

Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016

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July 29, 2016

Afghanistan and Pakistan have been engaged in their current wars for nearly 15 years, and the cost in human lives and health has been enormous: the combined death toll is 173,000 dead and more than 183,000 seriously wounded. The wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan remain interrelated, not least because the border is porous between the two countries, but also because the United States has put resources into the fighting on both sides of that border. On 6 July 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that the planned reductions of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be delayed. He said, "I strongly believe that it is in our national security interest, especially after all the blood and treasure we've invested in Afghanistan over the years, that we give our Afghan partners the very best opportunity to succeed."² The war has cost the United States more than \$800 billion in direct appropriations to the State Department and Department of Defense.³ As the Costs of War project has documented, there are many other economic costs in the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴

This paper focuses on the wars' deaths and injuries. Over the past nearly 15 years, approximately 111,000 people have been killed and more than 116,000 people have been injured in the war in Afghanistan. Of these, more than 31,000 of the dead are Afghan civilians. The war in Pakistan, which began as Al Qaeda and the Taliban fled from Afghanistan into the northwest region of Pakistan in 2001, has caused almost 62,000 deaths and an additional 67,000 injuries. *These numbers are approximations based on the reporting of several sources. The focus in this report is on direct deaths and injuries caused by wartime violence. Indirect deaths, due to the effects of war damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, and usually more numerous than direct deaths, are discussed elsewhere.*⁵

This short update summarizes the pattern of killing since 2001, with an emphasis on the most recent years. In May 2015, the Costs of War Project estimated the combined death toll in the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict zone due to direct violence to be 149,000 people.⁶ Since that report, the intensity of the war in each

country has changed: in Afghanistan, the war is becoming more intense, and continues to kill many Afghan civilians; in Pakistan, violence, especially toward civilians, diminished in 2015.

Although it is premature to conclude that 2016 will be more violent than 2015 in both countries, figures from the first 6 months of 2016 suggest that the trend in increased death and injury continues in Afghanistan, and that after a lull in 2015, Pakistan has become increasingly violent in the first half of 2016.

The Human Toll in Afghanistan

Although the US government plans to complete the withdrawal of its forces as the war winds down, the war in Afghanistan is arguably as intense as ever, especially in the South, near the border with Pakistan, and the Obama Administration has recently reduced the pace of US withdrawal. In its *Quarterly Report* to the US Congress in late April 2016, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) noted what Afghans themselves have highlighted: the security situation has deteriorated. The Afghan government controlled 70.5 percent of the country according to that report. About 23 percent of the territory was contested or "at risk", and about 6 percent is controlled by the Taliban or other insurgents.⁷ In its next *Quarterly Report*, released on 30 July 2016, SIGAR acknowledged that the area under Afghan government control had declined by about 5 percent.⁸ Violence occurs even in the areas "controlled" by the government. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documented 117,976 people who fled their homes, newly displaced, in Afghanistan from 1 January to 30 April of 2016 in 24 of 34 provinces.⁹ In this context, the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned that 2016 in Afghanistan will see "more intense fighting . . . continuing a decade long trend of deteriorating security."¹⁰ The data detailed here show that in the past ten years, the violence in Afghanistan has in fact intensified, rather than declined.


Afghan Civilian Death

More than 31,000 civilians have been killed in direct violence in Afghanistan since the 7 October 2001 invasion by the United States. But this number is necessarily an estimate, since there were long periods in the war when there was little or no counting of civilians killed or injured as a consequence of the fighting.

The International Security Force (ISAF) established the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell in 2008, which became the Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team in 2011. ISAF has made a database of civilian death and injury, but it has not consistently made the data public. The data is released to soldiers and commanders so that they can learn from incidents where civilians have been harmed.¹¹ In 2007, when the war began to intensify, the Human Rights arm of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) began to systematically record casualties in

Afghanistan. In 2008 UNAMA began to publish, summary counts and analyses of the civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan's war. UNAMA has also systematically attempted to make attributions of responsibility for the deaths and injuries. Other non-governmental organizations track civilian harm, but UNAMA reports are the most comprehensive data on the impact of war on civilians in Afghanistan.¹² UNAMA endeavors to investigate every incident and is also largely transparent about its reports' methods. UNAMA acknowledges uncertainty and that they "may be under-reporting civilian casualties given limitations inherent in the operating environment."¹³ UNAMA excludes in its count of casualties the individuals for whom their combatant/non-combatant status is uncertain.¹⁴

