US  Budgetary  Costs  of  Wars  through  2016:  $4.79  Trillion  and  Counting       Summary  of  Costs  of  the  US  Wars  in  Iraq,  Syria,  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  and   Homeland  Security1     Neta  C.  Crawford2   Boston  University   September  2016       Summary     Wars  cost  money  before,  during  and  after  they  occur  —  as  governments  prepare  for,   wage,  and  recover  from  them  by  replacing  equipment,  caring  for  the  wounded  and  repairing   the  infrastructure  destroyed  in  the  fighting.    Although  it  is  rare  to  have  a  precise  accounting  of   the  costs  of  war  —  especially  of  long  wars  —  one  can  get  a  sense  of  the  rough  scale  of  the  costs   by  surveying  the  major  categories  of  spending.       As   of   August   2016,   the   US   has   already   appropriated,   spent,   or   taken   on   obligations   to   spend   more   than   $3.6   trillion   in   current   dollars   on   the   wars   in   Iraq,   Afghanistan,  Pakistan  and  Syria  and  on  Homeland  Security  (2001  through  fiscal  year   2016).  To   this  total  should  be  added  the  approximately  $65  billion  in  dedicated  war   spending  the  Department  of  Defense  and  State  Department  have  requested  for  the  next   fiscal   year,   2017,   along   with   an   additional   nearly   $32   billion   requested   for   the   Department   of   Homeland   Security   in   2017,   and   estimated   spending   on   veterans   in   future  years.  When  those  are  included,  the  total  US  budgetary  cost  of  the  wars  reaches   $4.79  trillion.     But  of  course,  a  full  accounting  of  any  war's  burdens  cannot  be  placed  in  columns  on  a   ledger.     From   the   civilians   harmed   or   displaced   by   violence,   to   the   soldiers   killed   and   wounded,   to   the   children   who   play   years   later   on   roads   and   fields   sown   with   improvised   explosive  devices  and  cluster  bombs,  no  set  of  numbers  can  convey  the  human  toll  of  the  wars   in   Iraq   and   Afghanistan,   or   how   they   have   spilled   into   the   neighboring   states   of   Syria   and   Pakistan,   and   come   home   to   the   US   and   its   allies   in   the   form   of   wounded   veterans   and                                                                                                               1  This  paper  updates  Crawford,  N.  C.  (2014,  June  25).  US  Costs  of  Wars  Through  2014:  $4.4  Trillion  and   Counting:  Summary  of  Costs  for  the  US  Wars  in  Iraq,  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan.  Costs  of  War.     2  Neta  C.  Crawford  is  Professor  of  Political  Science  at  Boston  University  and  Co-­‐‑Director  of  the  Costs  of  War   project.  Crawford  thanks  contributors  to  the  Costs  of  War  Project,  especially  Linda  J.  Bilmes  and  Catherine  Lutz.         1 contractors.  Yet,  the  expenditures  noted  on  government  ledgers  are  necessary  to  apprehend,   even  as  they  are  so  large  as  to  be  almost  incomprehensible.3       The  United  States  government's  definitions  of  the  threat  and  the  scope  of  the  wars,  the   size  of  US  commitments  to  these  wars  in  terms  of  numbers  of  troops  and  equipment,  and  what   counts   officially   as   war-­‐‑related   expenditures   have   shifted   over   time.   Congress   and   the   Executive   Branch   describe   the   wars   in   Afghanistan,   Pakistan,   Iraq,   and   Syria   as   Overseas   Contingency  Operations  (OCO).  The  scope  of  the  wars  has  widened  into  Syria,  and  the  US  has   slowed   the   pace   of   its   withdrawal   from   Afghanistan.     These   are   the   major   OCO   discussed   below.  (Smaller  operations  are  underway  in  Africa,  Central  America  and  Europe.)  The  Budget   Control  Act  of  2011  and  sequestration  (automatic  across-­‐‑the-­‐‑board  spending  cuts)  has  made   it  difficult  to  track  how  money  is  actually  spent.4     War   spending   has   occurred   in   several   categories.   A   large   portion   of   the   costs   of   these   wars  are  Congressional  appropriations  for  the  State  Department  and  Department  of  Defense   (DOD).    If  one  simply  highlights  these  budgetary  allocations  so  far  in  the  major  war  zones  and   for  defense  of  US  airspace  and  bases,  the  US  has  spent  more  than  $1.7  trillion  for  combat  and   reconstruction.    (See  Tables  1  and  2,  which  include  the  spending  requests  for  FY2017).5    There   is  other  global  war  on  terror-­‐‑related  spending  —  including  additions  to  the  Pentagon  base   budget   and   spending   in   the   Department   of   Veterans   Affairs.   Further,   Homeland   Security   spending   has   increased   by   more   than   $500   billion   for   missions   related   to   preventing   and   responding  to  potential  terrorist  attacks.       In  addition,  any  reasonable  estimate  of  the  costs  of  the  wars  includes  the  fact  that  each   war  entails  essentially  signing  rather  large  promissory  notes  to  fulfill  the  US  obligations  for   medical   care   and   support   for   wounded   veterans.   These   future   obligations   will   total   approximately   an   additional   $1   trillion   in   medical   and   disability   payments   and   additional   administrative   burden   through   2053.   Table   1   summarizes   the   categories   and   amount   of   spending   and   obligations   undertaken   from   September   2001   to   the   present   fiscal   year,   rounded  to  the  nearest  billion  dollars.6                                                                                                                     3  On  calculating  the  costs  of  wars,  see:  Stiglitz,  J.  E.,  &  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2012).  Estimating  the  Costs  of  War:   Methodological  Issues,  with  Applications  to  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  In  M.  Garfinkel  &  S.  Skaperdas  (Eds.),  Oxford   Handbook  of  the  Economics  of  Peace  and  Conflict.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press. 4  In  June  2014,  I  reported  the  costs  of  the  major  wars  and  Operation  Noble  Eagle,  including  OCO,  homeland   security,  veterans,  future  obligations  and  war  interest  was  about  $4.4  trillion.  Crawford,  N.  C.  (2014,  June  25).   US  Costs  of  Wars  Through  2014:  $4.4  Trillion  and  Counting:  Summary  of  Costs  for  the  US  Wars  in  Iraq,   Afghanistan  and  Pakistan.  Costs  of  War.   5  All  calculations  are  made  and  reported  in  current  dollars.  The  figures  are  rounded  to  the  nearest  billion   dollars.   6  These  are  conservative  estimates.  There  is  considerable  fuzziness  in  Pentagon  spending,  and  especially  with   regard  to  spending  for  Pakistan  in  the  DOD  budget.  Moreover,  the  official  Pakistan  war  spending  does  not   include  weapons  and  other  military  equipment  that  the  US  donates  to  Pakistani  military  forces.    There  is   potential  for  some  double  counting  of  Pakistan-­‐‑related  spending.     2 Table  1.  Summary  of  War-­‐‑Related  Spending  in  Current  Dollars7     Category   $  Billion   DOD  and  State  (Overseas  Contingency  Operations  or  OCO)  FY2001-­‐‑2016      1,742     Other  War-­‐‑Related:  estimated  additional  DOD  base  budget  ($733  B)  and   946   Veterans  ($213  B)  spending,  FY2001  -­‐‑  FY2016     Homeland  Security  spending  for  prevention  and  response  to  terrorism,    548     FY2001-­‐‑  FY2016   Interest  on  borrowing  for  wars,  FY2001-­‐‑FY2016   453   Total  War  Appropriations  and  War-­‐‑Related  Spending  through  2016    3,689     Estimated  Future  Obligations  for  Veterans  Medical  and  Disability  2017  -­‐‑   1,000   20538     FY2017  Request  for  DOD  and  State  OCO,  incl.  Afghanistan,  Iraq/Syria   66   FY2017  Request  for  Homeland  Security  for  prevention  and  response  to   37   terrorism   Total  Spending  and  Future  Obligations  through  2053    4,792       The   Obama   administration   has   requested   money   to   support   a   continued   military   presence  and  war  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  and  plans  operations  for  several  more  years.    After   announcing   a   withdrawal   of   US   forces   in   Afghanistan   for   2017,   the   Obama   administration   announced   in   mid-­‐‑2016   that   a   planned   reduction   of   US   troops   would   go   more   slowly   than   previously   announced. 9     The   Obama   administration   requested   more   than   $44   billion   for   FY2017  for  the  Afghanistan  war,  a  number  that  will  likely  increase  as  the  US  military  presence   is  sustained.    In  addition,  the  Obama  administration  has  requested  additional  OCO  funds  for   missions  around  the  globe  —  including  $13.8  billion  funds  for  FY2017  to  continue  the  war   against  ISIS  in  Iraq  and  Syria  (Operation  Inherent  Resolve)  and  to  shore  up  the  Iraqi  regime.10     The   Obama   administration   requested   about   $35   billion   for   the   Department   of   Homeland   Security  related  to  preventing,  disrupting,  and  responding  to  terrorist  attacks.11       Some   observers   argue   that   the   Pentagon's   estimates   for   future   war   spending   are   conservative.   For   example,   the   Congressional   Budget   Office   projects   that   that   costs   of   executing  the  Pentagon's  plans  in  future  years  will  be  higher  than  the  Pentagon  has  suggested   in  its  own  projections.12    Further,  reporting  for  previous  spending  is  not  always  accurate.  For   instance,  in  June  2016,  the  Inspector  General  of  the  Department  of  Defense  published  a  report   showing  that  the  Air  Force  has  underreported  the  costs  of  its  air  war  in  Syria.    A  few  years                                                                                                               7  Rounded  to  the  nearest  $billion.  See  Table  5  for  a  breakdown  of  these  costs  by  Federal  Department. 8  For  a  discussion  of  her  methods  and  assumptions,  see  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2016).  A  Trust  Fund  for  Veterans.   Democracy:  A  Journal  of  Ideas,  Winter  2016  (39);  and  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq   and  Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending  Decisions  Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War.   9  Ryan,  M.,  &  DeYoung,  K.  (2016,  July  6).  Obama  Alters  Afghanistan  Exit  Plan  Once  More,  Will  Leave  8,400   Troops.  The  Washington  Post.     10  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  (2016,  February).  Defense  Budget  Overview:  United   States  Department  of  Defense  Fiscal  Year  2017  Budget  Request.     11  See  Office  of  Management  and  Budget.  (2016).  Analytical  Perspectives:  Homeland  Security  Funding  Analysis.     12  Congressional  Budget  Office.  (January  2016).  Long-­‐‑Term  Implications  of  the  2016  Future  Years  Defense   Program.  Washington,  DC:  Author.     3 earlier,   the   Inspector   General   reported   that   the   Marine   Corp   had   produced   unreliable   data   that  included  inaccuracies  totaling  more  than  $1  billion  in  FY2008.13         But  even  if  the  US  stopped  spending  on  war  at  the  end  of  this  fiscal  year,  interest  costs   alone   on   borrowing   to   pay   for   the   wars   will   continue   to   grow   apace.   Interest   costs   for   overseas   contingency   operations   spending   alone   are   projected   to   add   more   than   $1   trillion  dollars  to  the  national  debt  by  2023.    By  2053,  interest  costs  will  be  at  least  $7.9   trillion  unless  the  US  changes  the  way  it  pays  for  the  wars.         What  Counts  as  a  Cost  of  War?     There  are  many  costs  of  war  that  could  be  quantified  and  many  ways  to  count  those   costs.   Much   less   comprehensive   accounts   of   US   war   spending   are   available   from   the   US   Department  of  Defense.14    One  could  say  that  the  only  relevant  costs  are  those  associated  with   Pentagon   and   State   Department   spending,   in   which   case,   the   total   costs   of   the   Overseas   Contingency   Operations   including   the   wars   in   Afghanistan   and   Iraq   would   be   about   $1.7   trillion.       While  such  focused  accounts  are  useful  for  some  purposes,  they  understate  the  wider   budgetary   impact   of   the   wars   and   their   long   term   implications   for   US   federal   and   state   government   spending.     The   most   recent   Congressional   Research   Service   (CRS)   report   on   the   costs   of   the   main   wars   and   other   related   expenses   (December   2014)   by   Amy   Belasco,   CRS   specialist  in  Defense  Policy  and  Budget,  takes  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  the  costs  of  the   wars.15  Belasco  includes,  for  instance,  some  of  the  costs  of  veterans’  care.  Belasco  is  admittedly                                                                                                               13  The  Pentagon  provides  limited  visibility  in  its  accountability.    See  Government  Accountability  Office.  (2005,   September).  Global  War  On  Terrorism:  DOD  Needs  to  Improve  the  Reliability  of  Cost  Data  and  Provide  Additional   Guidance  to  Control  Costs  (Report  No.  GAO-­‐‑05-­‐‑882).  Washington,  DC:  Author;  Inspector  General,  US   Department  of  Defense.  (2016,  June  23).  Additional  Controls  Needed  to  Issue  Reliable  Cost  of  War  Reports  that   Accurately  Reflect  the  Status  of  Air  Force  Operation  Inherent  Resolve  Funds.  Retrieved  from   http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-­‐‑2016-­‐‑102.pdf;  Inspector  General,  US  Department  of  Defense.   (2011,  July  22).  Cost  of  War  Data  for  Marine  Corps  Contingency  Operations  were  not  Reliable.  Retrieved  from   http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/D-­‐‑2011-­‐‑090.pdf     14  For  example,  an  unclassified  Pentagon  accounting  of  Costs  of  War  through  November  30,  2012  reports   different  figures  from  the  Belasco  CRS  report  of  2011  —  in  some  years  lower,  perhaps  due  to  rounding,  and  in   some  years  higher  for  reasons  that  are  only  sometimes  explained.  Further,  this  DOD  report  does  not  include   related  State  Department  spending,  and  omits  "non-­‐‑DOD  classified  programs."  The  DOD  report  puts  "total   costs"  of  war  at  1,206.6  billion  from  9/11/2001  through  30  November  2012.  Source:  Office  of  the  Assistant   Secretary  of  Defense  for  Public  Affairs.  (2013,  January  2).  Costs  of  War  Update  as  of  November  30,  2012.   Washington,  DC:  Department  of  Defense.   15  Belasco,  A.  (2014,  December  8).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations   Since  9/11.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.  This  is  an  update  of  her  previous  reports,   including  Belasco,  A.  (2011,  March  29).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations   Since  9/11.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.  More  recent  numbers  on  appropriations  are   found  in  Towell,  P.,  &  Belasco,  A.  (2014,  January  8).  Defense:  FY2014  Authorization  and  Appropriations.   Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.  Towell  and  Belasco's  paper  recounts  the  uncertainty  over   budgeting  due  to  the  Budget  Control  Act,  sequester  and  continuing  resolutions  in  late  2013.     4 circumscribed  by  the  accounting  practices  in  the  Pentagon  —  which  she  diplomatically  notes   others   describe   as   entailing   "limited   transparency." 16  Despite   these   and   other   difficulties,   Belasco's  outstanding  work  remains  an  authoritative  accounting  of  major  expenses  and  I  have   relied  on  her  reporting  of  DOD  and  State  Department/USAID  spending  through  Fiscal  Year   2014.       Yet  Belasco’s  report  does  not  include  everything  that  is  relevant  to  an  accounting  of  the   cost  of  the  post-­‐‑9/11  US  wars.  For  instance,  it  does  not  include  the  Homeland  Security  budget   related   to   terrorism.   Further,   while   Belasco   does   count   appropriations   for   VA   medical   expenses,  she  does  not  consider  the  costs  of  future  obligations  to  veterans  nor  estimate  the   costs  of  interests  on  borrowing  to  pay  for  the  wars.    Belasco  notes  that,  "Other  observers  and   analysts   define   war   costs   more   broadly   than   congressional   appropriations   and   include   estimates  of  the  life-­‐‑time  costs  of  caring  for  OEF/OIF/OND  veterans,  imputed  interest  costs   on   the   deficit,   or   increases   in   DOD’s   base   budget   deemed   to   be   a   consequence   of   support   for   the   war.   Such   costs   are   difficult   to   compute,   subject   to   extensive   caveats,   and   often   based   on   methodologies  that  may  not  be  appropriate."17     Belasco   is   correct.     The   approach   taken   by   the   Costs   of   War   project   based   at   Brown   University,   and   by   Bilmes   and   Stiglitz,   is   more   comprehensive,   and   some   of   the   estimates,   especially   of   likely   increases   to   the   Pentagon   base   budget   and   future   costs,   are   subject   to   important   caveats,   discussed   below.18     Indeed,   there   are   many   ways   to   think   about   the   costs   of   the   US   war   depending   on   one's   assumptions   about   the   scope   of   the   wars,   how   emergency   costs  differ  from  and  are  related  to  the  costs  that  have  been  institutionalized  in  the  Pentagon's   base  budget,  and  how  to  estimate  the  future  obligations  for  the  care  of  veterans  as  a  cost  of   the  on-­‐‑going  wars.    Further,  Congress  has  not  funded  these  wars  as  it  has  funded  past  wars,   by  enacting  a  war  tax  or  selling  large  numbers  of  war  bonds,  which  would  made  these  "pay  as   you   go"   wars. 19  Hence   DOD   and   State   Department   OCO   spending   are   considered   here   as   borrowed.    We  include  the  costs  of  borrowing  as  an  expense,  just  as  individuals  would  include   the  costs  of  borrowing  on  a  home  or  a  car  when  they  calculate  their  expenses.     Further,  the  United  States  Congress  has  used  a  definition  of  emergency  funding  for  the   wars   as   spending   that   is   "unanticipated"   —   "sudden,"   "urgent,"   unforeseen"   and   "temporary." 20     But   some   costs   of   the   wars   do   not   fall   into   the   category   of   emergency   spending;  these  expenses  have  been  institutionalized,  for  example,  into  the  spending  of  the   Departments  of  Veterans  Affairs,  Defense,  and  Homeland  Security.           Other  costs  can  be  anticipated  and  estimated  because  they  are  future  obligations  —                                                                                                               16  Belasco,  A.  (2011,  March  29).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations  Since   9/11,  p.  42.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   17  Belasco,  A.  (2011,  March  29).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations  Since   9/11,  p.  3.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   18  Stiglitz,  J.  E.,  &  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2008).  The  Three  Trillion  Dollar  War:  The  True  Costs  of  the  Iraq  Conflict.  New  York:   Norton.   19  The  Treasury  Department  did  sell  a  small  number  of  Patriot  Savings  bonds  from  December  2001  to   December  2011.  See  Treasury  Direct.  (2013).  The  Patriot  Savings  Bond   20  Budget  Control  Act  of  2011,  Pub.  L.  No.  112-­‐‑25,  125  Stat.  240  (2011).   5 namely  the  costs  of  veteran's  future  medical  care  and  disability  payments.  It  is  important  to   keep   the   future   costs   of   veterans'   care   in   mind   precisely   because   these   obligations   will   be   enormously  costly.    The  VA  has  struggled  to  care  for  the  influx  of  the  veterans  of  the  post-­‐‑9/11   wars  even  as  the  total  number  of  veterans  has  declined  from  26  million  to  21.6  million  in  this   period   in   part   because   it   had   not   anticipated   the   number   nor   the   complexity   of   the   new   veterans’  medical  needs.     But  there  are  areas  of  uncertainty.    For  instance,  the  Costs  of  War  project  estimates  of   future   costs   of   interest   on   the   debt   associated   with   war   could   be   high   if   the   US   chooses   to   change   the   way   it   pays   for   the   wars   —   for   instance   by   increasing   taxes   or   selling   war   bonds.     