Beyond Nuclear
6930 Carroll Avenue
Suite 400
Takoma Park, MD 20912
Email: paul@beyondnuclear.org kevin@beyondnuclear.org
Tel. 301 270 2209
www.beyondnuclear.org

April 13, 2011

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
By email: secretary@nrc.org

10 CFR 2.206 PETITION TO IMMEDIATELY SUSPEND THE
OPERATING LICENSES OF GE BWR MARK I UNITS
PENDING FULL NRC REVIEW
WITH INDEPENDENT EXPERT AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
FROM AFFECTED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE COMMUNITIES
Mr. Borchart:
Beyond Nuclear (the Petitioner) submits the following request for emergency
enforcement action as provided by Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulation (10 CFR 2.206). This section is intended to help ensure the
protection of public health and safety through the prompt and thorough
evaluation of an alleged health and safety problem at nuclear facilities that
require emergency enforcement action by the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).

The Petitioner seeks this enforcement action to ensure that the public health and
safety is not unduly being jeopardized by the unsafe operations at twenty one
(21) General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Mark I units that rely upon a
1

fundamentally flawed combination of free standing steel primary containments for
their pressure suppression containment system, the installation of the “hardened
vent system,” or not, and an additional three (3) Mark 1units for a total of twenty
four (24) units which rely upon used radioactive fuel storage pools (also known
as “spent fuel pools” elevated to the top the reactor building outside and above
the rated containment structure without safety-related back-up electric power
(Class E1) systems to cool high-density storage of thermally hot and highly
radioactive nuclear waste in the event of loss of grid power.

The still unfolding catastrophic aftermath of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami of March 11, 2011 leading to the station blackout at Fukushima
Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant complex and multiple severe accidents raise
significant long standing concerns to a new level of questions and concerns.
Specifically, the Emergency Enforcement Petition focuses on the unreliability of
General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Mark I containment system to mitigate a
severe accident and the lack of emergency power systems to cool high density
storage pools each containing hundreds of tons thermally hot and extremely
radioactive used reactor fuel assemblies located atop the reactor buildings and
outside a rated containment.

Sincerely,
----------------/s/--------------

-----------------/s/------------------

Paul Gunter, Director
Reactor Oversight Project
paul@beyondnuclear.org

Kevin Kamps, Director
Nuclear Waste Specialist
kevin@beyondnuclear.org

2

April 13, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

BEYOND NUCLEAR PETITION
FOR
EMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTION
PER
10 CFR 2.206
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF
BROWNS FERRY 1, 2 & 3 (AL)
BRUNSWICK 1 & 2 (NC)
COOPER 1 (NE)
DRESDEN 2 & 3 (IL)
DUANE ARNOLD 1 (IA)
FERMI 2 (MI)
FITZPATRICK 1 (NY)
HATCH 1 & 2 (GA)
HOPE CREEK 1 (NJ)
MONTICELLO 1 (MN)
MILLSTONE 1 (CT)
NINE MILE POINT 1 (NY)
OYSTER CREEK 1 (NJ)
PEACH BOTTOM 2 & 3 (PA)
PILGRIM 1 (MA)
QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 (IL)
VERMONT YANKEE 1 (VT)_______

3

PETITION FOR EMERGENY ENFORCEMENT ACTION
FOR GE BOILING WATER REACTORS UTILIZING
MARK 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
AND WITHOUT DEDICATED CLASS E1 POWER FOR COOLING
ELEVATED IRRADIATED USED FUEL STORAGE POOLS
OUTSIDE A RATED CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE

Beyond Nuclear (the Petitioner) hereby petitions the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to suspend the operating licenses of all General
Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) that utilize the Mark I primary containment
system pending a complete and thorough near term and long term review 1 by
NRC to include statements by public and independent experts in public meetings
convened by NRC within each of the emergency planning zones on the
unreliability and inadequacy of current accident mitigation modifications, the need
for further changes or the permanent revocation of the captioned BWR operating
licenses.

