd
d e f a u l t _ b i t s =2048
d e f a u l t _ k e y f i l e=k e y f i l e . pem
encrypt_rsa_key=no
default_md=sha1
r e q _ e x t e n s i o n s=r e q _ e x t e n s i o n s _ s e c t i o n
prompt=no
d i s t i n g u i s h e d _ n a m e=r e q _ d i s t i n g u i s h e d _ n a m e _ s e c t i o n
[ req_distinguished_name_section ]
C=DE
ST=B e r l i n
L=F r i e d r i c h s h a i n
O=Name e n t i t y ( i n d i v i d u a l o r o r g a n i z a t i o n )
OU=I n t e l (R) C l i e n t Setup C e r t i f i c a t e
CN=provisionSystemName . mydomain . com
e m a i l A d d r e s s=user@DomainName . com
[ req_extensions_section ]
b a s i c C o n s t r a i n t s=CA: FALSE
keyUsage=d i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e
extendedKeyUsage=c r i t i c a l , serverAuth , 2 . 1 6 . 8 4 0 . 1 . 1 1 3 7 4 1 . 1 . 2 . 3
s u b j e c t K e y I d e n t i f i e r=hash
Listing 3.11. CSRrequest.cfg file

50

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

#o p e n s s l r e q −new −c o n f i g CSRrequest . c f g −o u t
RemoteProvisionCSR . pem −k e y o u t R e m o t e P r o v i s i o n k e y . pem
Listing 3.12. CSR generation command

pkcs12 −export −i n R e m o t e P r o v i s i o n c r t . pem −out
R e m o t e P r o v i s i o n c r t . p f x −i n k e y RemoteProvisionkey . pem −
name " I n t e l (R) RCFG C e r t i f i c a t e " −password " p a s s :
aSecurePassword ? "
Listing 3.13. PFX certificate generation

The File RemoteProvisionCSR.pem contains the CSR request ready for submission to the CA. Simply copying the contents of this file for instance using a text
editor by starting from —-BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST—– to the —–END
CERTIFICATE REQUEST—– and paste it to the appropriate form of the CA
vendor or upload it as a file (if such an option is available from the vendor) - the
CA will now provide you with a signed certificate.
Now that you have a certificate from the CA you will make use of the Intel’s setup
and configuration service (SCS) setup wizard that is provided (for free) on Intel’s
website[4]. The SCS setup wizard provides automated installation of the required
services and dependencies needed to utilize the zero touch remote configuration
process. Given the deluxe SSL certificate you can start remote provisioning of
AMT systems without any physical interaction. Note that there is a stripped down
version of the SCS named Manageability developer tool kit to support zero touch
remote provisioning of up to 20 (twenty) AMT systems. This lightweight version
uses less hardware resources and can be downloaded from Intel’s website for free[46].
The overall cost for the single deluxe SSL certificate from GoDaddy cost 60.23 e
before tax.
Hello packet
When in setup mode the AMT device transmits Hello packets. a Hello packet is a
special network packet transmitted periodically to the provision server and follows
the back-off algorithm shown in Table 3.4. The result is that for the first minute
the host will send 5 Hello packets during this minute, then it will send 5 more Hello
packets over the next 10 minutes, and 5 more packets over the next hour.
The network interface of AMT continues transmitting hello packets by default
for 24 hours; except for the AMT versions 2.2, 2.6, and 3.0 that cease transmitting
Hello packets after 6 hours. Note that custom OEM versions of AMT can prolong
the Hello packet network transmission, up to 255 hours. The back-off algorithm is
restarted after a firmware reset of the AMT, by restoring AMT to factory default
settings, or by power cycling[26] the AMT enabled system. The Hello packet has
the format depicted below.

3.7. REMOTE PROVISIONING

51

Table 3.4. Hello packet back-off algorithm

Time intervals
1 minute
10 minutes
60 minutes

Transmission retries
5
5
5

2 bytes header:
• Byte 0 is the hash algorithm, 0 for MD5 and 1 for SHA1
• Byte 1 has a hash length of 16 (MD5 hash) or 20 (SHA1 hash) bytes
16 or 20 bytes Hash corresponds to a root certificate from a CA.
The certificate hashes start at byte offset 25 and each hash entry consists of a header
and the hash itself.

3.7.5

Intel AMT remote provisioning: attack scenario

In this attack scenario an attacker performs an unprivileged ZTC remote provisioning to an ATM platform. The attack scenario is based upon the remote provisioning
flow of the Intel AMT as discussed in section3.7.1. Our implemented attack is
divided in six steps:
1. An unsuspecting user connects to a network (typically a LAN) with his/her
Intel AMT PC.
2. Automatically AMT acquires the appropriate DHCP and DNS configuration
parameters.
3. Once connected AMT sends a hello packet to determine the availability of the
provisioning server.
4. Attacker initiates a (rogue) provisioning server.
5. AMT platform queries the provisioning server and initiates the remote
provisioning process.
6. Finally upon completion of the remote provisioning process the attacker has
full control of the AMT platform.
In order to orchestrate this attack scenario an attacker can find the available
tools for free (see section 3.7.3). An additional requirement is a specific type of
a SSL certificate that is applicable to all Intel AMT platforms (see section 3.7.3).
This attack could be used indefinite times to compromise the Intel’s AMT remote

52

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

provisioning process and subverts the security of the non configured PCs that include
the AMT functionality even while it is disabled within the BIOS configuration as
presented in section 3.7.6.