Or  these  projections  could  be  low  if  the  US  continues  its  wars  over  many  more  years.    And  as   these  wars,  the  longest  in  US  history,  have  been  institutionalized,  it  is  hard  to  disentangle  the   parts  of  the  base  Pentagon  budget  that  are  actually  war-­‐‑related  costs,  and  what  parts  of  the   special  OCO  appropriations  are  better  considered  to  be  base  budget  costs.         While  the  Costs  of  War  project  estimate  is  more  comprehensive  than  many  accounts,  it   still  does  not  include  all  the  budgetary  and  economic  costs  for  the  US  associated  with  the  wars   in  Iraq  and  Syria  and  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  and  the  larger  war  on  terror.  For  instance,  I   have   not   included   here   state   and   local   government   expenses   related   to   medical   care   of   veterans  and  homeland  security.  Nor  do  I  calculate  the  macro-­‐‑economic  costs  of  war  for  the   US  economy.  Costs  that  are  not  included  in  this  accounting  are  discussed  below.         Description  and  Discussion  of  Direct  and  War-­‐‑Related  Spending  Through  2016     War-­‐‑related   spending   occurs   in   several   areas   of   the   US   Federal   budget.   The   special   appropriations  for  war,  described  as  emergency  or  "overseas  contingency  operations"  (OCO),   are  direct  war  appropriations  to  the  Department  of  Defense  and  State  Department/US  Agency   for   International   Development   (USAID).   This   spending   is   over   and   above   the   general   and   continuing  funding  for  the  DOD,  the  "base  budget,"  and  appropriations  for  other  war-­‐‑related   activities  in  the  budgets  of  the  State  Department  and  the  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  as   discussed  below.     Direct  War  Appropriations     Congress   has   appropriated   approximately   $1.74   trillion   for   overseas   contingency   operations  to  the  Department  of  Defense  and  the  US  State  Department  since  late  2001  (Table   2).    In  2014  Congress  began  to  appropriate  money  for  Operation  Inherent  Resolve,  in  Syria,   with   total  appropriations  for  Syria  of  over  $5   billion   each   year   from   2014-­‐‑2016.   In   addition,   other  overseas  contingency  operations  (OCO)  spending  is  designated  for  the  war  on  terror.   These  operations  are  in  Europe,  Africa  (in  Uganda,  Trans-­‐‑Sahara  and  the  Horn  of  Africa),  the   Caribbean  and  Central  America.    The  two  largest  categories  of  expenses  have  been  for  the  wars   in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan;  spending  for  these  wars  peaked,  respectively,  in  2008  and  2011.  The   US  started  bombing  ISIS  in  Syria  in  August  2014  and  began  to  appropriate  money  specifically   for  that  war  in  FY  2014.     6   Table  2:  Cumulative  Direct  War  Appropriations  for  DOD  and  State  Department/USAID   for  "Emergency"  or  "Overseas  Contingency  Operations"21     Cumulative  Total  FY2001-­‐‑ Request  for  FY  2017,     FY2016,  Billions  of  Current   Billions  of  Current   War  Zone/Operation   Dollars   Dollars   Iraq   $805   2.2   Syria   12   9.4   22 Afghanistan   783   43.7   Pakistan23   8   .3   24 Operation  Noble  Eagle   28   .1   Other   OCO   incl.   Bipartisan   Budget  Act   107   9.6   Total     $1,742  billion   $65.3  billion       In  Figure  1  below,  I  consolidate  the  expenses  for  closely  related  war  zones,  specifically   Afghanistan  and  Pakistan,  and  Iraq  and  Syria.                                                                                                                         21  Totals  may  not  add  due  to  rounding.  Sources:  Belasco,  A.  (2014,  December  8).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,   and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations  Since  9/11.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service;  Office   of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  (2016,  February).  Defense  Budget  Overview:  United  States   Department  of  Defense  Fiscal  Year  2017  Budget  Request.  For  State  Department  spending  FY2011-­‐‑2013,  see   Epstein,  S.  B.,  Lawson,  M.  L.,  &  Tiersky,  A.  (2012,  July  23).  State,  Foreign  Operations,  and  Related  Programs:   FY2013  Budget  and  Appropriations.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.  For  Pakistan,  see   Kronstadt,  K.  A.,  &  Epstein,  S.  B.  (2016,  February  24).  Direct  Overt  US  Aid  Appropriations  for  and  Military   Reimbursements  to  Pakistan,  FY  2002-­‐‑FY2017.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service,  and  previous   CRS  reports  for  Pakistan.   22  Includes  Coalition  Support  Funds  for  Pakistan.   23  This  figure  includes  only  US  security-­‐‑related  funding  that  is  not  for  Coalition  Support  Funds  (CSF).      Coalition   Support  Funds  for  Pakistan  are  part  of  the  OCO  spending  for  operations  in  Afghanistan.    Both  the  DOD  and  State   Department  receive  other  OCO  funding  for  Pakistan.  For  accounting  purposes,  I  have  counted  these   appropriations  under  the  State  Department  although  this  is  not  entirely  accurate.  For  example,  the  largest   single  element  of  the  $8  billion  is  Foreign  Military  Financing  (FMF),  a  State  Department  appropriation  for   Foreign  Operations  that  is  managed  by  the  Department  of  Defense.  The  next  largest  element  of  spending  is  the   Pakistan  Counterinsurgency  Fund  and  the  Pakistan  Counterinsurgency  Capability  Fund;  the  former  is  overseen   by  the  Pentagon,  and  the  latter  by  the  State  Department.  And  smaller  funds  for  Counternarcotics  are  Pentagon   appropriations.    For  a  complete  breakdown  and  explanation,  see  Kronstadt,  K.  A.,  &  Epstein,  S.  B.  (2016,   February  24).  Direct  Overt  US  Aid  Appropriations  for  and  Military  Reimbursements  to  Pakistan,  FY  2002-­‐‑FY2017.   Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   24  Operation  Noble  Eagle,  begun  on  9/11,  includes  enhanced  security  for  military  bases  and  US  airspace   provided  by  the  US  military  in  the  DOD  budget.   7 Figure  1.  Annual  Appropriations  by  Major  War  Zone/Overseas  Contingency   Operations  for  DOD  and  State/USAID,  FY2001-­‐‑2016,  in  Billions  of  Current  Dollars25     160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 - Iraq & Syria Afghanistan & Pakistan Noble Eagle and Other War Designated, OCO       The   OCO   budget   for   the   Departments   of   Defense   and   the   State   Department   contain   many   programs   and   projects   all   over   the   world.     The   most   significant   of   these   is   in   Pakistan,   regarded   as   part   of   the   area   of   operations   for   Afghanistan   Operation   Enduring   Freedom   and   its  successor,  Operation  Freedom’s  Sentinel.         There  are  three  ways  the  US  operates  in  Pakistan:  Since  2001,  the  US  has  used  Pakistan   as   an   overland   route   for   supplies   to   Afghanistan.     The   United   States   reimburses   and   compensates  Pakistan  for  the  use  of  its  ports  and  overland  transportation  of  food,  fuel  and   military  equipment  through  Pakistan  en  route  to  Afghanistan  with  Coalition  Support  Funds,   which   are   included   in   the   budget   for   OCO   in   Afghanistan.     Since   the   start   of   the   war   in   Afghanistan,  the  US  provided  about  $15  billion  in  Coalition  Support  Funds  to  Pakistan.    The   Department  of  Defense  describes  the  role  of  Coalition  Support  Funds  as  reimbursement  for   "expenses  Pakistan  incurs  to  conduct  operations  against  al  Qaeda  and  Taliban  forces  include   providing  logistical  support  for  its  forces,  manning  observation  posts  along  the  Afghanistan   border,  and  conducting  maritime  interdiction  operations  and  combat  air  patrols."26                                                                                                                 25 Belasco,  A.  (2014,  December  8).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations   Since  9/11.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service;  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense   (Comptroller).  (2016,  February).  Defense  Budget  Overview:  United  States  Department  of  Defense  Fiscal  Year   2017  Budget  Request.     26  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  (2015).  Overseas  Contingency  Operations,  Operations   and  Maintenance,  Defense-­‐‑Wide.       8 Pakistan  is  a  zone  of  US  military  operations,  including  drone  strikes  and  cross-­‐‑border   attacks,   against   Al   Qaeda,   the   Taliban   and   other   militants.     The   money   spent   on   US   drone   strikes  in  Pakistan  is  included  in  the  US  DOD  budget  for  Afghanistan.         The   US   is   also   a   direct   supplier   of   military   assistance,   equipment   and   training   for   Pakistan's   military   forces   in   their   operations   against   militants.   The   US   has   provided   an   additional  $8  billion  in  security-­‐‑related  funding  through  the  Departments  of  Defense  and  State   to   Pakistan   since   2001   for   border   security,   counter-­‐‑narcotics   and   counterinsurgency   activities.       Figure  2.  Trends  in  Percent  of  Pakistan's  Military  Budget  from  US  Military  Aid  and   Reimbursement,  2001-­‐‑201527       50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Percent  of  Pakistan's  Miltary  Budget  from  US  Military  Aid  and  CSF   Since   2002,   the   United   States   has   provided   Pakistan   with   additional   economic   and   humanitarian  assistance,  totaling  more  than  $11  billion  that  are  neither  specifically  security   related,  nor  part  of  the  OCO  budget  that  is  used  for  Pakistan.    While  it  is  arguable  that  some  of   that   US   economic   and   humanitarian   aid   is   used   for   security   purposes,   or   is   used   to   deal   with   the  refugees  and  food  insecurity  caused  by  fighting  in  the  border  region,  I  do  not  count  this   assistance   as   part   of   the   war   effort   and   report   here   only   the   CRS   numbers   for   security   assistance.   