The Petitioner asserts that new information and analyses generated by the
Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear accident in Japan raises this request to the level of
an emergency enforcement petition for all US reactors where public health and
safety relies upon the same failed design of a free standing steel primary
containment system based on the pressure suppression concept. This new
information and analysis supersede any prior NRC Final Director‟s Decision on
any previous Petition for Emergency Enforcement Action to include the Director‟s
Final Decision of December 12, 1989 to deny the Anne Harlow petition under 10
CFR 2.206 which requested the NRC to take emergency action to “fix or close”
all GE Boiling Water Reactors in the US.

1

Charter for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force To Conduct A Near Term Evaluation of the
Need for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan, USNRC, Undated March 2011, ML11089A045
4

As provided by Section 2.206 in Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10
CFR 2.206), Beyond Nuclear is submitting this emergency enforcement petition
for the immediate suspension of operating licenses for all nuclear power plant
units that:
A. Currently rely upon the General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (GE BWR)2
Mark 1Pressure Suppression Containment System3 fabricated of a free standing
steel primary containment comprised of carbon steel drywell and wetwell (also
known as the “torus”) as components credited by the Final Safety Analysis
Report (as updated) to be a leak tight structure originally designed, constructed
and licensed to mitigate and contain uncontrolled radiation releases from a
severe core damage accident.

The Petitioner submits that these same Mark I units were identified as early as
September 22, 1972 by memo from Dr. Stephen Hanauer, United States Atomic
Energy Commission, to be vulnerable to early failure under severe accident
conditions including over-pressurization.4 Dr. Hanauer states that “Recent events
have highlighted the safety disadvantages of the pressure suppression
containment. While they have some safety advantages, on balance I believe the
disadvantages to be preponderant. I recommend that the AEC adopt a policy of
discouraging further use of pressure suppression containments, and that such
designs not be accepted for construction permits files after a date to be decided
(say two years after the policy is adopted).”5 Dr. Hanauer went on to point out
“Since the pressure suppression containments are smaller than conventional
‘dry’ containments, the same amount of hydrogen, formed in a postulated
accident, would constitute a higher volume or weight percentage of the
containment atmosphere. Therefore, such hydrogen generation tends to be a

2

Graphic of General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Mark I unit, USNRC
Drawing of the GE BWR Mark I pressure suppression system credited for containment, USNRC
4
Memo of Dr. Stephen Hanauer, DRTA, “Pressure Suppression Containments, United States Atomic
Energy Commission, September 20, 1972
5
Ibid, p. 1
3

5

more serious problem in pressure suppression containments.”6 While the AEC
did adopt a policy to not accept further new construction applications in 1972, the
nuclear agency did not take action to discourage the further use of the vulnerable
design and in fact allowed three more Mark I projects then under construction to
be completed after 1972 for licensing. Dr. Hanauer‟s now significant warning to
the agency for the need of “discouraging further use” of the Mark I was ignored
by US federal safety officials. In this context, US nuclear safety officials bear in
part responsibility for the Japanese nuclear disaster given the very direct warning
and description of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi containment failure mechanism raised
early on by Dr. Hanauer and subsequently ignored over the decades.

Moreover, safety concerns over the substandard Mark I pressure suppression
containment system were again affirmed in 1986 by Dr. Harold Denton, Director
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
when he told a nuclear industry conference that the flawed reactor containment
type has as high as a 90% chance of failure if challenged by a severe accident
conditions.7

This same reactor design has now dramatically failed in Japan to reliably and
adequately mitigate and contain significant and mounting radiological releases to
the atmosphere, groundwater and the ocean from multiple severe accidents in
multiple GE BWR Mark I units at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant.