Figure 1. Number of Civilians Killed in Afghanistan from 2001 to through 2015¹⁵



In 2007, UNAMA reported that 41 percent of the direct violent civilian deaths in Afghanistan could be attributed to pro-government forces; that percentage gradually declined to a low of 12 percent in 2012 and 2013. Recently, however, that trend has reversed. The percentage of civilians killed by pro-government forces (including international and Afghan security forces) increased to 16 and 18 percent, respectively, in 2014 and 2015. Moreover, as fighting intensifies, it is increasingly difficult to say who has killed the persons confirmed as civilians, as we can see by the greater share of civilian casualties for which the UNAMA is unable to make an attribution. In 2008, about 6 percent of civilian deaths were not attributed to a party to the conflict; in 2015, UNAMA could not make an attribution in about 14 percent of the civilian deaths. Since 2007, the majority of civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan are the victims of insurgents or militant forces.

Figure 2. UNAMA Attribution of Civilian Death from 2007-2015¹⁶





Figure 3. Patterns of Civilian Killing in Afghanistan, 2009-2015¹⁷




The number and proportion of civilians killed by ground engagement is growing, as is the number of people killed by unexploded ordinance, the "explosive remnants of war." In 2014, 124 civilians were killed by ERW; in 2015, that number had more than tripled, to 431 civilians killed by ERW.¹⁸ Many of the explosive remnants of war date back to the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) notes that a "new challenge" has recently emerged: the firing ranges used by NATO/ISAF during their training operations. After the trainings the explosive remnants of heavy weapons remain on the ground in the firing ranges, endangering surrounding communities. "From 2009 to December 2014, MACCA recorded 130 casualties resulting from ERW incidents in these firing

ranges."¹⁹ In early 2016, MACCA identified, in total, more than 4,000 mine/ERW hazards of all types that need to be removed before they cause harm.²⁰

In the late 2000s, when air strikes were killing an increasing number of civilians, the UN and other humanitarian organizations urged ISAF to change their rules of engagement. More restrictive rules for close air support strikes resulted in a decrease in the number of civilians killed in airstrikes, per year, starting in mid-2009. UNAMA notes that these gains made in curtailing injury and death were not maintained in 2015. The UN attributed 1,766 civilian deaths to aerial operations by Pro-Government forces from 2008 to 2015 out of a total of 4,258 deaths attributed to Pro-Government forces. Some of the increase in civilian death in 2015 may be due to the fact that Afghans are now flying more of their own missions, and may be using less stringent rules of engagement and more "dumb", unguided, gravity bombs.²¹


Figure 4. Afghan Civilian Deaths Due to Aerial Operations and All Other Pro-Government Operations²²



Afghan Civilian Injuries

More than 40,000 Afghan civilians have been seriously injured since the US invasion in 2001, although the number is difficult to know with any precision. UNAMA counts more than 40,900 Afghan civilian injuries since January 2009.²³

Figure 5. Afghan Civilians Killed and Injured from 2009-2015²⁴



Traumatic amputations constitute a significant burden of the war for Afghan civilians. Of the more than 9,200 new patients that the International Committee of the Red Cross registered in 2015 for limb fitting and physical rehabilitation, 1,261 were amputees. The Red Cross also assisted more than 1,600 people with spinal cord injuries in 2015.²⁵ In 2015 Handicap International assisted more than 7,000 new patients. Of those, about 20 percent — 1,400 people — had lower limb amputations that were "a result of land mines, improvised explosive devices and other weapons."²⁶

Combatant Death and Injury in Afghanistan

The United States has reduced its armed forces in Afghanistan since May 2014 from 33,000 to 9,800, but despite the drawdown, 22 US soldiers other Department of Defense (DOD) personnel have died since January 2015.

All told, over the course of the war, 2,371 US military and DOD civilian personnel have been killed in Afghanistan and "other locations" associated with the war.²⁷ In addition, than 1,100 allied troops have been killed in the war, with the British forces comprising the largest share of those losses.²⁸


U.S. fatalities could have been much higher. The introduction of body armor for all soldiers, and Kevlar helmets may have saved many lives.²⁹ Advances in battlefield medicine, and the reduction in evacuation times, have led to higher survival rates of wounded soldiers who would have otherwise have likely died in the field. For example, traumatic amputations have, in previous eras, often led to death. Of the more than 20,000 U.S. soldiers who were injured from 2001 to mid 2015, 833 had major limb amputations.³⁰

Afghan military, police and other security forces have grown in number. Afghan forces thus bear an increasing share of the combat, and are now more exposed to militant attacks. Insurgents are killing Afghan National Army and Police in growing numbers, with international forces suffering fewer casualties as Afghans take the lead in fighting.