It   is   also   plausible   that   most   of   that   money   —   beyond   that   used   for   disaster                                                                                                               27  In  constant  dollars.  The  table  is  illustrative:  US  fiscal  years  and  the  Pakistani  military  budget  run  on  different   cycles.  Sources:  US  spending:  Kronstadt,  K.  A.,  &  Epstein,  S.  B.  (2016,  February  24).  Direct  Overt  US  Aid   Appropriations  for  and  Military  Reimbursements  to  Pakistan,  FY  2002-­‐‑FY2017.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional   Research  Service.  Pakistan's  military  budget:  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI).  (2016).   SIPRI  Military  Expenditure  Database:  Pakistan's  military  budget;  Pakistani  Military  Spending.       9   assistance  —  would  not  have  gone  to  Pakistan  absent  a  war  since  the  US  was  giving  little  or   no  aid  to  Pakistan  prior  to  the  9/11  attacks.    All  told,  Pakistan  has  received  about  $33  billion   in   economic   and   security   assistance,   including   Coalition   Support   Funds   as   part   of   the   Afghanistan  operational  budget,  since  2002.     Croatia,  Georgia,  Hungary,  Jordan,  Poland  and  Romania  also  receive  Coalition  Support   Funds,   as   reimbursements   for   their   work   in   US   wars   from   the   OCO   budget. 28     As   the   Department   of   Defense   argues,   "Reimbursing   partner   nation   efforts   is   critical   to   enabling   forces  from  eligible  foreign  countries  to  remain  in  theater  and  support  US  military  operations.   Without   financial   support,   many   of   these   nations   would   not   be   able   to   participate   in   US   military  operations."29     There   are   other   military   assistance   programs   and   coalition   members   who   receive   funding  from  the  US  as  part  of  the  OCO  budget  and  outside  it.  Uzbekistan  is  not  defined  as   inside  the  zone  of  overseas  contingency  operations.30    Yet  since  the  9/11  attacks,  Uzbekistan,   which  shares  a  border  with  Afghanistan,  has  supported  the  US  war  in  Afghanistan  and  has   been   considered   an   important   partner   to   the   US 31  For   example,   Uzbekistan   allowed   US   military  vehicles  the  use  of  Uzbekistan  Khanabad  airbase  as  part  of  its  transportation  network   into  northern  Afghanistan  until  November  2005  when  the  US  ceased  operations  at  the  base   after  the  US  criticized  the  Uzbek  government.  Beginning  in  2009,  some  rail  and  air  transit  and   overflight   permissions   were   negotiated   between   the   US,   NATO   and   Uzbekistan.   Overland   transit  to  Afghanistan  through  Uzbekistan  became  more  important  when  the  US  killed  two-­‐‑ dozen  Pakistani  soldiers  in  late  November  2011  and  Pakistan  halted  US  transit  to  Afghanistan   for   about   7   months.   Military   aid   to   Uzbekistan,   which   is   meant   to   secure   military   transportation   access   to   roads   into   Afghanistan   (and   for   a   number   of   years,   access   to   the   military   base   in   Karshi-­‐‑Khanabad)   peaked   in   2002,   and   totaled   more   than   $200   million   through   FY2013.     In   early   2015,   the   US   announced   that   it   would   send   Uzbekistan   military   equipment  valued  at  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  —  308  Mine-­‐‑Resistant  Ambush  Protected   Vehicles  and  20  Armored  Recovery  Vehicles.32     Uzbekistan  is  an  authoritarian  state  that  has   raised   flags   as   a   notorious   human   rights   violator. 33  Yet,   military   and   foreign   assistance   to   Uzbekistan  is  comparatively  small,  less  than  $1  billion  since  2001,  when  compared  to  other   spending  for  the  wars,  and  we  have  not  included  it  in  this  accounting  of  the  costs  of  war.34                                                                                                               28  The  roles  of  these  governments  in  the  wars  in  Iraq,  Syria,  and  Afghanistan  is  described  in  Office  of  the  Under   Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  (2015).  Overseas  Contingency  Operations,  Operations  and  Maintenance,   Defense-­‐‑Wide.     29  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  (2015).  Overseas  Contingency  Operations,  Operations   and  Maintenance,  Defense-­‐‑Wide.     30  Belasco,  A.  (2014,  December  8).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on  Terror  Operations   Since  9/11  p.  90.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   31  See,  for  instance,  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense.  (2014,  June).  Overview:  Overseas  Contingency   Operations,  p.  8.     32  Imamova,  N.  (2015,  January  22).  Exclusive:  US  Gives  Uzbekistan  Military  Equipment  Boost.  Voice  of  America.     33  In  July  2015,  Congressman  Jim  McGovern  of  Massachusetts  asked,  "Could  somebody  explain  the  rationale  for   the  initiative,  given  Uzbekistan’s  human  rights  record?"  Quoted  in  Michel,  C.  (2015,  July  9).  Washington's   Military  Gift  to  Uzbekistan  Questioned.  The  Diplomat.   34  See  Dancs,  A.  (2011,  June).  International  Assistance  Spending  Due  to  War  on  Terror.  Costs  of  War;  and   Department  of  State,  Foreign  Operations,  and  Related  Programs.  (2000-­‐‑2016).  Congressional  Budget     10   Some   of   the   DOD   and   State   Department   appropriations   include   funding   intended   to   facilitate  the  physical  and  political  reconstruction  of  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  in  part  based  on   the   view   that   a   functioning   civil   society   and   government   will   be   less   hospitable   to   militant   organizations.     Special   Inspector   General   reports   on   Afghanistan   and   Iraq   have   found   that   reconstruction   in   both   Afghanistan   and   Iraq   have   had   some   successes   but   are   also   sites   of   corruption  and  incomplete  or  shoddy  work.35    As  Catherine  Lutz  shows,  the  reconstruction  of   Iraq  is  far  from  complete.36       Additional  War-­‐‑Related  Spending     The  Department  of  Defense  "base"  or  non-­‐‑emergency  budget  includes  spending  for  the   procurement  of  new  weapons,  military  construction,  the  health  care  and  pay  of  active  duty   soldiers,  operations,  and  maintenance.  The  base  budget  is  much  larger  than  the  emergency  or   OCO  budget.  The  Congress  makes  special  appropriations  for  the  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  wars   and   funds   the   "base"   budget   in   separate   appropriations.     Items   in   the   base   budget   include   personnel  pay  and  benefits,  weapons  procurement,  and  funding  for  military  bases.       Overall   military   spending   grew   after   9/11.37     In   Fiscal   Year   (FY)   2001   the   entire   US   military  budget  was  about  $316  billion.    In  FY  2016,  the  military  budget  including  the  OCO   spending  is  about  $580  billion,  down  from  its  peak  in  FY2010  of  $691  billion.38         Winslow   Wheeler   has   argued   that,   prior   to   the   9/11   attacks,   the   Pentagon's   base   military   budget   was   not   expected   to   significantly   increase,   yet   after   the   war   it   did   grow   significantly.    Military  spending  might  well  have  increased  after  2001  even  if  the  9/11  attacks   had  not  happened,  but  we  should  ask:  How  much  of  the  unanticipated  increase  in  the  base   budget   is   due   to   the   wars   in   Iraq   and   Afghanistan   and   the   larger   war   on   terror?   And   is   it   possible  to  disaggregate  the  effects  of  each  of  the  wars  on  the  base  budget?       In   separate   analyses,   Linda   J.   Bilmes   and   Winslow   Wheeler   have   estimated   tens   of   billions   of   dollars   in   extra   spending   in   the   Pentagon's   base   budget   due   to   the   wars   in   Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  Wheeler  attributes  much  of  the  increase  to  the  war  climate,  namely  the   desire   of   the   administration   and   members   of   Congress   to   show   support   for   the   troops   in   the   form  of  higher  pay  and  modernization  of  military  equipment.    Bilmes  suggests  that  increases   to  the  Pentagon  base  budget  are  in  part  due  to  military  pay  increases  used  to  bolster  military                                                                                                               Justification  for  Foreign  Operations.  Washington,  DC:  United  States  Department  of  State.  Also  see  Nichol,  J.   (2013,  August  21).  Uzbekistan:  Recent  Developments  and  US  Interests.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research   Service.  Also  see  the  Bureau  of  European  and  Eurasian  Affairs.  (2012-­‐‑2015).  Foreign  Operations  Assistance:   Uzbekistan.  Washington,  DC:  United  States  Department  of  State.     35  See  for  instance  Special  Inspector  General  Afghanistan  Reconstruction  (SIGAR).  All  Reports.;  Special  Inspector   General  Iraq  Reconstruction.  Publications.     36  Lutz,  C.  (2013,  February).  Reconstructing  Iraq:  The  Last  Year  and  the  Last  Decade.  Costs  of  War.   37  Wheeler,  W.  T.  (2011,  June).  Unaccountable:  Pentagon  Spending  on  the  Post-­‐‑9/11  Wars.  Costs  of  War.  And   Linda  Bilmes.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  Costs  of  War.     38  See  Department  of  Defense.  (2016).  FY2017  Budget  Proposal.   11 recruitment   when   it   was   lagging   during   the   Iraq   War,   which   she   argues   are   unlikely   to   be   reduced  after  the  wars'  end.    Bilmes  argues  that  medical  expenses  of  active  duty  personnel   have  grown  due  to  the  increasing  utilization  rates  by  active  duty  troops  and  their  families,  the   expansion  of  the  TRICARE  program,  and  the  more  complicated  medical  needs  of  active  duty   soldiers  injured  during  their  deployments.    