There are twenty one (21) GE Mark I BWRs in the United States utilizing the
Fukushima Dai-Ichi style free standing steel primary containment composed of a
carbon steel drywell connected by large diameter piping to the carbon steel
suppression chamber or wetwell or “torus” to make up the safety-credited
pressure suppression containment system.
6

Ibid, p. 2
“Reactor design in Japan has long been questioned,” New York Times, March 15, 2011, Tom Zeller
referencing “Denton Urges NRC to Settle Doubts About Mark I Containment,” Inside NRC, McGraw-Hill,
Vol. 8 No. 12, June 9, 1986.
7

6

The nuclear reactor units located within the jurisdiction of the NRC are identified
as Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 (AL), Cooper 1 (NE), Dresden 2 & 3 (IL), Duane
Arnold 1(IA), Fermi 2 (MI), Fitzpatrick 1(NY), Hatch 1 & 2 (GA), Hope Creek 1
(NJ), Monticello 1(MN), Nine Mile Point 1 (NY), Oyster Creek 1 (NJ), Peach
Bottom 2 & 3 (PA), Pilgrim 1 (MA), Quad Cities 1 & 2 (IL) and Vermont Yankee 1
(VT).
The Petitioner notes that the NRC technical report “Containment Integrity
Research at Sandia National Laboratory: An Overview” (NUREG /CR-6906,
Sandia National Labs, July 2006) identifies only twenty (20) Mark I containments
with free standing pressure suppression containments of a carbon steel drywell
and wetwell. In fact, the Sandia National Laboratory contract report to the NRC
inadvertently excluded the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant (VT) from its
listing in Table 3 at “BWR Containment Construction Types.”8 The Petitioner is
unaware if this omission was subsequently corrected in a later reference
document. The Petitioner is however well aware that the Commission voted to
relicense the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant and its Fukushima Dai-Ichi
style pressure suppression containment for another twenty (20) years on March
14, 2011.

Additionally, NUREG/CR-6906 identifies that unlike other Fukushima Dai-Ichi
style Mark I containment systems, there are two (2) U.S Mark I units at
Brunswick 1 and 2 (NC) where the credited primary pressure suppression
containment structure, the drywell, is instead a reinforced concrete structure that
is lined with carbon steel and the wetwell or “torus” and also called the
suppression chamber is a hollow concrete structure that is lined with cylindrical
carbon steel sections to form the torus steel liner.

8

“Containment Integrity Research at Sandia National Laboratory: An Overview,” US NRC, NUREG/CR
6909, July 2006 Table 3, p. 9
7

Additionally, there is one (1) Mark II at Columbia (WA) that unlike what was
intended to be a more unified Mark II containment design, the credited primary
containment utilizes a variation of the free standing steel drywell and steel
wetwell system. Similarly, NUREG/CR-6906 identifies that there are two (2) Mark
III units at Perry (OH) and Riverbend (LA) that unlike other Mark III containment
units constructed of reinforced concrete and steel liner instead, again, utilize a
variation of free standing steel primary containment comprised of a reinforced
concrete drywell and carbon steel wetwell pressure suppression containment
system.

The inadvertent omission of Vermont Yankee from listing in NUREG/CR-6906
lends to the Petitioner‟s overall concern for the accurate tracking of various
modifications to containment design, their differences and similarities within the
three BWR designs (Mark I, Mark II, Mark III), their construction and the
presence or omission of pre-approved but voluntary industry back fits. This
concern now regards to the current heightened uncertainty and demonstrated
unreliability of U.S. Mark I free standing steel primary containment integrity as
back fitted, or not, for mitigating potential severe accident conditions.

B. Of the twenty one (21) GE BWR Mark l with the free standing steel primary
containment a number of the units currently rely upon a “hardened vent system”9
also known as the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) where the control room can
now deliberately vent the recognized undersized and vulnerable Mark I pressure
suppression containment temporarily under severe accident conditions in order
to prevent the containment from over-pressurizing and/or internally venting
explosive environments that would likely cause the permanent rupture and
breach of containment and result in a sustained uncontrolled release of
significant amounts of harmful radioactivity . These back fits were pre-approved

9

DTVS schematic, US NRC Generic Letter 89-16 “Installation of Hardened Wetwell Vent System,”
September1, 1989
8

by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 “Installation of Hardened Wetwell Vent System,”
September 1, 1989.10