3.7.6

Vulnerability: ZTC implemented when AMT is disabled

In our laboratory environment (see section 3) we have tested and found that the ZTC
remote provisioning can be implemented even while the Intel AMT functionality
is disabled within the BIOS as illustrated in Figure 3.6. Surprisingly the AMT
platform broadcasts an ARP request packet upon connecting to a wired network
(typically a LAN) and follows the sequence described in section 3.7.1. From this
point and beyond the attacker operates the SCS and could manipulate the PC
according to his/her malicious activities (see section 3.7.5 even while the Intel AMT
is disabled in BIOS.

Figure 3.6. Intel AMT disabled in BIOS

Figure 3.7 illustrates the SCS application console screenshot that discovers the
not configured AMT platform. Figure 3.8 illustrates the SCS console screenshot

Figure 3.7. Intel AMT SCS console – not configured

pushing our desired configuration profile with success.

Obviously the ZTC

3.8. MOBILE VERSION OF AMT

53

provisioning process has been realized while Intel AMT is disabled in BIOS.
Surprising after enabling the AMT functionality in BIOS (since it was disabled)

Figure 3.8. Intel AMT SCS console – configured

the configuration remains the same as the one configured with ZTC provisioning
while AMT was disabled. That gives a clear advantage to a malicious person
implementing his desired attack vector by pushing the configuration to the PC when
AMT is disabled. Finally enables the AMT option in BIOS and the configuration
remains the same (as the one forced when disabled). Keep in mind that all running
AMT operations (i.e. remote management operations) are transparent to the user
due to local environment restrictions implied by the AMT technology. Note that
the requirements mentioned in section 3.7.3 are needed (available for free) for this
attack vector to be successful.
The PCs along with the released version are illustrated in Table 3.5 have been
tested and perform the vulnerability (i.e. ZTC implemented when AMT is disabled)
mentioned in this section. Most important, that this critical vulnerability affects
even the latest Intel AMT ME firmware version [55] 4.2.20.1036 released on
the 4th of March, 2010.
Table 3.5. Vulnerability affected PCs

Brand Model
Fujitsu Lifebook T5010
Lenovo Thinkpad X200
Lenovo Thinkpad X200

3.8

Chipset
GM 45
GS 45
GS 45

Version
4.0.3
4.1.3
4.2.20

Mobile version of AMT

An important feature of Intel AMT is the mobile version that offers support for
most of the remote management control capabilities offered by the wired (default)
version of AMT. As we have mentioned earlier the important issue for AMT in
general is that it relies on a dynamic IP addressing scheme, thus creating more
attack vectors since most of the unsophisticated or "default" type attacks will apply
for AMT. The best practice for wired and wireless networking in the case of AMT
mobile version would be to use a static IP addressing scheme with a reduced subnet

54

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

size an option which cannot be implemented since AMT enterprise provision model
(the most secure) operates only in dynamic IP addressing scheme (i.e DHCP). The
important note on this issue is that the attacker can deploy the attacks described
below with limited resources; typically a notebook with 2 wireless interfaces (for
better diversity) is sufficient.

3.8.1

How mobile AMT works

The wireless manageability version of Intel AMT is implemented by using two layers:
the wireless network interface controller (NIC) and the interface driver executed on
the host platform. The wireless NIC is responsible for managing the radio frequency
(RF) communication network connection. In order to utilize the mobile version of
AMT the platform must be attached to AC power since AMT activity is limited
when the system is operating on batteries[43]. However, when in S0 power state
the AMT platform can be configured to operate even when operating on battery
mode. In AMT release version 4 and above there is extensive support for remote
management in all permitted power states (see section 2.1.1).

3.8.2

Activating AMT mobile version

By default mobile AMT version is disabled. First the mobile version of AMT needs
to be enable by specifying an applicable power policy (subject to AMT version) as
illustrated in Figure 3.10. Next a wireless profile needs to be configured with an
appropriate SSID network name, the credential data, and the appropriate security
settings that correspond to the wireless access point (AP) as depicted in Figure
3.10. The mobile version of AMT will receive an IP address from a DHCP server.
Note that a static IP addressing scheme is not provided in the mobile version of
AMT.

Figure 3.9. AMT mobile power policies

3.8. MOBILE VERSION OF AMT

55

Figure 3.10. AMT mobile version web UI

Additionally, when the wireless manageability features of AMT are active you
cannot access any WLAN except those configured in the wireless profile parameters,
regardless of the connection’s establishment. This means that the wireless LAN
adapter can only be used for the AMT mobile provisioning and not for any other
WLAN connectivity since the current implementation does not allow simultaneous
access to the wireless LAN adapter.