Contractors continue to work for the US in Afghanistan and perform functions that the US and allied military have traditionally performed. The US Department of Labor (DOL) reports deaths and sick days. Catherine Lutz of Brown University and the Costs of War has reported that civilian contractors who are not US citizens are often not counted in the DOL statistics on contractor deaths. This year, the Costs of War project reports two categories of contractor deaths — the DOL number and Lutz's estimate of the additional number of contractors killed who were not reported in the DOL statistics. Lutz estimates that in addition to the total number of more than 1,600 contractors killed identified by the DOL,³¹ nearly 1,900 additional contractors were killed from 2001-2015.³²

There are no reliable sources for the number of militants killed since 2001. In my previous report, I estimated that approximately 35,000 Taliban and other militants had been killed between 2001 and 2014. Last year, press reports chronicled the deaths of hundreds of militants in Afghanistan. And this year, the U.S. announced that it had killed the head of the Taliban, Mullah Mansur in May 2016.³³ But the press does not regularly report on insurgent fatalities, injuries, and arrests. The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), on the other hand, reports the number of militants killed, wounded and arrested in individual press releases. Adding the numbers in 2015, the MOD reported more than 7,137 insurgents killed, about 4,000 wounded, and an additional 758 insurgents were reported to have been arrested. In some press releases, the reports use phrases like "numbers" killed or "dozens" wounded: in those cases, I count 3 for "numbers" and 24 for "dozens". Adding those numbers, perhaps as many as 7,212 insurgents were killed, and 4,397 were wounded by the Afghan military in 2015.³⁴ Phrases like "numbers" or "dozens" raise flags about the veracity, or at least precision of Afghan MOD press releases. The Afghan military has an incentive to inflate the numbers of insurgents they kill and injure. Further, some of the people the Afghan MOD reports as militants killed may be civilians since UNAMA reports civilians killed by Afghan security forces, but the Afghan Ministry of Defense press releases do not include harm to civilians.

Figure 6. Coalition Military and Afghan Security Force Deaths, 2001-2015³⁵



The US estimated the total insurgent force in Afghanistan in early 2016 was between 20,000 and 40,000 fighters.³⁶ More recently, the US has acknowledged that militant forces were resurgent in some parts of Afghanistan.³⁷ In 2008, there were an estimated 5,000-20,000 Taliban and an additional 2,000 other militants in Afghanistan.³⁸ In 2005, there were an estimated 2,000-10,000 fighters in the Taliban.³⁹ If 42,000 militants have been killed and at least 19,000 wounded since 2001, and the United States estimates that there are between 20,000 and 40,000 militants in 2016, then the earlier estimates of the strength of the Taliban and associated fighters were quite wrong, and/or the insurgency is growing faster than militants can be killed, wounded or captured.⁴⁰ It is also possible that some of people the US and Afghan forces have described as insurgents killed and wounded are actually civilians.

Humanitarian Workers and Journalists Killed

Those who try to help the people affected by the war have also been targeted for violent attacks and intimidation. The ICRC recorded a 50 percent increase in the number of violent incidents affecting hospital staff and facilities in 2015.⁴¹ Since the start of the war, 382 humanitarian workers have been killed (45 of those deaths occurred last year) and 299 humanitarian workers have been injured in Afghanistan.⁴² By contrast, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), that profession appears to be in a less precarious position. The CPJ found that in 2014, three journalists were killed, where the motive could be confirmed, while they found that no journalists were killed for confirmed motives in 2015.⁴³ Costs of War uses the CPJ count, but there are other sources that record different numbers. An Afghan monitoring organization found that Afghan journalists faced continued "violence, threats, and intimidation" from mid March 2015 to mid March 2016, and records 10 deaths in that year.⁴⁴ The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, which includes both domestic and international journalists

and their interpreters, counts 32 journalists killed in Afghanistan from 2005 to mid 2016 — ten of these killings occurred in 2016 alone.⁴⁵