The NRC staff pre-approval was provided as incentive to the Mark I operators to
voluntarily install “hardened vent systems” also known as the Direct Torus Vent
System (DTVS) to the pressure suppression pool component also known as the
“torus.” The DTVS is an 8-inch hardened steel line that runs from the Mark I
suppression pool chamber or torus, bypasses the BWR charcoal bed radiation
filtration system and connects directly to the three hundred (300) foot tall off gas
ventilation stack. The DTVS design to bypass the radiation filtration system is
essential to reduce back pressure on release through the experimental pipe
system. The control room operates a butterfly valve in the pipe in conjunction
with a 30 psi carbon rupture disc designed given the operator an option to
temporarily defeat containment in order to assure long term containment
integrity. It is the understanding of the Petitioner that a certain number of nuclear
power plants operators may have installed the DTVS but subsequently either
abandoned it or removed it while some number of operators did not followthrough with the installation of these hardened vents for on their containments.
A complete and transparent review is necessary to determine which and why
operators did and did not experiment with the hardened vent systems to mitigate
potential severe accident consequences in Mark 1 containment systems.

C. All GE BWR Mark I units in the United States that currently;

1) Rely upon the cooling and indefinite storage of hundreds of tons of used
radioactive fuel also known as high-level radioactive waste being stored in each
of the elevated, densely-packed (“high-density”) nuclear waste storage ponds,
also known as “spent fuel pools” located atop the reactor building and outside the
credited primary containment structure, and;

10

Ibid, GL 89-16
9

2) Utilize densely packed, elevated used radioactive fuel pools with cooling water
systems that do not have safety-related electrical backup systems (Class E1) to
assure circulating water for reliable long term cooling to thermally hot and
extremely radioactive used fuel assemblies stored outside any rated containment
structure. The Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear catastrophe demonstrates the
vulnerability of this large volume of nuclear materials outside of any rated
containment in the event of a prolonged electrical grid power failure without backup emergency Alternating Current electrical generators and without the additional
reliable emergency backup of Direct Current battery systems.

The GE BWRs with elevated storage irradiated fuel storage pools outside of a
credited primary containment structure and without Class E1 safety-related
power systems for backup fuel pool cooling are identified as the above listed
twenty four (24) Mark I units and include the permanently closed Millstone 1 unit
(CT).

D. All GE BWR Mark I units subject to the internal NRC near term thirty (30) day,
sixty (60) day and ninety (90) day review process and a yet-to-be specified long
term evaluation period of review as described in the NRC charter issued in
March, 2011 as a direct result of the multiple severe accidents at the Fukushima
Dai-Ichi nuclear power station in Japan.11 For purposes of the Petitioner‟s
emergency enforcement petition the Petitioner asserts that written and oral public
and expert comment to be included into the “NRC review process” is in reference
to the on-going near term and yet-to-be specified long term evaluation period.

REQUESTED NRC EMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The Petitioner requests that the NRC suspend the operating license of all GE
BWR Mark I units in response to the dramatic and ongoing failure of similarly
designed and constructed GE Boiling Water Reactors systems, structures and
11

NRC Fukushima Charter, Ibid
10

components at one or more units at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant
in Fukushima, Japan. These same GE Mark I systems, structures and
components are demonstrated to have failed to effectively mitigate and contain
significant and mounting radiological releases to the atmosphere, groundwater
and the sea which in turn is likely to affect the health and safety of the public, the
long term and potentially permanent dislocation of entire communities, significant
long term disruption and potentially permanent destruction by radioactive
contamination of meat, dairy and agricultural farms, the offshore coastal fishing
industry of northeast Japan and potentially beyond, the long term disruption and
dislocation of commercial and industrial infrastructure and the associated
significant financial disruption and damage to Japan and its investors.