3.8.3

Implementation fault

There is no built in wireless security support, hence the only configuration settings
are related to the connectivity settings with the AP as illustrated above in Figure
3.10. The wireless profile parameters for the mobile version of AMT include the
following configuration settings:
• Profile name
• Profile priority
• Network Name (SSID)
• Security Settings
– Key Management approach: Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) or Robust
secure Network (RSN)
– Encryption Algorithm: Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or
Counter Mode CBC MAC Protocol (CCMP)
• Authentication: Passphrase or IEEE 802.1x profile

56

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

The AMT wireless protocol stack broadcasts the following packets at an interval
rate of 120 seconds.
• Three IEEE 802.11 Probe requests:
– One with a packet size of 106 bytes and
– Two with a variable packet size of 106 bytes with the SSID character
bytes added.
• In every probe request the broadcast includes the following:
– The supported bit rates of the AMT wireless NIC.
– The supported modulation and coding scheme set
– The supported high throughput capabilities
– The SSID parameter set.
• In two out of the three packets, the configured SSID set in the wireless
configuration parameters of AMT is broadcasted.
The implementation fault of the mobile AMT version introduces several serious
weaknesses (additional details are presented in section 3.8.4).
Automatic network SSID selection imposes serious risks since the mobile
platform of AMT tries to associate with the configured SSID (wireless profile) every
two minutes. As demonstrated in section 3.8.3 the AMT broadcasts the SSID (along
with other data) of the AP, as configured in the wireless profile settings. Therefore
an attacker simply listens for the probe requests that are broadcasted, noting the
configure SSID, by passively monitoring the wireless channel. Next the attacker
impersonate an AP with this SSID, hence it can now deceive the AMT platform into
establishing a connection to it (the rogue AP). A more secure practice would limit
the AMT to establishing a connection with a specified AP based on its MAC address.
This specific MAC address would need to be manually configured. However such a
configuration is not available on Intel AMT mobile version. Detailed information is
covered in section 3.8.6.

3.8.4

Wireless attacks on AMT

Surprisingly the AMT mobile version is vulnerable to many known vulnerabilities
and wireless network attacks.

3.8.5

Attack types

By definition IEEE 802.11 LANs are shared medium networks[1], hence wireless
NICs and APs establish connections by utilizing protocols over a shared radio
channel. All packets can be monitored by any WLAN interface that is compatible
with the transmitter. We classify these types of attack vectors into: confidentiality,
integrity and availability attacks.

3.8. MOBILE VERSION OF AMT

57

1. Confidentiality attacks:
• Fake AP: masquerading as a legitimate AP by using the SSID learned
from the broadcast probe SSID frames
• Man in the Middle: intercepting all the network traffic by using a fake
AP.
2. Integrity attacks:
• 802.11 frame injection: Sending arbitrary 802.11 frames.
• 802.11 data deletion: Jamming to prevent delivery of frame, while
simultaneously spoofing ACKs for deleted data frames.
• 802.11 data replay: Capturing and replaying modified data.
3. Availability attacks
• RF jamming: Transmitting at the same frequency as the targeted WLAN
is using, perhaps at a power that exceeds the regulated equivalent isotopic
radiated power (EIRP) – thus ensuring that no legitimate stations can
communicate.
• 802.11 beacon flood: Generating large amounts of 802.11 beacons making
it difficult for the AMT stations to associate with the corresponding AP.
• 802.11 de-authentication: Probing AMT stations with custom deauthentication packets causes rapid disassociation from a legitimate AP.

3.8.6

Confidentiality attacks

In this section we analyze the confidentiality attacks that apply to the AMT mobile
version.
Normally a fake AP implementation is utilized for one reason; to lure unsuspected clients to connect with a malicious AP rather than connecting with a
legitimate AP (the one that the user intended to use). In our case the client
that establishes a connection with the AP is the AMT system since no defense
mechanisms are implemented on the mobile version of AMT. Implementation of a
fake AP can be done with open source tools such as Airbase-ng[72]. An overview
of this attack combined with the de-authentication attack is illustrated in Figure
3.11.
In principle a man in the middle attack (MITM) occurs when an attacker
intercepts the communication between two or more devices, and could eavesdrop,
craft, and send arbitrary packets at will. In detail a station "C" (client) is associated
and authenticated with a legitimate AP "B". An attacker "A" performs a deauthentication attack (described above) to the station "B" in order to lure the client
"B" into establishing a connection to the attacker by impersonating the legitimate
AP. While the client "C" successfully associates with the attacker’s AP or (a fake

58

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

Figure 3.11. Fake AP attack

AP) as described above the attacker "A" will re-transmit all the frames received
from "B" to the legitimate AP or frames to the client "C" – hence enabling "A" to
eavesdrop and/or modifying at will any of the frames. Note that a MITM attack
can be realized without the need for de-authentication or a fake AP attack. The
attacker can simply acts as an illicit AP, by using a PC (usually a notebook) with two
wireless NICs and perhaps with directional antennas to establish a good connection
with the legitimate AP ("B") and with the client ("C").