Displacement and Indirect Harm

Afghanistan has received more than 100,000 Pakistanis fleeing a military operation that began in North Waziristan in June 2014. In June 2016 Afghanistan had 1.4 million refugees inside its borders, and nearly 1 million Afghans were internally displaced. An additional 2.6 million Afghans are currently refugees in more than 70 countries. The largest number of Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan (1.5 million people), and Iran (nearly a million people).⁴⁶

Further, there is a toll in indirect death and illness due to the destruction of infrastructure and the hardships of displacement. For instance, when the *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) hospital in Kunduz was destroyed by international forces airstrike on 3 October 2015, not only were medical personnel and other civilians killed and injured, but the hospital itself was largely destroyed and remains closed.

The Increasing Lethality of the Afghanistan War in 2016

The Taliban have certainly followed up on their threat made in early 2016, to be more aggressive.⁴⁷ They have continued to attack vulnerable civilians and police recruits. Indeed, the most recent reports by UNAMA indicate that violence is growing in Afghanistan, with antigovernment forces killing the majority of civilians. In the first quarter of 2016, compared to the same period in 2015, there was an overall 2 percent increase in the total number of civilians killed and injured.⁴⁸

Summary of Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan

Table 1. Estimate of Afghans Killed and Injured Directly in War, 2001- 2016

	Killed	Wounded*
Afghan Civilians 2001-2015	29,818	37,412
Afghan Civilians Jan-June 2016	1,601	3,565
Afghan Military and Police	30,470	17,000
Taliban and Other Militants	42,100	19,000
US Forces (through 26 July 2016)	2,371	20,179
US Allies (through 26 July 2016)	1,136	3,800**
Contractors Reported by US DOL	1,650	15,348
Unreported Contractor Estimate	1,890	unknown
NGO Humanitarian Workers	382	299
Journalists	24	unknown
Total	111,442	116,603

*Incomplete

**Only including UK, Canadian, French and German wounded, through 2014

The Human Toll in Pakistan

Pakistan remains a hot, albeit underreported, war zone. It is underreported partially because the news media have been targeted for killings by both militants and security forces, and because the Pakistani government controls journalists' access. Thus, observers often do not agree on the basic indicators of the war, including a disagreement on the number of journalists killed in Pakistan. The Committee to Protect Journalists counts 53 journalists killed in Pakistan since 2001.⁴⁹ UNESCO counts 58 journalists killed from 2001 to mid 2016.⁵⁰

Despite uncertainty and opacity, the total number of people killed in 2015 in Pakistan was lower than in any single previous year since 2007. I estimate that the war in Pakistan, which began as Al Qaeda and the Taliban fled from Afghanistan into the northwest region of Pakistan in 2001, has directly caused about 62,000 violent deaths and an additional 67,000 injuries from 2001 through 2015. The downward trend in civilian death in Pakistan during 2015 is evident in a number of areas, including US drone strikes, militant suicide attacks, and Pakistani military operations. However, in early 2016, the lethality of the war was on the rise.

US Drone Strikes

The US targeted killing counterterrorism strike program remains largely secret, even after the 1 July 2016 release of summary data from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. The U.S. figures for all deaths in U.S. counterterrorism strikes for 20 January 2009 to 31 December 2015 in areas "outside active hostilities" — which includes all drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia — totaled 2,372 – 2,581 combatants and 64 to 116 noncombatants. These figures were not disaggregated by individual war zones and the Obama administration acknowledged that their numbers for all noncombatant deaths in counterterrorism strikes were lower than non-governmental assessments, because, they said, they have access to "information that is generally unavailable to nongovernmental organizations."⁵¹

It is possible, however, using open non-governmental sources, to assess the general trends, although there is continuing disagreement among these sources. For instance, the annual number of drone strikes conducted by the US in Pakistan has declined. Nearly all observers conclude that the US killed many fewer people by drone strikes in 2015 than in 2014. The sources estimate of the total individuals killed range between about 2,700 and 3,500. Sources also vary widely in their estimate of the number of civilians killed in the strikes. Not including the recently released Obama administration figures which does not disaggregate by war zone, the lowest estimate of civilians killed by US drone strikes in Pakistan through 2015, made by the conservative *Long War Journal*, is 158 civilians. By contrast, Pakistan Body Count reports in excess of 2,600 civilians killed of the more than 3,500 people it estimates have been killed by drones.