For all of the above concerns arising out of the longstanding identified Mark I
design flaws and experimental back fits now demonstrated to have failed to
mitigate severe accident conditions, Beyond Nuclear requests that all GE BWR
Mark I operating licenses be suspended until the following emergency
enforcement actions are taken:

I. Each of the four US NRC Regional Offices will publicly notice and conduct
public meetings within each of the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone for each
General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (GE BWR) site in their Region for the
purpose of receiving public comment and independent expert testimony from the
communities affected in each Emergency Planning Zone to be incorporated into
the NRC review process so as to:

A. Publicly identify and communicate which GE BWR Mark I operators
did and why some did not install as pre-approved by NRC Generic
Letter 89-1612 the “hardened vent system” also known as the Direct
Torus Vent System (DTVS) on the GE BWR Mark I pressure
suppression containment system to determine as part of the agency‟s
12

Installation of the Hardened Wetwell Vent, Generic Letter 89-16, US NRC, September 1, 1989
11

review process whether or not past modifications can still be
considered reliable and/or if further modifications by license
amendment are needed and justified or if the permanent revocation of
these operating licenses is necessary, and;

B. Given the demonstrated failures of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Mark I
containment system and containment vent system to effectively
mitigate the severe accident resulting in the significant and ongoing
radioactive releases to the environment, the Petitioner requests;

1) the NRC immediately revoke prior pre-approval for the
installation of an experimental “hardened vent system” also
known as the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) at each US GE
BWR Mark I as pre-approved in GL 89-16 under the provisions
of 10 CFR 50.59 . The Petitioner asserts that Section 50.59 of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation is provided only for
“changes, tests and experiment” that the NRC believes
acceptable for a licensee to install and test themselves so long
as such activities do not place the facility in a condition for which
a NRC review is necessary. The fact that NRC is now reviewing
the Mark I containment and the experimental hardened vent
nullifies pre-approval by 10 CFR 50.59.

The Petitioner asserts that the failure of the Mark I containment
and the hardened vent system at Fukushima Dai-Ichi are at the
root of the current near-term and long-term review of all US
reactors to include the above captioned Mark I units.

The Petitioner further asserts that demonstrated unreliability of
the Mark I containment and the experimental hardened vent
system raises a significant compliance issue to defeat and
12

ultimately fail the design function of the Mark I containment and
hardened vent contrary to NRC regulations “which for such SSC
(systems, structures and components) demonstrate that their
intended function will be accomplished [10 CFR 50.59(a)(3)(iii)]
and:

2) NRC will then direct the licensees in accordance with 10 CFR
50.59(2) that prior to restart “A licensee shall obtain a license
amendment pursuant to Sec. 50.90 prior to implementing any
proposed change, test or experiment if the change, test or
experiment that would result;
(i) In more than a minimal increase in the frequency of
occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the final
safety analysis report (as updated);

Whereby the Petitioner responds that the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
accident demonstrates the failure of the Mark I containment to
adequately mitigate and contain a severe accident even with a
hardened vent system as the direct result of the combination of
a more severe than previously analyzed earthquake and a
higher than previously postulated tsunami which led to the much
longer than expected station blackout. These shortcomings of
analyses demonstrate the unreliability of placing public health
and safety at undue risk by miscalculation or more to the point
bad guesswork on the frequency of an occurrence of an
accident as basis for justifying and tolerating the continued
operation of a nuclear power plant with an identified
substandard containment. It is unreasonable to back fit an
identified design flaw with a venting system to deliberately
defeat the purpose of a leak tight containment in order to save it

13

from failure based on the unlikelihood that the task will be
required. Petitioners assert that such back fits do not constitute
a “safety enhancement” for unsafe operations. Long standing
public safety advocate Ralph Nader might compare it to
irrationally putting an airbag on the dangerously designed and
“unsafe at any speed” Corvair automobile to justify further
corporate sales and keeping a dangerous vehicle on the road.
Similar unanticipated events in the United States can
reasonably lead a similar prolonged and longer than expected
station blackout for which the hardened vent would now
constitute more than minimal increase in occurrence of severe
accidents in the vulnerable Mark I containment. A similar
unanticipated combination of events might include such station
blackout scenarios as a severe flood followed by a severe
thunderstorm or accompanied by large tornado, or a prolonged
blizzard with repeated heavy snow fall and ice accumulation, or
a prolonged severe solar flare affecting grid stability combined
with similar severe meteorological events. It is really now more
about whether it is rational or reasonable to leave the all too
apparent unforgiving consequences to chance or unexpected
events to challenge a fundamentally flawed reactor containment
system.
(ii) Result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of
occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or
component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in
the final safety analysis report (as updated);
Whereby the Petitioner responds that the New York Times
reported on March 12, 2011 (“Japan Orders Evacuation at
Second Plant,” Matthew Wald, NYT, March 12, 2011) that “the
company (TEPCO) is considering „a controlled containment
14