3.8.7

Integrity attacks

IEEE 802.11 is shared accessed medium and malicious persons can attack the
integrity of transmitted data by using frame injection and frame replay tool. By
implementing IEEE 802.11 frame manipulation an attacker can transmit data to be
the station (client) by transmitting arbitrary IEEE 802.11 packets.
The attacker will generally begin by capturing interesting IEEE 802.11 frames
that will fit his attacking schema, then manipulating and sending forged 802.11
frames to the legitimate AP or targeted station. Note that the frames can be
manipulated off-line or in real-time. Open source tools such as airpwn[15] provides
a framework for IEEE 802.11 packet injection. Airpwn listens for incoming wireless
data frames and uses pattern matching to select "interesting" frames. If the data
matches a pattern specified in the configuration files, a customized response is
injected or spoofed accordingly to/from the wireless access point. As long as airpwn
responds prior to the legitimate AP, the station (client) will accept these frames as

3.8. MOBILE VERSION OF AMT

59

valid. From the client side airpwn seems to be a "legitimate" AP.

3.8.8

Availability attacks

Availability attacks are closely related to denial of service (DoS), thus making
unavailable a service or a resource hosted on a system usually by resource exhaustion
of the specific services. These attacks are implemented by transmitting carefully
crafted control and management packets using IEEE 802.11 frames. DoS attacks are
extremely difficult to control and prevent, since the attack is not easily detectable,
when implemented by sophisticated attackers. Such an attack could last from
milliseconds to hours.
Because the IEEE 802.11 network is a shared medium, RF jamming provides
a very effective attack. RF jamming denies service to the legitimate users, in our
case the Intel AMT administrator and client. An attacker can disrupt operation
of the IEEE 802.11 network communications by increasing interference, leading to
the signal to noise ratio of legitimate traffic being too low for successful detection
by the legitimate receivers. An attacker can launch such attack by using modified
WLAN NIC (for example with an amplifier between the NIC and the antenna or
using a highly direction antenna to focus the NIC’s emissions in a given direction).
The attacker could also use a powerful signal generator to flood the relevant IEEE
802.11 radio channels.
A beacon flood attack overloads the communication channel with counterfeit
packets, so that the AP spends all of its resources processing the flood packets
rendering it unavailable to legitimate users. This type of attack can performed with
open source tools such as Fake AP[70] to generate the appearance of a very large
number of rogue AP, thus "confusing" the legitimate client when it tries to select a
legitimate AP. Such an attack is illustrated in Figure 3.12.

60

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

Figure 3.12. Beacon flood attack

An IEEE 802.11 station (client) associates with and authentication with a
legitimate AP by transmitting IEEE 802.11 frame. An attacker can interfere with
this process by sending spoofed network frames impersonating the AP or the station.
Such an attack can target a specific or denying access to the whole communication
channel. This attack is quite powerful since the attacker can monitor the WLAN
channel and transmit de-authentication frames to newly associated stations. Such
an attack can be launched with freely available open source tools, for instance
aireplay-ng[73]. An example command line is shown in listing 3.14. In this example,
you simply fill in the client’s MAC address and the ESSID that you wish to target.
a i r e p l a y −ng −−deauth 15 −c ’ c l i e n t ’ s mac ’ −a ’ e s s i d mac ’
ath1
Listing 3.14. De-authentication attack example

3.9

Intel AMT Privacy threat

Intel claims that their AMT system has been designed to securely manage systems,
while allowing administrators and end-user to opt-in or out-out:
Intel AMT has several built in mechanisms to ensure that computer
management happens securely and only by authorized IT administrators
belonging to the organization’s IT departments. It also provides several
options that offer choices and control to IT administrators and end users
of the computers for opting in or opting out of various capabilities.
...Mechanisms are also available to protect against attacks by rouge
administrators.

3.9. INTEL AMT PRIVACY THREAT

61

[[13]; page 288-289] However, it is not clear that this statement is actually true in
fact. We will examine some of the specific issues in the following subsections.

3.9.1

Privacy protection mechanisms in AMT

The user can opt-out from AMT whenever he wants according to the above
quotation, but how does the user do so? Does the user need to know a password?
We noted earlier that they are two passwords: one for MEBx and one for the
WEB/XML server; but these are not synchronized. So which of these passwords
does the user need and how can he/she use it?
If the AMT mechanism can be used even if the user has disabled it in the BIOS
- how can the user know that no one else can activate it and re-provision their
computer?