Table 2. Estimates of the Number of Civilians Killed by Drone Strikes in Pakistan through 2015⁵²


Source	Civilians Killed	Total Number of People Killed	% Civilians Killed
TBIJ Min	417	2,708	15%
TBIJ MAX	960	3,922	24%
LWJ	158	2,948	5%
NAF High	315	3,045	10%
PBC Max	2,657	3,548	75%

Sources: TBIJ: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism; LWJ: Long War Journal; NAF: New America Foundation; PBC: Pakistan Body Count.

Militant Suicide Attacks on Civilians


Militant activity decreased overall in Pakistan during 2015. Specifically, both South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and Pakistan Body Count (PBC) find that militants conducted fewer suicide attacks in 2015 than at any time since 2006.

Figure 7. SATP and PBC Counts of Militant Suicide Attacks 2002 - 1 July 2016⁵³



However, it may be that the number of attacks will be higher in 2016 than 2015 if the pace of activity in the first few months of 2016 is an indication. It also appears that the numbers killed and injured in suicide attacks have been declining for a number of years, although again, if the pattern established in the first six months of 2016 holds, there will be a rise in the number of people killed and injured in suicide attacks in 2016 as compared to 2014 and 2015.


Figure 8. Number of People Killed and Injured in Militant Suicide Attacks, in Pakistan, 2002-June 2016⁵⁴



Pakistani Operations that Harm Civilians

Thousands of civilians have been killed by the Pakistani military, paramilitary and police forces during "operational attacks" to kill and capture militants. But, although the Pakistani military has continued to search for and attack militants in the northwest region of Pakistan, the number of civilians injured and killed in these operational attacks declined in 2015.

Figure 9. Civilian Casualties in Attacks by Pakistani Forces, 2007-2015⁵⁵




Pakistani military operational attacks also cause civilians to flee their homes or become internally displaced. For example, on 15 June 2014, Pakistan began an offensive against militants, its Operation Zarb e-Azb. In December 2015, Lt. General

Asim Bajwa of the Pakistani military claimed that his forces had killed 3,400 militants after 18 months of this operation.⁵⁶ Operation Zarb e-Azb also caused many Pakistanis to flee North Waziristan and even after operations were suspended, it was difficult for Pakistani civilians to return to their homes. *Al Jazeera* reported that of the approximately 1 million people displaced by Operation Zarb e Azb since June 2014, most had been unable to return by June 2015, despite government promises that the area had been cleared of militants.⁵⁷

US Support of Pakistani Military Spending

While the US is not directly involved in the majority of the fighting in Pakistan, the US has trained Pakistani military forces, subsidized its war against militants, and reimbursed Pakistan for its support of US operations in Afghanistan. The US has provided Pakistan about \$22 billion since 2001 in Coalition Support Funds, a form of reimbursement for Pakistan's assistance in the war in Afghanistan, and military assistance. But the portion of Pakistani military spending that comes from US military assistance and coalition support funds has declined in the past two years.

Figure 10. Trends in Percent of Pakistan's Military Budget from U.S. Military Aid and Reimbursement, 2001-2015⁵⁸



The US also uses contractors in Pakistan. Catherine Lutz estimates that in addition to the total number of more than 42 contractors killed in Pakistan reported by the US DOL, 48 additional contractors were killed from 2001-2015.⁵⁹

Displacement and Indirect Harm

Although the war in Pakistan was less intense during 2015, there were nearly a million people internally displaced in early 2016. In addition, Pakistan was home to more than 1.5 million Afghan refugees in early 2016.⁶⁰ I have made no estimate of the number of civilians who were killed indirectly by the war, although that number is likely larger than those killed directly.

Summary of Deaths and Injuries in Pakistan

Table 3. Estimated Total Direct Death and Injury in Pakistan, 2001- June 2016⁶¹

	Killed	Wounded
Pakistani Civilians	22,100	40,792
Pakistani Security Forces	8,214	14,583
Taliban and Other Militants	31,000	11,415
Contractors Reported by US DOL	42	134
Unreported Contractor Estimate	48	unknown
NGO Humanitarian Workers	92	87
Journalists	53	unknown
Total	61,549	67,011