venting‟ in order to avoid an „uncontrolled rupture and damage‟
to the containment unit.”13 The Mark I hardened vent concept
as pre-approved by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and installed by
some number of Mark I operators in the 1990‟s was to provide
U.S. operators with exactly such an option for controlled
containment venting to avoid an uncontrolled rupture and
damage to the containment unit resulting in uncontrolled
radiological releases to the environment.
An AREVA PowerPoint Presentation prepared to evaluate the
etiology of the accident further points to the failure of the Mark I
containment vent system resulting in an internal explosion in the
pressure suppression containment system for Fukushima DaiIchi Unit 2. Slide 24 of the AREVA Power Point focuses on the
failure of the Mark I containment venting system installed in Unit
2 failure resulting in the rupture of the suppression chamber
component (wetwell or torus) and the uncontrolled release of
fission products from containment.14 AREVA offered no clear
information on why the vent failed to mitigate the severe
accident.
The USNRC Japan Reactor Safety Team Assessment of
Fukushima Daiichi Units report of March 26, 2011 further
identifies in its assessment of Unit Two (2) Primary Containment
is “Damage suspected” as based on the most recent data and
input from the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum, Japan
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Tokyo Electric Power
Company.15 The damage is identified as resulting in an
uncontrolled radioactive release from containment. The same
RTS report identified that for it is their assessment of Unit Three
13

“Japan Orders Evacuation at Second Plant,” Matthew Wald, NYT, March 12, 2011
“The Fukushima Daiichi Incident,” Dr. Matthias Braun, AREVA, April 12, 2011, Slide 24
15
RST Assessment of Fukushima Daiichi Units, USNRC, March 26, 2011, p. 5
14

15

Primary Containment they assume “Damage suspected”
according to Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and
Tokyo Electric Power Company and “Not damaged” according
to an earlier assessment by Japan Atomic Industrial Forum.16
The RST assessment finds that the reactor core fuel is
damaged, the reactor coolant system potentially breached at the
recirculation seals and the primary containment damaged
resulting in the uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
These are clear indications by NRC‟s own assessment that two
of the Mark I containments at Fukushima Dai-Ichi are
“damaged” and as the Petitioner reads ruptured as the result of
an experimental controlled venting system that failed
conceptually, mechanically and/or by operator actions. Further
reliance upon the demonstrated failure of the experimental
concept, experimental design and/or operator actions must be
furthered discouraged by the revocation of any further reliance.
The failure of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 2 experimental vent
on the undersized and vulnerable Mark I pressure suppression
containment system dramatically demonstrates the unreliability
of both the containment design and construction as well as the
hardened vent system whether by mechanical failure and/or
human error in practice of the operator action.
(iii) Result in more than a minimal increase in the
consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the final
safety analysis report;

Whereby the Petitioner responds that at the time of submission
of this Emergency Enforcement Petition, the Washington Post of
16

NRC RST, Ibid. p. 6
16

April 11, 2011 reports “Japan rates nuclear crisis at highest
severity” stating that Japanese authorities raised the Fukushima
Dai-Ichi nuclear disaster from Level 5 to Level 7, the highest
level on the international scale, equal to that of the 1986
Chernobyl disaster.17 On April 11, 2011, Japanese authorities
further expanded the emergency evacuation zone around the
severely damaged reactor complex.18 Japanese authorities are
further admitting that the ongoing accident may have huge
impacts on the ocean with reports that 7.5 million times
permitted limits of radioactive iodine and 1.1 million times
radioactive cesium have been released into the Pacific Ocean
contaminating the marine food web such as the example of the
near shore schools of sand lance which tuna, salmon and
whales feed upon.19 News reports and expert documents
confirm each day the nuclear accident stemming from the flaws
and failure of the Mark I design is surpassing all accident
consequences previously analyzed for the GE BWR Mark I
pressure suppression system and vulnerable elevated “spent
fuel pools.”