3.9.2

End user notification

As we have previously discussed AMT acts regardless of the OS or without OS at
all, so why does AMT platform depend on the OS in order to display an end-user
awareness message status of AMT since Intel cares about the end-user’s privacy
while being monitored or managed?
[...] the end-user has little knowledge whether his or her computer is
being managed and monitored by another entity–the IT administrator.
From a privacy standpoint, the impact of such a mode of operation
might range from an uncomfortable feeling for the end-user to something
more significant. Therefore. Intel developed a host software-based
modification mechanism (an application icon in the system tray) that
explicitly made the end-user aware that Intel AMT is available within
the platform, and some other information regarding its status. The main
functionality of the tray icon application is to give Intel AMT status to
the end-user of the computer with Intel vPro technology. This icon
application is available for the most popular versions of Windows and
Linux (Windows XP, Windows Vista, Red Hat Linux and Novell SuSE
Linux).[[13]; page 293-294]
Surprisingly the AMT status notification in our tested system displayed that the
AMT platform while we were remotely managing the device as illustrated in Figure
3.13. We have used version 3.1.0.31 of the MEstatus package; a GUI application
used to monitor Intel AMT status by providing a system tray icon on the desktop.
It depends on the uns package with version 3.2.0.24; an application that receives
messages from the AMT platform and transmits them to the local OS event log, in
order to notify the end-user.

62

CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF INTEL AMT

Figure 3.13. AMT status notification

3.9.3

Privacy concerns from publishers and end-users

Rick C. Hodgin posted an article on TG Daily[66] about Intel AMT technology part
of it quoted:
Big Brother potentially exists right now in our PCs, compliments
of Intel’s vPro. The ability for a CPU, chipset and network chip to
operate independently of the OS through commands given to it from
hidden, out-of-band communications is a telltale sign that it is possible.
And while there may be many applications which benefit from such
technology (Intel indicates billions of dollars saved, including hundreds
of thousands of tons of greenhouse gas emissions, through the use of
vPro’s ability to operate even if the machine is off), the enabling factors
are there for vPro to be used by another type of system; something like
Big Brother.
From GIGA-BYTE technology corporation community forums[28] as quoted:
How to disable Intel vPro spyware
Please enable your BIOS with an option to permanently and effectively
disable all Intel vPro technology. The last thing I want is hackers or
the US government spying on my computer and downloading my files,
passwords, etc. without authorization.
Tony Dennis by Incisive Media published this article[74] part of this are
quotationd:
Intel proudly shows off snooping tech ...Details about a vPro or
Centrino based PC are saved into non-volatile memory. But, scarily,
this information can be read even if the machine’s power switch is in
the ’off’ position. ...Obviously Intel claims this kind of stuff is mega
secure. But what if it were hacked? Or what if they hacked it? You
could potentially be woken up in the middle of the night by the sounds
of somebody completely reconfiguring your laptop.

Chapter 4

Conclusions and Future Work
4.1

Conclusions

A vicious employee, organization, or even an OEM can "accidentally" force a rigorous
configuration customized to his needs in order to completely control the AMT
platform, thus gaining (and maintaining) complete control of the computer system.
As a result it is possible to install a powerful rootkit (i.e AMT) over the Internet
as Intel presented in[6]. They showed that it is possible to control the IDE-R
functionality of AMT for remote diagnosing and repairing remote sites over the
Internet or a mesh networking by using a distributed network architecture. This
enables the installation and control of a botnet now on the hardware level. AMT
was introduced in 2004[31] and many IT administrators as well as OEMs do not
recommend to upgrade firmware (see appendix A). Some vendors luckily include
an upgrade of the AMT firmware bundled within the BIOS firmware upgrade,
while surprisingly some others are not aware of the AMT functionality and the
potential capabilities of this remotely controllable powerful rootkit, given the fact
the tremendous insecurity that the ZTC remote provisioning process provides.

Customers and end users lack knowledge of this backdoor (i.e. AMT) when they
buy a PC that includes the AMT platform. This can potentially lead to havoc
should there be a well publicized attack that would make them concerned about
their privacy and ability to control their own computers. Since AMT is enabled
by default in many computers and the end user often lacks technical expertise
this leads to unexpected vulnerabilities for the user. Unfortunately today AMT
is shipped on "home" PCs and as we previously discussed the insecurities of this
embedded device are scary, especially as IT administrators, end customers of PCs,
notebooks, and servers are unfamiliar with this technology, thus malicious persons
could remotely manipulate these systems. Over the last decade IT technology has
advanced tremendously, but many of the systems that have been developed are
insecure.
63

64

4.2

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

HTTP digest access authentication issues

Apparently Intel made a poor choice implementing the HTTP digest access
authentication scheme[48] to the AMT platform for crucial operations, specifically
for remote management. The implemented access authentication method dates
back to 1999 and could be exploited by a malicious person carrying out an offline brute force attack. Depending on the attacker’s resources, ingenuity, the use
of specialized hardware and software contributes to the recovery –cracking of the
administrative credentials, and then managing the AMT platform accordingly(see
section 3.6). Intel does not follow the recommendations of the Internet engineering
task force (IETF) who noted in June 1999 in section 4.14 of[48] that with respect to
the cryptographic standards of 1999 that Digest Authentication is weak. We should
note that by the standard of 2010, the security offered by Digest Authentication is
largely unacceptable for most practical applications, hence AMT should be revised
to utilize a TLS implementation in all setup and configuration and note only in the
enterprise provision model (see Table 2.6).