Similarly,  short  term  health  care  expenses  directly   related  to  combat  are  part  of  the  OCO  budget,  but  longer  term  needs  and  the  infrastructure  to   provide  for  health  care  of  soldiers  who  have  deployed  to  the  war  zones  are  not  in  the  OCO   budget.39    In  FY2001,  Appropriations  for  Military  Personnel  and  the  Defense  Health  program   totaled  $91  billion;  in  FY  2015,  those  programs  were  budgeted  to  cost  $160  billion.40           In  addition,  while  the  size  of  the  federal  government  fluctuates,  the  number  of  civilians   employed   by   the   Pentagon   is   larger   than   in   the   past   —   and   has   tended   to   grow   even   as   spending   on   the   wars   declines.     In   2014,   the   Department   of   Defense   had   about   723,400   employees;  this  year,  the  Department  of  Defense  will  employ  about  738,000.    The  number  of   DOD  full  time  employees  will  begin  to  fall  only  in  2017.     In  summary,  some  costs  of  the  post-­‐‑9/11  wars  have  become  institutionalized  in  the   base  budget  in  the  form  of  increased  weapons  procurement,  health  care,  and  active  duty  pay.     There  is  little  willingness  in  Congress  to  cut  military  spending,  even  on  very  expensive  items   that  the  Pentagon  has  said  it  does  not  want  or  need,  since  the  9/11  attacks.41     Figures   3   and   4,   below,   illustrate   the   institutionalization   of   higher   base   budget   spending   and   the   failure   of   the   base   budget   to   decline   at   the   same   rate   as   emergency   OCO   funding,  which  peaked  in  2008.42    When  war  spending  declines,  one  would  expect  base  budget   spending  to  decline  at  about  the  same  rate.    However,  while  this  does  occur  in  some  years,   notably  in  2004,  2010  2011,  and  2017,  in  many  instances,  the  two  budgets  are  out  of  sync:   even  when  war  spending  declines,  annual  base  budget  spending  remains  around  $500  billion.                                                                                                                             39  See  Appendix  B  in  Belasco,  A.  (2014,  December  8).  The  Cost  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  Other  Global  War  on   Terror  Operations  Since  9/11,  pp.  89-­‐‑92.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   40  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  (2016,  February).  Defense  Budget  Overview:  United   States  Department  of  Defense  Fiscal  Year  2017  Budget  Request,  p.  6-­‐‑2.     41  See  Chadwick,  L.,  &  Smith,  R.  J.  (2016,  July  5).  Congress  Funds  Problematic  Weapons  the  Pentagon  Does  Not   Want.  Center  for  Public  Integrity.   42  Because  the  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  wars  have  been,  for  most  of  their  duration,  fought  simultaneously,  and   soldiers  have  frequently  served  —  very  often  more  than  once  —  in  both  major  war  zones,  it  is  not  possible  to   disaggregate  these  additional  costs  to  the  base  budget  by  war  zone.   12 Figure  3.  Trends  in  the  US  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  Authorizations  for  Overseas   Contingency  Operations  (OCO)  and  the  Base  Budget,  Fiscal  Years  2002-­‐‑2017  in  Billions   of  Current  Dollars43     600 500 400 300 200 100 0 DOD  War DOD  Base   Figure   4.   Percent   Change   in   Overseas   Contingency   Operations   (OCO)   and   the   Base   Budget,  over  the  Previous  Year's  Budget44     120 2003 %  change  in  the  OCO  (war)  budget  compared  to  the  previous  year 100 %  change  in  the  Base  budget  compared  to  the  previous  year 80 60 2005 40 20 2004 2007 2006 2008 2014 2010 0 2017 2011 -­‐‑20 2009 -­‐‑40 2012 2013 2015 2016                                                                                                                 43  Source:  Department  of  Defense.  (2016).  FY2017  Budget  Proposal;  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense   (Comptroller).  (2016,  February).  Defense  Budget  Overview:  United  States  Department  of  Defense  Fiscal  Year   2017  Budget  Request,  p.  1-­‐‑5.     44  Calculated  using  the  numbers  in  the  previous  table.   13   The  Pentagon  has  made  efforts  to  cut  some  costs.  For  instance,  the  DOD  has  proposed   changes   to   the   TRICARE   medical   program   including   increasing   co-­‐‑pay   amounts   but   the   spending   for   health   care   of   active   duty   soldiers   and   their   dependents   will   likely   remain   significant  unless  the  system  is  completely  overhauled.    The  Department  of  Defense  and  the   President  have  also  requested  that  Congress  allow  it  to  close  some  military  bases  that  it  does   not  need  in  a  new  Base  Realignment  and  Closure  process.  Pentagon  officials  estimated  that   they  had  22  percent  excess  infrastructure  capacity,  and  that  closing  excess  bases  would  save   more  than  $2  billion  in  annual  recurring  savings.45  Congress  has  not  acted  on  this  request.46     Smaller  expenditures  are  more  difficult  to  trace  and  may  or  may  not  be  included  in  the   military  base  budget,  or  in  other  State  Department  accounts  of  military  spending  on  Iraq  and   Afghanistan.     For   instance,   the   United   States   acquired   the   support   of   troops   from   other   countries,  or  in  some  cases  access  to  air  space,  land-­‐‑lines  of  communication,  or  military  bases   from   the   smaller   contributors   to   the   "coalitions   of   the   willing"   for   the   wars   in   Iraq   and   Afghanistan.  Indeed,  more  than  40  countries  contributed  to  the  war  in  Iraq  and  some  received   compensation   for   their   role.   The   United   States   is   also   now   spending   more   money   to   support   counterterrorism   in   Europe   and   Africa,   as   mentioned   above.     Some   of   the   security   and   economic  assistance  to  European,  African  and  Central  American  countries  that  is  not  charged   to  the  OCO  budget,  appears  instead  in  the  base  budgets  of  the  Departments  of  Defense  (and   State)  but  are   arguably  in  service  of  shoring  up  the   potential  of  some  states  to  detect  threats   and  combat  violent  extremism.     Congressional  appropriations  to  the  Pentagon  from  FY2001-­‐‑2016  have  totaled  more   than   $8.5   trillion   in   current   dollars;   about   6.8   trillion   of   that   was   in   non-­‐‑emergency,   base   budget  appropriations.    Assuming  that  some  of  the  increase  in  the  base  budget  due  to  the  wars   in  Afghanistan,  Iraq,  and  the  larger  war  on  terror  have  been  institutionalized,  I  calculate  that   the  portion  of  the  increase  to  Pentagon  base  budget  from  2001-­‐‑2016  that  can  be  attributed  to   the  wars  is  about  $733  billion.47     The   largest   ongoing   war-­‐‑related   costs   that   occur   outside   the   Defense   and   State   Department   Overseas   Contingency   Operations   budgets   are   associated   with   Homeland   Security  spending  dedicated  to  diminishing  the  risks  and  potential  effects  of  terrorism  and  the   more  than  1.9  million  living  US  veterans  of  what  the  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  calls  the   Global  War  on  Terror  (GWOT).48    Created  in  2002,  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  has   a  number  of  responsibilities  that  are  directly  and  indirectly  war  related,  including  preventing   and   disrupting   terrorist   attacks,   protecting   critical   infrastructure,   and   responding   and   recovering  from  terrorist  incidents.    Since  2002,  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  has                                                                                                               45  Department  of  Defense.  (2016,  March).  Department  of  Defense  Infrastructure  Capacity.   46  See  Gould,  J.,  &  Mehta,  A.  (2016,  April  15).  Pentagon  to  Congress:  We  Need  Base  Closures.  Defense  News. 47  This  estimate  assumes  that  additions  to  the  Pentagon  base  budget  that  are  in  proportion  to  OCO  spending.    I   calculated  additions  to  the  Pentagon  base  from  2001-­‐‑2003  as  30  percent  of  OCO  spending;  at  40%  of  OCO   spending  from  2004  to  2008;  and  at  50%  of  OCO  spending  from  2009-­‐‑2015.       48  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs.  (2014).  VA  Benefits  Activity,  Veterans  Deployed  to  the  Global  War  on  Terror:   VBA  Data  Through  Jun  2014,  DMDC  Data  Through  May  2014;  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs.  (2016).  Budget  in   Brief:  2017.       14 received  about  $548  billion  for  these  roles.  The  Obama  administration  requested  an  additional   $36.8  billion  for  those  missions  for  Fiscal  Year  2017.49       About  2  million  of  the  more  than  2.75  million  people  who  served  deployments  in  the   war  zones  have  left  the  military  and  entered  into  the  VA  system.50      Spending  for  the  veterans   of   recent   US   wars   includes   care   for   the   more   than   52,000   US   soldiers   who   were   officially   wounded  in  action  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  and  many  who  were  evacuated  from  the  war  zones   for  disease  or  non-­‐‑hostile  injuries  require  on-­‐‑going  medical  care  either  by  the  Department  of   Veterans  Affairs  (or  the  Department  of  Defense  if  they  remain  in  service).         The  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  has  been  under-­‐‑capacity  to  deal  with  the  influx  of   new  veterans  who  are  eligible  for  services  and  it  has  had  to  grow  its  staffing  levels  very  quickly   —  nearly  doubling  in  size  since  2001,  to  350,000  workers  —  to  manage  these  veterans'  care   and  to  reduce  a  large  backlog  in  processing  claims  for  disability.  The  backlog  has  declined,  but   the  number  of  VA  staff  is  projected  to  grow  over  the  next  several  years.       It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  future  costs  of  veteran's  care  and  disability  benefits  based   on  past  wars:  GWOT  veterans  have  been  making  more  claims  for  injury  and  illness  than  earlier   veterans  because  they  have  higher  rates  of  service  connected  disability  than  the  veterans  of   previous  US  wars.51    Specifically,  more  than  1,600  soldiers  who  fought  in  the  post-­‐‑9/11  wars   Iraq   or   Afghanistan   have   had   battle-­‐‑injury   major   limb   amputations   as   of   late   2015.52     And   of   course,  not  all  injuries  are  immediately  diagnosed.    