Conclusion

We have much more to do to understand the human toll of the long wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan and their interrelationship. There are gaps in the counting of casualties, and likely some manipulation of the official reports of the numbers killed and injured. For instance, although UNAMA reports that the Afghan National Army has killed and wounded civilians in its operations, the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan reports insurgents killed and wounded in operations, but does not release reports of the number of civilians killed. Nor does the Afghan Ministry of Defense note the numbers of their own forces wounded in their attacks on militants. Further, the US still does not report its drone strikes in Pakistan, nor provide detailed information about the process of the strikes, estimates of civilian casualties, or analysis of the effects of the strikes on surviving civilians. Further, we still know too little about the indirect effects of the wars on long-term health and welfare.⁶²

Despite these areas of uncertainty, there is no disputing the fact that the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to be devastating for civilians. After nearly fifteen years of war, the combined death toll in the Afghanistan and Pakistan war zone is nearly 173,000 dead and more than 183,000 seriously wounded. The first 6 months of 2016 indicate that there is as much or more war related violence in Afghanistan as in 2015. And, unfortunately, unless the fighting in Afghanistan diminishes, the increased intensity of fighting in Afghanistan will likely spill over into Pakistan.

Endnotes

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- ¹ Neta C. Crawford is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Co-Director of the Costs of War project.
- ² Obama quoted in Ryan, M., & DeYoung, K. (2016, July 6). Obama Alters Afghanistan Exit Plan Once More, Will Leave 8,400 Troops. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com>
- ³ These are the amounts appropriated by the Congress to the Departments of State and Defense since 2001. Additional economic costs of this war are associated with additional Pentagon and Homeland Security spending, the costs of caring for veterans, and interest on borrowing to pay for the war.
- ⁴ See the following Costs of War papers on economic costs to the U.S.: Crawford, N.C. (2014, June 25). US Costs of Wars Through 2014: \$4.4 Trillion and Counting: Summary of Costs for the U.S. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2014/US%20Costs%20of%20Wars%20through%202014.pdf>; Garrett-Peltier, H. (2011, June 13). The Job Opportunity Cost of War. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/Job%20Opportunity%20Cost%20of%20War.pdf>; Lattanzi-Silveus, L. (2015, January 1). Costs of the War in Afghanistan and Iraq for the State of Rhode Island. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/Costs%20of%20the%20Wars%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Iraq%20for%20the%20State%20of%20Rhode%20Island.pdf>; Smith, B. (2015, January 3). The Cost of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans' Care to Texas. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/The%20Cost%20of%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan%20Veterans%20Care%20to%20Texas.pdf>
- ⁵ See Crawford, N.C. (2015, May 22). War Related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN.pdf>; Crawford, N.C. (2011, September). Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001-2011. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/Civilian%20Death%20and%20Injury%20in%20Afghanistan,%202001-2011.pdf>
- ⁶ See Crawford, N.C. (2015, May 22). War Related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014. Retrieved from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN.pdf>
- ⁷ United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2016, April 30). *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, p. 95. Retrieved from <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-04-30qr.pdf>
- ⁸ United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2016, July 30). *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, p. 86. Retrieved from <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-07-30qr.pdf>
- ⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2016, May 15). *Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements*. Retrieved from https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/afg_conflict_idps_2016_jan_apr_s_napshot_20160515.pdf
- ¹⁰ Clapper, J.R. (2016, February 9). *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*, p. 26. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf
- ¹¹ For a history and analysis of the ISAF data see Keene, J. (2014). *Civilian Harm Tracking: Analysis of ISAF Efforts in Afghanistan*. New York, NY: Center for Civilians in Conflict; Bohannon, J. (2011, March). Counting the Dead in Afghanistan. *Science*, 331, 1256-1260.
- ¹² Others who track harm to civilians in Afghanistan include Handicap International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Human Rights Watch.
- ¹³ UNAMA. (2016, February). *Afghanistan Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, p. ii. Kabul: Author
- ¹⁴ "Where UNAMA is not satisfied with information concerning an incident, it will not be considered

verified nor will unverified incidents be reported... Where information is unclear, conclusions will not be drawn until more satisfactory evidence is obtained, or the case will be closed without conclusion and will not be included in the statistical reporting. In some incidents, the civilian status of the reported victims cannot be conclusively established or is disputed. In such cases, UNAMA is guided by the applicable norms of international humanitarian law and does not presume fighting-age males are either civilians or fighters. Rather, such claims are assessed and documented based upon the facts available on the incident in question." UNAMA. (2016, February). *Afghanistan Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, p. i. Kabul: Author. See the discussion of Methodology in each UNAMA Annual Report.

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