4.3

Mobile version issues

Wired networks (typically Ethernet) have less concern for security compared with
wireless networks. In principle wireless connectivity does not provide weaker
security that wired networks –unless the physical wires of the network are protected.
However, use of a wireless connection facilitates easy connectivity for both good and
bad purposes. Catastrophic consequences can occur to the managed PC’s hardware
when "sensitive" AMT functionalities are used. For instance a remote BIOS upgrade
of a platform via the wireless network link. Hence the insecurity of Intel’s AMT
OOB remote management can be easily exploited as presented in section 3.8.4.

4.4

Gratis hardware rootkit

The Intel AMT platform can provide the basis for secretly operating a platform’s
hardware based on a backdoor, since its included in a prominent fraction of
PCs (desktop and notebooks) servers, POS, embedded systems and even ATMs
as illustrated in Table 2.2 and 2.3. By design the AMT architecture uses a
separate OOB channel independent of any network traffic transmitted to and
from the other parts of the computer. Therefore this interface provides a covert
communication channel that introduce a set of issues: allowing malicious parties to
perform surveillance, to monitor, to carry out espionage, and fully control a system.
Malicious parties include government agencies, individual attackers, and industries.
A catalytic factor for this powerful backdoor arises from the functionality of AMT
architecture that was designed to operate and perform remote management, even
though the system is turned off.

4.5. RECOMMENDATIONS

65

Additionally though a separate communication channel via the TCP/IP protocol
stack, the platform can be controlled remotely over a wired or a wireless interface,
even if the operating system implements a firewall or other security countermeasures.
In this thesis we have demonstrated (see section 3.7 and 3.2) different ways of fully
controlling an Intel AMT enabled system via the ZTC functionality and bypassing
local access restrictions to the platform.

4.5

Recommendations

The AMT technology aimed to introduce a powerful remote management tool,
creating a secure infrastructure that is secure against inbound and outbound attack
vectors, especially for critical environments such as enterprises. Unfortunately, this
means that the underlying technology requires careful design and implementation
of security, especially with respect to network centric attacks - in order to
successfully prevent critical attack vectors from being exploited. Our suggested
recommendations for the AMT platform would be to enforce the TLS/SSL security
implementation in all provisioning models and not only in one out of the three setup
and configuration models.
Additionally extended security features should be implemented in the mobile
version of to protect the AMT since it is highly dependent upon the access point’s
security scheme. As discussed in section 3.8.4 the mobile version of AMT falls into a
variety of attacks and could be implemented by an attacker with limited resources.
Last but not least the ZTC remote configuration process should be implemented in
such an extend that malicious entities and attackers would be almost impossible to
obtain this special type of certificate for qualifying and successfully employing the
ZTC remote provisioning as discussed in section 3.7.2.

4.6

Future work

In this section we will enumerate some of the suggested future work that could
extend and enhance our research done in this thesis given the fact that there is
almost not related research in the field. The logical continuation to this thesis is a
security evaluation of the SSL/TLS implementation (i.e. enterprise provisioning
model) of the AMT platform in respect to integrity and confidentiality attack
vectors. Additionally an interesting and approach would be the security analysis
with respect to the hardware layer of the AMT platform. Finally surveying
the AMT’s certificate based protection would be compelling to follow up on this
research.

Appendices

67

Appendix A

Vendor e-mail communication
• Quoting the e-mail communication from Acer Group Customer Service [7]:
We would not recommend flashing your BIOS due to the inherent risk of
rendering your machine inoperable. We are able to repair your machine
if the BIOS has been flashed. Unfortunately this problem is not covered
by the warranty and would be classed as a chargeable repair. an initial
charge of £51.99 would need to be taken.
...
• Quoting the e-mail communication from Fujitsu Technology Solutions technical support [27]:
Regarding your request to LIFEBOOK T5010 iAMT ME firmware
version. The answer from our development:
the current iAMT ME Firmware version is: 4.1.3.1038.
The iAMT firmware version can not be flashed by BIOS upgrade.
The iAMT firmware version will be flashed during production process.
...

69

Bibliography
[1]

IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer
(PHY) Specifications. June 1997.

[2]

Intel Centrino Pro and Intel vPro Processor Technology. 2007. URL
http://download.intel.com/pressroom/kits/centrino/CentrinoPro_
vPro_whitepaper.pdf.

[3]

BarsWF MD5 Cracker. October 2008. URL http://3.14.by/en/md5.

[4]

Intel SCS Setup Wizard, September 2008. URL http://www.vproexpert.
com/59JHE/.

[5]

OpenSSL Project, June 2009. URL http://www.openssl.org.

[6]

Abdul Bailey, Teri McFaul and Ylian Saint-Hilaire. Small & Medium Business:
How to Deliver Intel vProTM Technology, September 2009. URL http://www.
intel.com/go/idfsessions.

[7]

Acer Group Customer Service. Personal e-mail communication. December
2009.

[8]

Alex Golod. Security FAQ for Intel vPro Technology. 2008. URL http:
//communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-1989.

[9]

Alexander Peslyak. John the Ripper. URL http://www.openwall.com/john/.