The  veterans  of  these  wars  suffer  from   skeletal  injury,  PTSD  and  Traumatic  Brain  Injury  at  rates  higher  than  the  veterans  of  other   wars.    More  than  327,000  GWOT  veterans  have  been  diagnosed  with  Traumatic  Brain  Injury.53     Of  those  veterans  of  the  GWOT  whose  disability  claims  had  been  processed  in  2014,  the  most   recent  year  for  which  there  are  figures,  about  700,000  were  classified  as  30  percent  or  more   disabled.54                                                                                                                   49  See  Dancs,  A.  (2011,  June).  Homeland  Security  Spending  Since  9/11.  Costs  of  War;  Office  of  Management  and   Budget.  (2016).  Analytical  Perspectives:  Budget  of  the  US  Government,  Fiscal  Year  2017,  pp.  351-­‐‑352.   Washington,  DC:  US  Government  Printing  Office;  and  previous  years.  In  January  2015,  Senator  Tom  Coburn   published  a  review  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security.  See,  Coburn,  T.  (2015,  January).  A  Review  of  the   Department  of  Homeland  Security's  Mission  and  Performance.   50  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs.  (2014).  VA  Benefits  Activity,  Veterans  Deployed  to  the  Global  War  on  Terror:   VBA  Data  Through  Jun  2014,  DMDC  Data  Through  May  2014,  p.  1;  Commission  on  Care.  (2016,  June  30).  Final   Report  of  the  Commission  on  Care,  p.  165.   51  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs:  National  Center  for  Veterans  Analysis  and  Statistics.  (2016,  May).  Profile  of   Post-­‐‑9/11  Veterans:  2014     52  See  Fischer,  H.  (2015,  August  7).  A  Guide  to  US  Military  Casualty  Statistics:  Operations  Freedom's  Sentinel,   Operation  Inherent  Resolve,  Operation  New  Dawn,  Operation  Iraqi  Freedom,  and  Operation  Enduring  Freedom.   Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.  Also  see  Lutz,  C.  (2013,  February  21).  US  and  Coalition   Casualties  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  Costs  of  War.;  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and   Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending  Decisions  Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War.   53  Fischer,  H.  (2015,  August  7).  A  Guide  to  US  Military  Casualty  Statistics:  Operations  Freedom's  Sentinel,   Operation  Inherent  Resolve,  Operation  New  Dawn,  Operation  Iraqi  Freedom,  and  Operation  Enduring  Freedom,  p.   4.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   54  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs.  (2014).  VA  Benefits  Activity,  Veterans  Deployed  to  the  Global  War  on  Terror:   VBA  Data  Through  Jun  2014,  DMDC  Data  Through  May  2014,  p.  4.       15 Table  3.  Estimated  Veterans  Spending,  FY  2001-­‐‑201655     Additional  War-­‐‑Related  Spending   Cumulative  Total  $Billions   56 VA  Medical   37.4   Social  Security  Disability57   6.5   VA  Disability   53.7   58 VA  Other  Costs  Related  to  Afghanistan  and  Iraq   115   Total     212.6     Further,  as  the  US  continues  to  remain  in  Afghanistan  and  returns  to  war  in  Iraq,  US   deployments  have  been  extended  beyond  what  was  projected.    This  will  increase  the  numbers   of   veterans   with   service   in   those   wars   who   are   eligible   for   VA   services.     Thus,   nearly   all   estimates   for   the   current   Department   of   Defense   future   costs   of   health   care   for   soldiers   (TRICARE)  and  future  costs  of  caring  for  veterans  are  probably  low.     I   have   not   counted   the   costs   of   other   VA   benefits   for   which   Global   War   on   Terror   veterans   are   eligible.     For   instance,   Global   War   on   Terror   veterans   are   eligible   for   significant   educational   and   mortgage   benefits.     The   VA's   Home   Loan   Guarantee   Program   has   already   served  more  than  600,000  veterans  at  a  cost  of  more  than  $206  billion  as  of  late  2014.59    More   than  815,000  GWOT  veterans  have  so  far  received  educational  benefits  under  programs  that   were  already  in  place  or  which  have  been  created  specifically  for  Post-­‐‑9/11  veterans.60     Future  Military  and  Veterans-­‐‑Related  Spending     There  are  two  major  categories  of  future  war-­‐‑related  spending  —  costs  for  the  care  of   veterans   and   continuing   appropriations   for   overseas   contingency   operations.   Total   costs   for   the  veterans  of  these  wars  will  increase  over  time.  Peak  spending  on  veterans'  disability  and   medical  care,  for  every  war,  occurs  decades  after  the  service  of  those  veterans'  ends.61  The                                                                                                               55  This  conservative  estimate  assumes  that  reductions  spending  under  the  Budget  Control  Act  and  increases  in   demand  will  yield  expenditures  that  are  about  the  same  between  FY2013  and  FY2016.       56  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending  Decisions   Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War.  VA  medical  including  direct  outlays  for  Iraq/Afghanistan   veterans  +  directly  related  medical  costs  related  to:  Traumatic  Brain  Injury;  Spinal  injury;  Women  veterans.   57  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending  Decisions   Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War.  Disability  Pay  for  fully  disabled  veterans  (90-­‐‑100%)  service-­‐‑ connected. 58  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending  Decisions   Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War.  Other  VA  costs  directly  related  to  Iraq/Afghanistan,  including   investments  in:    Claims  processing  for  new  claims;  Mental  health/PTSD;  IT  investment  related  to  claims;   Prosthetics;  Readjustment  Counseling  for  new  veterans.   59  This  figure  is  not  included  in  this  paper’s  calculations  of  costs  because  it  is  comprised  of  loans  that  will  in   theory  be  repaid.   60  As  of  mid  2014.  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs.  (2014).  VA  Benefits  Activity,  Veterans  Deployed  to  the  Global   War  on  Terror:  VBA  Data  Through  Jun  2014,  DMDC  Data  Through  May  2014,  pp.  7-­‐‑8.     61  Institute  rans,  Service  Members,  and  their  Families,  p.  3.  Washington,  DC:  The  National  Academies  Press.     16 costs   for   WWI   veterans   peaked   in   1969,   for   World   War   II   veterans   in   1986.   Cost   for   the   care   of  Vietnam  War  veterans  has  not  yet  peaked.62       The  costs  for  veterans  of  the  post-­‐‑9/11  wars  will  be  comparatively  greater  than  for   past   wars.   Specifically,   the   veterans   of   the   wars   in   Iraq   and   Afghanistan   often   return   with   multiple  traumas,  as  well  as  respiratory  and  cardiac  trouble  which  may  take  some  years  after   deployment  to  emerge.63     Further,  as  each  veteran  ages,  their  health  care  needs  will  become   more  complex  and  expensive.       Of  those  who  have  been  discharged,  Bilmes  estimated  in  2013  that  their  care  over  the   next  forty  years  would  cost  approximately  $836  billion  through  2053.  Table  4  details  Bilmes’   2013  estimate  of  future  costs.         Table  4.  Future  Obligations  for  Veterans'  Care  FY2014-­‐‑205364     Categories  of  Veterans'  Care   Present  Value  2014-­‐‑2053   Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  Medical   287.6   Social  Security  Disability   42.3   Department  of  Veterans  Affairs   Disability   419.7   VA  Related   86.6   Total     836.2       Since  Bilmes  made  the  estimates  in  Table  4,  the  number  of  service  members  in  the  VA   system  has  grown  to  nearly  2  million  people.  This  is  thus  a  conservative  estimate  of  costs  for   veteran's   care   —   if   only   because,   unfortunately,   the   war   in   Afghanistan   will   continue   to   produce  more  people  with  complex  wounds  and  conditions  who  will  enter  into  the  VA  system.   In   June   2014,   Bilmes   updated   her   estimate   of   future   spending   on   veterans’   care.   Bilmes   projects  that  through  2053,  Net  Present  Value  costs  for  veterans  disability,  medical,  and   associated   costs   of   administration   for   care   of   veterans   will   be   more   than   $1   trillion,   because  the  rate  and  complexity  of  medical  and  disability  claims  has  been  higher  than  Bilmes   originally  predicted.65     "In  addition,  a  significant  number  of  veteran's  claims  are  now  being   appealed,   adding   to   the   cost   of   the   process   and   in   most   cases,   resulting   in   higher   awards   for   veterans."66                                                                                                                 62  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending  Decisions   Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War. 63  Commission  on  Care.  (2016,  June  30).  Final  Report  of  the  Commission  on  Care,  p.  166.     64  Long  term  present  value  of  medical  care,  social  security,  and  disability  claims  already  submitted  through   2014-­‐‑2053.  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2013,  March).  The  Financial  Legacy  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan:  How  Wartime  Spending   Decisions  Will  Cancel  Out  the  Peace  Dividend.  Costs  of  War.   65  L.  J.  Bilmes,  personal  communication,  25  June  2014.  Also  see  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2016).  A  Trust  Fund  for  Veterans.   Democracy:  A  Journal  of  Ideas,  Winter  2016  (39).     66  L.  J.  Bilmes,  personal  communication,  17  August  2016.   17 As  Bilmes  reminds  us,  even  though  the  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  has  "the  fastest-­‐‑ growing  budget  in  the  federal  government,"  the  department  "still  lacks  sufficient  funding  to   fill  thousands  of  vacancies  for  doctors  and  nurses  and  to  finance  badly  needed  repairs  to  its   hospitals   and   clinics." 