(iv) Result in a more than minimal increase in the consequences
of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in
the final safety analysis report (as updated);

Whereby the Petitioner responds that as the result of station
blackout conditions, the combined and simultaneous failures of
the undersized Mark I containment systems, the failure of the
experimental hardened vent systems as intended back fit to
17

“Japan rates nuclear crisis at highest severity level,” Washington Post, April 12, 2011
“Evacuation areas around crippled nuclear plant expanded,” Kyodo News Service, April 12, 2011
19
Beyond Nuclear website link to “Japan nuclear plant operator reports some success on leak,” Los
Angeles Times, April 6, 2011
18

17

mitigate the consequences of a severe accident resulting in
significant damaged to the identified undersized and flawed GE
Mark I containment system and the significant used nuclear fuel
damage in at least four (4) of the Mark I of the total of six (6)
Fukushima Dai-Ichi units that did not have Class EI backup
power systems to cool the “spent fuel pools” have resulted in a
different type of accident that was not previously evaluated in
the final safety analysis report (as updated). Repeated nuclear
waste fires and high radiation fields from the combined reactor
and “spent fuel pool” severe accidents repeatedly thwarted
operator actions to effectively cool either.

(v) Create the possibility for an accident of a different type than
previously evaluated in the final safety evaluation report (as
updated);

Whereby the Petitioner responds as stated above the
catastrophic accident now demonstrated at Fukushima Dai-Ichi
is a cascading sequence of accidents defeating the vulnerable
and flawed Mark I containment system and the experimental
hardened vent back fit that failed to mitigate the consequence of
severe core accident and the severe damage to the elevated
“spent fuel pools” outside of any rated containment structure
without Class E1 power for cooling high density storage of
nuclear waste (irradiated fuel assemblies).

The NRC RTS report further identifies that Fukushima Daiichi
Unit 3 pressure suppression containment is “damaged”
according to Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Tokyo
Electric Power Company and “not damaged” according to the

18

Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum.20 While no assessment is
provided at this time as how the Mark I pressure suppression
containment was damaged, the very energetic explosion from
hydrogen gas venting operations at Unit 3 are not ruled out as
yet. Petitioner is concerned that the actual operation of the
containment vent at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 failed to preserve
containment integrity rather than the intended mitigation.
The RST further reports that highly radioactive fuel fragments
were found not only on the reactor site but also in locations one
mile from the reactor site after a series of the hydrogen
explosions occurred as a result of the unanalyzed severe
accidents at this GE Mark I complex.

(vi) Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC (system,
structure or component) important to safety with a different
result than any previously evaluated in the final safety analysis
report (as updated);

Whereby the Petitioner responds that the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
nuclear catastrophe involving the reliance upon the GE BWR
Mark I has dramatically demonstrated that the free standing
steel primary containment or pressure suppression system can
malfunction as previously warned in 1972 and again in 1985 to
be unreliable in severe accident conditions. The reactor core
accident and containment failure can complicate then defeat
vital mitigation efforts to cool the elevated high density nuclear
waste storage pools located outside of primary containment
significantly worsening the environmental consequences of the
severe accident.

20

NRC RST, Ibid p. 9
19

(vii) Result in a design limitation for a fission product barrier as
described in the FSAR (as updated) being exceeded or altered.”

Whereby the Petitioner responds that at the emergency
enforcement petition filing the scope of the severe accident
exceeding the Mark I pressure suppression containment and the
failure of the containment venting system to mitigate increased
releases of more fission products generated by reactor core fuel
and “spent fuel” damage, loss of reliable cooling, the damaged
/breached containment is now dramatically demonstrated to
have been exceeded perhaps to even surpass the Level 7
international rating for this nuclear accident still in progress.