[10] Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk. Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits.
2009. URL http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/bh09usa/Ring%
20-3%20Rootkits.pdf.
[11] Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk. Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits proof of
concept code, July 2009. URL http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/
bh09usa/ring-minus-3-tools-1.3.tgz.
[12] ARC International.
ARC4 processor.
April 2003.
URL http:
//web.archive.org/web/20040926134313/http://www.arc.com/upload/
download/F1010.5_ARC+A4_4-9-03_FINAL.pdf.
71

72

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[13] Arvind Kumar, Purushottam Goel and Ylian Saint-Hilaire. Active Platfrom
Management Demystified. Intel press, June 2009.
[14] Mihir Bellare and Oded Goldreich. On defining proofs of knowledge. pages
390–420.
[15] Bryan Burns. Airpwn. June 2006. URL http://airpwn.sourceforge.net/
Airpwn.html.
[16] Business Wire. Atos Origin Takes Pole Position with Intel AMT from
Intel, June 2005. URL http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/
is_2005_June_6/ai_n13797230/.
[17] CCITT (Consultative Committee on International Telegraphy and Telephony).
Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentication Framework, 1988.
[18] Center for Democracy and Technology Group. Anti-Spyware Coalition Group.
URL http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/glossary.htm.
[19] Damon Poeter. Intel vPro Chipset Lures MSPs, System Builders. August 2007.
URL http://www.crn.com/white-box/201802550.
[20] Distributed Management Task Force Inc. Alert Standard Format Specification.
[21] Distributed Management Task Force Inc. Common Information Model. URL
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim/.
[22] Distributed Management Task Force Inc. Desktop and mobile Architecture for
System Hardware Initiative. URL http://www.dmtf.org/standards/mgmt/
dash/.
[23] Distributed Management Task Force, Inc. Web Services for Management,
December 2008. URL http://www.dmtf.org/standards/wsman/.
[24] Distributed.net.
Distributed computing project, 1997.
distributed.net/.

URL http://

[25] Erik Zachte. Wikimedia Visitor Log Analysis Report - Operating Systems,
December 2009. URL http://stats.wikimedia.org/wikimedia/squids/
SquidReportOperatingSystems.htm.
[26] Free Online Dictionary of Computing. power cycle term. URL http://foldoc.
org/power+cycle.
[27] Fujitsu Technology Solutions Technical Support. Personal e-mail communication. December 2009.
[28] GIGA-BYTE technology community forums. How to disable Intel vPro
spyware, October 2009. URL http://forum.giga-byte.co.uk/index.php/
topic,724.msg3233.html.

73

[29] Gregory Regan.
University of Plymouth & PC Power Management.
September 2008. URL http://www.heepi.org.uk/jisc/events/Sheffield%
20Presentations/Gregory%20Regan%202.9.08.ppt.
[30] Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Intel Corporation, Microsoft Corporation,
Phoenix Technologies Ltd. and Toshiba Corporation. Advanced Configuration
and Power Interface Specification, June 2009. URL http://www.acpi.info/
DOWNLOADS/ACPIspec40.pdf.
[31] IDG
Communications.
CA
announces
plans
to
support
Intel
Active
Management
Technology,
October
2004.
URL
http://www.arnnet.com.au/mediareleases/3706/
ca-announces-plans-to-support-intel-active-managem/.
[32] Intel. Active Management Technology System Defense and Agent Presence
Overview. URL http://cache-www.intel.com/cd/00/00/32/09/320960_
320960.pdf.
[33] Intel. Intel Active Management Technology Technology Brief, February 2005.
URL http://cache-www.intel.com/cd/00/00/23/63/236366_236366.pdf.
[34] Intel. Improve IT efficiency white paper. 2006. URL http://www.cgs4u.com/
docs/intel%20active%20management%20technology.pdf.
[35] Intel. Active Management Technology Small Business Configuration User
Guide.
May 2007.
URL http://www.intel.com/technology/manage/
downloads/amt_smbusiness.pdf.
[36] Intel. Case study: Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust puts Intel
vPro technology. July 2007. URL http://communities.intel.com/docs/
DOC-1131.
[37] Intel.
Architecture Guide:
Active Management Technology.
2008.
URL
http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/
architecture-guide-intel-active-management-technology/.
[38] Intel. Intel AMT Remote Configuration Certificate. 2008.
[39] Intel. Intel Centrino 2 with vPro Technology and Intel Core2 Processor with
vPro Technology. 2008. URL ftp://download.intel.com/products/vpro/
whitepaper/crossclient.pdf.
[40] Intel. Intel Technology Journal. 12, 2008.
[41] Intel. Intelligent Platform Management Interface Adopters List, August 2008.
URL http://www.intel.com/design/servers/ipmi/adopterlist.htm.
[42] Intel. Intelligent Platform Management Interface reference, August 2008. URL
http://www.intel.com/design/servers/ipmi/spec.htm.

74

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[43] Intel. Mobile Computing with Intel AMT. July 2008. URL http://software.
intel.com/en-us/articles/mobile-computing-with-intel-amt/.
[44] Intel.
Technical Considerations for Intel AMT in a Wireless
Environment. 2008. URL http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/
technical-considerations-for-intel-amt-in-a-wireless-environment/.
[45] Intel. 2009 Intel IT Performance Report.
//communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-4776.