67     Long   wait   times   for   services   have   been   a   persistent   barrier   for   veterans'  access  to  health  care,  and  ultimately  may  increase  the  costs  of  care.68         The   Costs   of   War   estimate   takes   into   account   the   greater   number   of   veterans   in   the   system,   and   is   still   likely   an   underestimate   of   the   final   cost   because   more   Iraq   and   Afghan   soldiers   will   enter   the   VA   system   over   the   next   several   years   and   the   costs   of   administration   and  services  for  the  veterans  of  the  wars  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  will  grow  accordingly.    This   paper  uses  Bilmes’  estimate  of  $1  trillion  for  future  veterans-­‐‑related  spending  through  2053.     Macroeconomic,  Non-­‐‑Budgetary  and  Externalized  Costs     Earlier  Costs  of  War  project  analysis  by  Heidi  Garrett-­‐‑Peltier,  James  Heintz,  and  Ryan   Edwards  showed  that  the  wars  likely  costs  tens  of  thousands  of  jobs,  affected  the  ability   of   the   US   to   invest   in   infrastructure   and   probably   led   to   increased   interest   costs   on   borrowing,  not  to  mention  greater  overall  federal  indebtedness.69  The  post-­‐‑9/11  wars   have  been  funded  primarily  by  borrowing.  No  additional  taxes  were  raised  for  these  wars;   indeed,  taxes  were  cut  in  many  categories  for  most  of  the  war  years,  and  they  recently  rose   only  for  households  with  incomes  over  $400,000.       Using   a   standard   macroeconomic   model   of   the   US   economy,   Ryan   Edwards   estimates   that   as   of   2014,   the   US   has   already   incurred   an   additional   approximately   $453   billion   in   interest  on  borrowing  to  pay  for  the  wars.70    Over  the  next  several  decades,  assuming  no  more   military   spending   on   these   wars,   but   also   no   additional   tax   increases   or   spending   cuts,   cumulated  interest  costs  on  borrowing  to  pay  for  the  wars  will  ultimately  rise  to  dwarf   the   $1.5   trillion   of   direct   military   spending   from   2001-­‐‑2013,   adding   more   than   $7.9   trillion  to  the  national  debt.71     Thus,  although  military  spending  may  not  continue  to  rise   over   the   next   40   years,   interest   costs   will   surpass   total   war   costs   unless   Congress   devises   another  plan  to  pay  for  the  wars.     The   severity   of   the   burden   of   war-­‐‑related   interest   payments   will   depend   on   many   factors,  not  least,  the  overall  future  health  of  the  US  economy,  interest  rates,  government  fiscal   policy,   and   national   saving.   But   unfinanced   war   spending   has   played   a   significant   role   in                                                                                                               67  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2016).  A  Trust  Fund  for  Veterans.  Democracy:  A  Journal  of  Ideas,  Winter  2016  (39).   68  Institute  of  Medicine  of  the  National  Academies.  (2013).  Returning  Home  from  Iraq  and  Afghanistan:   Assessment  of  Readjustment  Needs  of  Veterans,  Service  Members,  and  their  Families,  pp.  9-­‐‑10.  Washington,  DC:   The  National  Academies  Press.   69  See  respectively,  research  briefs  by  Garrett-­‐‑Peltier,  H.  (2011,  June).  The  Job  Opportunity  Costs  of  War.  Costs   of  War;  Heintz,  J.  (2011,  June).  Military  Assets  and  Public  Investment.  Costs  of  War;  and  Edwards,  R.  D.  (2011,   June).  Post-­‐‑9/11  War  Spending,  Debt,  and  the  Macroeconomy.  Costs  of  War.     70  Edwards  calibrates  a  standard  Solow  model  to  model  feedbacks  from  deficit-­‐‑financed  government  defense   spending  into  current  GDP,  the  capital  stock,  and  interest  rates.  See  Edwards,  R.  D.  (2011,  June).  Post-­‐‑9/11  War   Spending,  Debt,  and  the  Macroeconomy.  Costs  of  War.   71  Edward's  calculation  is  based  on  only  the  direct  war  appropriations  noted  in  Table  2  for  DoD  and  State   Department.   18 raising  the  US  national  debt,  and  it  has  few  of  the  benefits  associated  with  other  measures  that   have   raised   the   debt,   such   as   reductions   in   taxes   and   increases   in   spending,   which   were   policies  intended  to  combat  the  recession.     Some   of   the   costs   of   the   wars   in   Iraq   and   Afghanistan   have   been   externalized   and   therefore   do   not   appear   in   this   accounting,   focused   on   US   federal   outlays   and   obligations.   Specifically,  as  Zoe  Wool's  research  shows,  the  externalized  costs  include  the  social  costs  of   care   for   disabled   veterans   borne   by   their   families. 72     The   costs   to   US   military   families   of   uncompensated  expenses  of  caring  for  injured  family  members  may  be  as  much  as  $300-­‐‑400   billion  over  the  next  several  decades.73    Further,  state  and  local  governments  assume  some  of   the  costs  of  veteran's  care  and  benefits.74     Finally,  each  one  of  the  nearly  7,000  US  soldiers   killed  by  wars  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  could  be  assigned  a  statistical  value  of  human  life  —  a   dollar  value  to  their  deaths.    The  Costs  of  War  project  has  not  estimated  the  economic  impact   on   the   United   States   economy   —   the   loss   of   economic   productivity   —   of   the   deaths   and   injuries  of  US  soldiers  due  to  the  wars.       The  economic  costs  of  the  war  for  other  countries  are  also  not  included  in  this  accounting.     The   costs   incurred   outside   the   US   by   its   allies   and   by   the   people   and   governments   of   Afghanistan,   Pakistan,   and   Iraq   total   in   the   many   billions   of   dollars.   For   example,   the   disruption   caused   by   war   to   Iraq's   health   care   and   economic   infrastructure   has   led   to   continued  adverse  health  effects  and  a  continuing  economic  burden  for  the  people  of  Iraq  and   the  region.  Much  the  same  can  be  said  of  the  wars  in  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan.    There  are   millions   of   refugees   for   whom   the   burden   of   care   has   fallen   to   international   humanitarian   organizations  and  host  countries.  The  UK  spent  about  $14  billion  in  Iraq  from  2003-­‐‑2011  and   was   projected   to   spend   about   $30   billion   in   Afghanistan   by   the   time   of   the   complete   withdrawal  of  the  UK.75     By  one  estimate  published  in  2011,  the  budgetary  costs  of  German   military  involvement  in  Afghanistan  is  more  than  $15  billion  (12  billion  Euros),  at  the  low  end,   and   this   number   does   not   include   medical   costs   or   the   costs   of   financing   the   German   participation  in  the  war.76     While   the   US   has   given   assistance   to   the   governments   of   Afghanistan,   Pakistan,   and   Iraq,  there  are  still  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars’  worth  of  reconstruction  and  military  costs   borne  by  those  governments.    Further,  there  is  also  increased  military  spending  in  Pakistan   (beyond   what   the   US   has   given   in   military   aid)   and   a   burden   of   refugee   flows   in   these                                                                                                               72  Wool,  Z.  H.  (2013,  February).  The  War  Comes  Home:  Institutionalizing  Informal  Care  and  the  Family   Consequences  of  Combat  Injuries.  Costs  of  War.   73  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2011,  June).  Current  and  Projected  Future  Costs  of  Caring  for  Veterans  of  the  Iraq  and   Afghanistan  Wars.  Costs  of  War;  Howell,  A.,  &  Wool,  Z.  H.  (2011,  June).  The  War  Comes  Home:  The  Toll  of  War   and  The  Shifting  Burden  of  Care.  Costs  of  War;  and  Wool,  Z.  H.  (2013,  February).  The  War  Comes  Home:   Institutionalizing  Informal  Care  and  the  Family  Consequences  of  Combat  Injuries.  Costs  of  War.   74  See  Smith,  B.  (2015,  January  3).  The  Cost  of  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  Veterans'  Care  to  Texas.  Costs  of  War;   Lattanzi-­‐‑Silveus,  L.  (2015,  January  1).  Costs  of  the  Wars  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  for  the  State  of  Rhode  Island.   Costs  of  War.   75  BBC.  (2011,  December  14).  Iraq  War  in  Figures.  Kirkup,  J.  (2012,  May  19).  Afghan  War  Will  Costs  British   Taxpayers  £20  billion  by  Time  Mission  is  Complete.  The  Telegraph.     76  Brück,  T.,  de  Groot,  O.  J.,  &  Schneider,  F.  (2011,  November).  The  Economic  Costs  of  the  German  Participation   in  the  Afghanistan  War.  Journal  of  Peace  Research,  48(6),  793-­‐‑805.   19 countries.     While   the   US   does   provide   some   money   to   the   victims   of   war   in   Pakistan   through   USAID   Civilian   Victim   Support   Program   grants,   local   governments   in   Pakistan   —   in   Balochistan   and   Khyber   Paktunkhwa   —   provide   assistance   to   civilian   victims   of   conflict   and   terrorism.77         In   addition,   there   is   a   budgetary   burden   to   international   institutions   involved   in   humanitarian  assistance  in  the  war  zones,  which  is  shared  broadly  by  many  of  the  world's   governments.   This   burden   includes   the   costs   of   work   by   UN   agencies,   non-­‐‑governmental   organizations,  humanitarian  organizations  such  as  the  International  Committee  for  the  Red   Cross   and   Handicap   International,   and   regional   governments   that   care   for   refugees   and   displaced  people  in  the  war  zones.           Conclusion:  Pre-­‐‑War  Optimism  about  Costs  and  the  $4.78  Trillion-­‐‑Plus  Reality     By  my  conservative  estimate,  the  wars  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  have  cost  and  will  cost   more   than   $4.78   trillion,   including   future   veterans’   care   and   the   President's   request   for   FY2017   Overseas   Contingency   Operations,   but   not   including   all   future   interest   on   debt   associated  with  the  wars.    This  will  likely  be  many  trillions  of  dollars.  And  as  explained  earlier,   this  paper’s  estimate  does  not  include  all  the  costs  of  the  war  for  which  it  is  difficult  to  come   to   a   reasonable   estimate   or   which   are   smaller   and   scattered   in   various   federal   and   state   budgets.    