The Petitioner argues that the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear
disaster has demonstrated a clear and present danger exists
with the continued operation of all GE BWR Mark I units here in
the United States as well as in Japan and other countries
utilizing a fundamentally flawed design with an unreliable
experimental back fit containment venting system. The
combination cannot be accurately or rationally described as an
“enhancement” to public safety.

It is no longer reasonable or rational to further ignore the early
warnings of Dr. Stephen Hanauer in 1972 that further use of the
Mark I pressure suppression containment system “should be
discouraged.” The NRC‟s 1989 pre-approval and the BWR
industry‟s 1990‟s installation of the hardened vent system is now
clearly demonstrated to be a failed experiment that comes at
unacceptable risk with the increasing and widening tragic
consequence to the health and safety of the people in northern
Japan in addition to the immeasurable loss of life and human
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suffering caused by the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami.

C. As the NRC RST report of March 26, 2011 further confirms the
demonstrated failure of the elevated GE BWR Mark I nuclear waste
storage pools21 at Fukushima Dai-Ichi as the result of prolonged
station blackout with severe nuclear fuel damage occurring above and
outside a credited containment structure in cooling ponds that did not
have emergency backup power for reliable cooling, the NRC shall;

1) Immediately issue Confirmatory Action Orders to all BWR Mark I
operators to promptly install for each unit‟s elevated irradiate fuel
storage pool a dedicated Class E1 power system to assure:

a) the prompt and reliable availability of standby backup electrical
power from redundant Alternating Current (AC) Power
emergency power systems (i.e. bunkered AC emergency onsite
generators) and;

b) additional standby emergency backup power be provided by
Direct Current (DC) battery systems rated to provide sufficient
power for a minimum of 72 hours to assure the operation of
nuclear waste storage ponds cooling systems until main grid
power, emergency standby generators can be restored or
additional battery power can be made available.

CONCLUSION
The Petitioner asserts that the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear catastrophe has both
dramatically illuminated and grievously darkened the undue risks and unforgiving
consequences of a severe accident as a result of the fundamental failures of the
21

Schematic of BWR spent fuel pool, USNRC
21

Mark I containment concept, design, construction and the subsequent
experimental retrofit employed to conceptually mitigate these significant flaws.

The Petitioner concludes that the situation for the need for Emergency
Enforcement Action at US GE BWR Mark 1 units is best summed up in the
reporting of the Daily Yomiuri news service of an interview with a Fukushima
Prefecture government official who told to the Daily Yomiuri news source:
“Fukushima Gov. Yuhei Sato has expressed anger at the central government
and Tokyo Electric Power Co., saying both „betrayed‟ the people of Fukushima
Prefecture with repeated assurances about the safety of nuclear power plants.
“„We feel we were betrayed [by the central government and TEPCO],‟ Sato said
during an interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun on Thursday, nearly a month after
the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and the outbreak of a series of accidents
at the Fukushima No.1 nuclear power plant.
“The central government and TEPCO repeatedly told us, 'Nuclear power plants
are safe because they've got multiple protection systems,' and, 'Earthquakeproof measures have been taken,'" Sato said.
"TEPCO used the term 'beyond our expectations' [to describe the natural
disaster], but they can't establish effective policies for nuclear energy safety
unless they take into account things that are beyond their expectations," Sato
said.”22
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission is obligated to uphold and
protect the interests of the public health and safety over the corporate interests
of the nuclear industry. Given this tragic demonstration at Fukushima, the
rational, reasonable and only relevant protection is remove the Mark I from any
set of circumstances that might ever challenge the failed experiment again.

22

“Fukushima Daiichi was beyond our (TEPCO) expectations,” DailyYomiuri Online, Japan news service,
April 10, 20011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110408005027.htm
22

Respectfully submitted,
---------/s/---------Paul Gunter
Reactor Oversight Project

---------/s/---------Kevin Kamps
Radioactive Waste Specialist

April 13, 2011

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