January 2009.

URL http:

[46] Intel.
Manageability
Developer
Tool
Kit,
May
2009.
URL
http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/
download-the-latest-version-of-manageability-developer-tool-kit/.
[47] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. Port numbers. URL http://www.iana.
org/assignments/port-numbers.
[48] J. Franks, P. Hallam-Baker, J. Hostetler, S. Lawrence, P. Leach, A. Luotonen
and L. Stewart. RFC 2617, HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access
Authentication. June 1999. URL http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2617.txt.
[49] John Linn. Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail — Part I:
Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures. February 1993.
[50] Josh Hilliker. Known Issues, Best Practices, and Workarounds. November
2007.
URL http://communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-1247#Using_
international_keyboards_to_create_MEBx_passwords_via_Setup_and_
Configuration_Service_SCS.
[51] Josh Hilliker. Tools and Utilities for Intel vPro Technology. October 2007.
URL http://communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-1171.
[52] K. Fiftal, E. Herold, R. Klleiman and J. Nicholes. Intel Active Mananagement
Technology Security Configuration Guide, December 2008.
[53] Kelsey Witherow and Steve Lewis. Order an Intel vPro technology "ActivationReady" PC. December 2009. URL http://communities.intel.com/docs/
DOC-2033.
[54] Ken Munro. Database security an oxymoron? December 2006.
[55] Lenovo. Intel AMT 4.2 Management Engine Firmware. March 2010. URL
http://www-307.ibm.com/pc/support/site.wss/MIGR-71137.html.
[56] MD5.My-Addr.com. My-Addr Project MD5 database, October 2008. URL
http://md5.my-addr.com/.

75

[57] Michiel Timmers and Adriaan van der Zee. LIA project: Intel AMT and
network management. April 2009. URL https://www.os3.nl/2009-2010/
courses/lia/start.
[58] Naren Kumar. Order an Intel AMT enabled Embedded Product, August 2009.
URL http://communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-3737.
[59] Ned Freed and Nathaniel S. Borenstein. Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(MIME) — Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies. November 1996.
[60] NVIDIA Corporation.
CUDA Architecture Overview, April 2009.
URL http://developer.download.nvidia.com/compute/cuda/docs/CUDA_
Architecture_Overview.pdf.
[61] Openwall Community Wiki.
How to extract tarballs and
apply
patches.
URL
http://openwall.info/wiki/john/
how-to-extract-tarballs-and-apply-patches.
[62] Project RainbowCrack. The Time-Memory Tradeoff Hash Cracker. URL http:
//project-rainbowcrack.com.
[63] R. Fielding and J. Gettys and J. Mogul and H. Frystyk and L. Masinter
and P. Leach and T. Berners-Lee. RFC 2616, Hypertext Transfer Protocol
– HTTP/1.1. June 1999.
[64] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk and D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile. 1999.
[65] R. Shirey. Security Architecture for Internet Protocols: A Guide for Protocol
Designs and Standards Internet Draft. November 1994.
[66] Rick C. Hodgin. Big Brother potentially exists right now in our PCs, September
2008. URL http://bit.ly/DcG3A.
[67] Romain Raboin. HTTP Digest Access Authentication patch. URL http:
//syscall.eu/romain/.
[68] Sreelekshmy Syamalakumari.
Intel MEBx and QWERTY Keyboard.
May 2008. URL http://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2008/05/16/
intel-mebx-and-qwerty-keyboard/.
[69] Stat Owl. Operating System Version Usage, December 2009. URL http:
//www.statowl.com/.
[70] Stuart Stock and Ken Beames. Fake AP, March 2005. URL http://www.
blackalchemy.to/project/fakeap/.
[71] The Jargon File. Out-of-band terminology, December 2003. URL http://
www.catb.org/jargon/html/O/out-of-band.html.

76

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[72] Thomas d’Otreppe and Christophe Devine. Airbase-ng, September 2009. URL
http://aircrack-ng.org/.
[73] Thomas d’Otreppe and Christophe Devine. Aireplay-ng, September 2009. URL
http://aircrack-ng.org/.
[74] Tony Dennis.
Intel proudly shows off snooping tech, September 2006. URL http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1045799/
intel-proudly-shows-off-snooping-tech.
[75] Victorian Electronic Democracy. Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee.
May 2005. URL http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/SARC/E-Democracy/
Final_Report/Glossary.htm.
[76] Ylian Saint-Hilaire.
Top 5 things I would change about Intel
AMT.
URL http://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2008/02/24/
top-5-things-i-would-change-about-intel-amt/. February 2008.
[77] ZDNET Asia. Bangkok General Hospital Finds Intel vPro Technology
With Intel AMT Capability Heals Asset Management Woes, May 2007.
URL http://www.zdnetasia.com/itlibrary/enterprise-applications/
0,3800009948,40574930p,00.htm.

TRITA-ICT-EX-2010:37

www.kth.se