For  example,  as  noted  above,  I  have  not  included  the  various  costs  of  veterans’  care   that  have  fallen  to  state  and  local  governments  or  other  costs  externalized  to  military  families   and  Americans  more  generally.    Nor  have  I  estimated  the  macro-­‐‑economic  consequences  of   the  wars.     In  the  previous  version  of  this  paper,  I  assumed  65  percent  of  the  costs  of  veterans’   care  and  disability  expenses  could  be  attributed  to  the  Iraq  war.78      The  long  duration  of  these   wars,  and  the  fact  that  they  occurred  simultaneously,  involving  many  of  the  same  personnel   and   equipment,   has   meant   that   their   expenses   and   future   costs   related   to   personnel   are   increasingly   difficult   to   disaggregate.   In   addition,   Overseas   Contingency   Operations   are   essentially   global   in   scope   —   occurring   in   Africa,   the   Americas,   Europe   and   Asian   and   the   Pacific.  While  more  soldiers  served  in  Iraq,  many  soldiers  have  served  multiple  deployments   in  both  war  zones.  Further,  the  trauma  and  injury  soldiers  experience  is  cumulative  and  the   VA  does  not  track  injuries  by  war  zone,  but  by  time  of  service.79     Similarly,  equipment  was                                                                                                               77  See  Open  Society  Foundations.  (2014).  After  the  Dead  are  Counted:  US  and  Pakistani  Responsibilities  for   Victims  of  Drone  Strikes,  pp.  22-­‐‑23.     78  The  peak  number  of  troops  deployed  in  Iraq  was  170,000  soldiers  in  2007  and  about  32,000  have  been   reported  as  wounded  in  action  in  Iraq.  US  troop  levels  in  Afghanistan  peaked  at  about  101,000  in  2011  and  so   far  more  than  19,000  have  been  wounded  in  action  as  of  January  2014.    In  the  past  two  years,  the  severity  of   the  injuries  of  troops  returning  from  Afghanistan  has  grown.    See  Lutz,  C.  (2013,  February  21).  US  and  Coalition   Casualties  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  Costs  of  War;  and  Fischer,  H.  (2015,  August  7).  A  Guide  to  US  Military   Casualty  Statistics:  Operations  Freedom's  Sentinel,  Operation  Inherent  Resolve,  Operation  New  Dawn,  Operation   Iraqi  Freedom,  and  Operation  Enduring  Freedom,  p.  1.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service.   79  Linda  Bilmes  also  argues  that  there  is  no  "reasonable  way  to  divide  costs."  Personal  communication,  June  20,   2014.         20 often  used  in  both  major  war  zones,  so  the  costs  to  repair  and  replace  equipment  may  not  be   separable  by  war  zone  at  the  aggregate  level.    Further,  soldier's  pay,  death  gratuity  benefits   and  health  care  costs  rose  for  the  entire  military,  regardless  of  whether  they  were  deployed   to   a   war   zone. 80     Nonetheless,   an   estimate   of   the   proportion   of   total   costs   that   could   be   attributed   to   each   war   zone,   based   on   the   proportion   OCO   spending   through   FY2016,   attributes   less   than   1%   of   total   costs   to   the   war   in   Syria,   about   45%   to   the   war   in   Afghanistan/Pakistan,  and  46%  to  the  Iraq  war.    Spending  on  other  OCO  accounts  for  about   7%  of  the  total  spending.     This  paper’s  estimate  of  current  and  future  costs  of  war  greatly  exceeds  pre-­‐‑war  and   early   estimates.   Indeed,   optimistic   assumptions   and   a   tendency   to   underestimate   and   undercount   war   costs   have,   from   the   beginning,   been   characteristic   of   the   estimates   of   the   budgetary  costs  and  the  fiscal  consequences  of  these  wars.         Nowhere   is   this   clearer   than   estimates   of   the   budgetary   costs   of   the   Iraq   war.   In   mid-­‐‑ September  2002  Lawrence  Lindsey,  then  President  Bush's  chief  economic  adviser,  estimated   that   the   "upper   bound"   costs   of   war   against   Iraq   would   be   $100   to   $200   billion.   Overall,   Lindsey  suggested  however  that,  "The  successful  prosecution  of  the  war  would  be  good  for   the   economy." 81     On   31   December   2002,   Mitch   Daniels,   then   the   director   of   the   Office   of   Management  and  Budget  estimated  that  the  costs  of  war  with  Iraq  would  be  $50  to  60  billion.82       Daniels   suggested   that   Lindsay's   estimates   were   much   too   high,   although   neither   official   provided   details   for   the   basis   of   their   estimates.   There   were   other   pre-­‐‑war   estimates   for   the   costs  of  war  in  Iraq.    For  instance,  in  September  2002,  US  House  of  Representatives  Budget   Committee  Democratic  staff  estimated  costs  of  $48  to  60  billion,  assuming  30  to  60  days  of   combat  and  a  2½  month  occupation.83     The  headline  in  The  Wall  Street  Journal  covering  the   Congressional   estimate   read,   "Lindsey   Overestimated   Costs   of   Iraq   War,   Democrats   Say."84   Later  in  2002,  Yale  economist  William  Nordhaus  suggested  a  nearly  $2  trillion  cost  for  the  Iraq   war  if  the  war  were  to  be  protracted  and  difficult.  He  argued  while  the  main  component  of   costs   could   be   higher   oil   prices   ($778   billion),   a   long   war   could   cost   $140   billion   in   direct   military   spending   and   another   $615   billion   to   pay   for   occupation,   peacekeeping,   reconstruction  and  nation-­‐‑building,  and  humanitarian  assistance.85    To  this,  Nordhaus  added   an  estimated  $391  billion  in  negative  macroeconomic  consequences.  The  most  comprehensive   estimate   of   the   long-­‐‑term   budgetary   costs   of   both   wars   —   including   direct   and   indirect                                                                                                               80  For  instance,  Congress  increased  the  Death  Gratuity  from  $12,000  to  100,000  for  all  active  duty  military   personnel  in  2005,  effective  starting  in  FY2006.    See  Department  of  Defense.  (2008).  Death  Gratuity.  Death   gratuities  that  occur  as  a  result  of  specific  operations  are  charged  to  that  OCO  account.     81  Lindsey,  quoted  in  Davis,  B.  (2002,  September  16).  Bush  Economic  Aid  Says  the  Cost  of  Iraq  War  May  Top   $100  Billion.  The  Wall  Street  Journal.   82  Bumiller,  E.  (2002,  December  31).  Threats  and  Responses:  The  Cost;  White  House  Cuts  Estimates  of  Cost  of   War  with  Iraq.  The  New  York  Times.   83  House  Budget  Committee.  (2002,  September  23).  Assessing  the  Costs  of  Military  Action  Against  Iraq:  Using   Desert  Shield/Desert  Storm  as  Basis  for  Estimates.     84  Davis,  B.  (2002,  September  24).  Lindsey  Overestimated  Costs  of  Iraq  War,  Democrats  Say.  The  Wall  Street   Journal. 85  Nordhaus,  W.  D.  (2002).  The  Economic  Consequences  of  a  War  with  Iraq.  In  American  Academy  of  Arts  and   Sciences  (Ed.),  War  with  Iraq,  Costs,  Consequences,  and  Alternatives  (51-­‐‑86).  Cambridge:  American  Academy  of   Arts  and  Sciences.     21 spending  and  other  economic  effects  —  is  The  Three  Trillion  Dollar  War  by  Joseph  E.  Stiglitz   and  Linda  J.  Bilmes.86  The  Stiglitz-­‐‑Bilmes  estimate  was  conservative  in  many  respects.      Not   including  the  increased  burden  to  our  national  debt,  the  costs  of  war  have  exceeded  even  their   cautious  estimates.     Table  5  summarizes  the  information  in  this  paper.  It  is  a  more  detailed  version  of  Table   1,  including  a  breakdown  of  categories  of  costs  that  make  the  post-­‐‑9/11  wars  so  expensive,  at   more  than  $4.79  trillion  current  dollars.       Table  5.  Detailed  Summary  Estimate  of  Costs  to  Date  and  Future  Costs  of  Wars87     Appropriations  and  Expenditures  FY2001-­‐‑FY2016  Costs   $Billion   1,630   Total  Department  of  Defense,  all  OCO   112   Total  State  Department  and  US/AID,  all  OCO   733   Estimated  additions  to  the  Pentagon  "base"  budget   213   Veterans’  total  medical  and  disability  care   548   Additions  to  Homeland  Security     88 453   Interest  on  Pentagon  War  Appropriations   Subtotal  FY2001-­‐‑FY2016  Costs   3,689   Estimates  of  Future  Spending     Department  of  Defense,  all  OCO,  request  for  FY201789   60   6   State  Department/USAID,  all  OCO,  request  for  FY2017   Homeland  Security  spending  for  prevention  and  response  to  terrorism,   request  for  FY2017   37   1,000   Future  Veterans'  costs  for  medical  and  disability,  FY2016-­‐‑2053   Subtotal  Future  War-­‐‑Related  Spending  (not  including  future  increases  to   1,101   Pentagon  base  budget)   Total  Costs  to  Date  and  Estimated  Future  Federal  Budget  Costs   4,792   Plus  additional   Cumulative  Interest  through  2053  on  war  appropriations  through   FY201390   >7,900                                                                                                                 86  Stiglitz,  J.  E.,  &  Bilmes,  L.  J.  (2008).  The  Three  Trillion  Dollar  War:  The  True  Costs  of  the  Iraq  Conflict.  New  York:   Norton.   87  Using  current  dollar  budget  figures,  rounded  to  the  nearest  $billion.       88  As  estimated  by  Ryan  Edwards,  and  rounded  to  the  nearest  $100  billion.  See  Edwards,  R.  D.  (2011,  June).   Post-­‐‑9/11  War  Spending,  Debt,  and  the  Macroeconomy.  Costs  of  War.   89  The  President's  requested  OCO  budget  for  FY2017.  Congress  has  on  occasion  appropriated  more  than   requested  for  OCOs. 90  As  estimated  by  Ryan  Edwards,  and  rounded  to  the  nearest  $100  billion.  See  Edwards,  R.  D.  (2011,  June).   Post-­‐‑9/11  War  Spending,  Debt,  and  the  Macroeconomy.  Costs  of  War.  As  noted  above,  war  appropriations  for   Iraq  and  Afghanistan  were  not  funded  with  new  taxes,  but  by  borrowing.  This  adds  interest  costs  to  war   spending,  specifically,  the  interest  costs  already  paid,  and  future  interest  costs.    The  severity  of  the  burden  of   war-­‐‑related  interest  payments  will  depend  on  many  factors,  not  least  the  overall  future  health  of  the  US   economy,  interest  rates,  government  fiscal  policy,  and  national  saving.     22